Burma's relations with her eastern neighbours in the Konbaung period, 1752-1819. by Kyaw Thet, Maung
BURMA.1 S RELATIONS WITH IiER EASTERN 
NEIGHBOURS IN THE KONBAUNG PERIOD, 
1752 -  1819
by
Maung Kyaw Thet
Thesis submitted for the de'gree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in the University 
of London, 1950.
ProQuest Number: 10731211
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10731211
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Abstract of Thesis being submitted for the ^hD degree 
of the Univerlity of London*
Title of Thesis. Burma*s relations with her Eastern
Neighbours in the Konboung Period I752-I8I9.
The thesis i§ an attempt to portray Burma's foreign 
relations through Burmese eyes. The Burmese of the period 
regarded the glory of Buddhism as the dominant motive in 
both public and private life. The king was regarded as 
essential to this aim, and as by virtue of the general 
acceptance of the idea of successive reincarnations, the 
king could be regarded the most worthy contemporary Buddhist 
he was thereby fully invested with autocratic powers.
A tradition of great empdre, which, however mis­
taken, found great favour in the general Burmese mentality, 
made it necessary for the Konboung dynasty to embark on 
endless wars of aggrandisement, and this is mainly res­
ponsible for the nature of the relations Burma had with 
Siam and Laosuln this period. It was partly because of 
the Burmese attempt at the imposition of control over 
the Northern Lao states that caused the Shinese invasion.
The Siamese at the opening of our period lacked 
effective leadership, and the cumbersome and unsatisfactory 
nature of her administration, prevented the quick concentra­
tion of her forces of resistance, and the Eurmese were 
successful in the early stages.
China had old traditions of overlordship but the 
enforcement of recognition varied and was seldom as effective 
as in the far more accessible are<of Tonquin. The Burmese 
were a proud race and their kings would always attempt 
to beat off Chinese pretentions. They had always tried to, 
but sometimes unsuccessfully. *
The Chinese invasions diverted Burmese strength from 
Siam, and Siam under pressure of the threat of renewed 
aggression reorganised and revived , and from that time 
held its own with Burma. Soon the West came on the scene 
and relations between these countries became incidents in 
more significant pattern of European expansion in the Far East.
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INTRODUCTION
The years 1752-1819 in. the history of Burma cover
the period from the emergence of a new and virile
1Bvirmese dynasty, out of chaos, to the time when Europe ai 
enqpansion in the Ear East really "began to encroach on 
the traditional scene in Burma, Siam and China*
In the 1740s the Toungoo dynasty which had reached 
its zenith in the reign of the great emperor Bsyinnaung 
(1551-81) was fast declining in power and prestige.
1 . Konbaung Dynasty,
Naung Daw Gyi 
1760-65.
Maung Maung 
(7 days)
Alaungpaya 1752-
T
Hsinbyushin
 r
Bodawpaya
Singu
1776-82.
Bagyi Daw
1819-57
Tharrawaddy 
1857-46.
Pagan
1846-55
‘Mindon
1853-75
Thibaw
1875-35
The Manipuris were carrying fire and sword right up to 
the Irrawaddy; there was a rebel camp a few miles away 
from the capital. The Mons of the delta had risen in a 
great rebellion and setting up their capital at Pegu 
had begun raiding right up to Ava, and in 1752 
they had captured Ava and the Burmese king IVlaha Dhamma 
Yaza Dipat i while all this was going on U Aung Zeya a 
scion-of the local ruling family, a virile, fierce and 
a proper man, respected for his manly qualities by all 
the villages surrounding his ancestral village of Moksobo 
had proclaimed his faith in his destiny. Brushing aside 
ruthlessly all waverers and doubters he had first enrolled 
a small number of 68 picked men, then collecting more men, 
he1 had started to turn his village into a little fort - 
determined not to submit to the Mons • He massacred the 
first small detachment of Mons sent to administer the 
oath of allegiance, then ambushed the next, a larger 
force. Then they came back in their thousands, but they 
could not take his village, and one night he made a 
sortie, and sent them flying. The news of his stand 
and his courage spread, and men came pouring in. As 
his resistance went on from strength to strength, his 
followers snowballed and by the end of 1753 & Burmese 
king ruled once more over Ava. The king was Aungzeya, 
now Alaungpaya.
My decision to devote this thesis to the study of 
the foreign relations of the Konbaungzet Dynasty from 
1752-1 8 1 9, i.e. the period of its emergence, to the 
zenith of its power was taken largely because it is only 
in this period, owing to a variety of factors, that some 
materials which could stand up to the critical demands of 
an -English University, and would serve as a reliable 
check on the Burmese chronicle which I have used extensive 
ly to convey the atmosphere of Burma1 s relations with 
her neighbours, were available in some satisfactory 
quantity; but this period also offers certain ’brands 
and themes in Burmese history which apply throughout 
its known length; the wars with Siam, the struggles 
of the Mons to throw off the Burmese yoke, the competition 
with Siam for dominance over the Laos and the Chinese 
invasions.
1An earlier historian has quoted a Burmese 
Minister’s words to explain the intransigence and 
arrogance of the Burmese, by explaining that in Burma’s 
previous relations with her eastern neighbours, she had 
never met her match, and that she felt she could adopt 
the same sort of relations with the western powers, i.e.
1. H. Gougers Personal Narrative of Two Years
Imprisonment in Burmah, p.104.
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that she was totally ignorant of her relative power vis- 
a-vis Great Britain. This on examination must "be 
modified? for instance, the Burmese Embassies to 
Pekin left records of mileage, distance, military and 
economic strength, which judged hy present day U.N.E.S.O.C 
publication standards are of poor quality, 'but reading 
through them one can sense that for contemporary and 
especially Burmese palace purposes, they were adequate. 
There is also proof that the Burmese Oourt collected - 
and presumably studied, information about British 
relations with other nations; for example, the Treaty 
of Balta Liman (between the Ottoman Porte and Great 
Britain) was known to the Burmese. I have devoted much 
space to an examination of the Burmese palace system of 
administration with its concentration of policy-making 
in a very few individuals, for though the effect of the 
system and how it worked has been dealt with by con­
temporary Europeans, the evidence of the traditional 
conception of administration has not been used to 
explain the system. When one recollects that the 
Burmese court was sending embassies to the last 
independent powers of India for alliance against the 
British, it stands to reason that they did appreciate to
1 . J.B.R.S. Vol. XXX, p.345.
vsome extent the strength of the British, but were 
justifiably afraid of the future, and with a mixture of 
motives, well larded with optimism took steps to prevent 
the thing they feared, from coming to pass.
The period in question, on 'being examined for out­
standing new characteristics offers very poor results; 
the vitality of the idea of kingship can be observed 
in previous Burmese history; the kingly types, the 
courtly types, the military types, and the schemers are 
all of an old tradition and mould, and the only definite 
idea that one can deduce from one’s studies of these 
factors in this period, is that they stayed remarkably 
true to type. It tempts one to assume that the structure 
of society had become remarkably static; fcesh ideas 
were not originating, and though in the last stages of 
the monarchy one new idea, that of constitutional 
monarchy came from the West, even that was early over­
thrown.
To begin with her relation with her immediate 
Eastern neighbours, the Shan states; in this period, 
the idea of any danger to Burma emanating from the 
fragmented Shans never existed. The Shan states came 
definitely under Burmese suzerainty, and almost to the 
end, the nominal tokens of vassalage were given and 
accepted as a matter of course. Then there was the ebb
and flow of Burma’s hostile relations with Siam which 
illustrate the shortcomings of the Burmese administrative , 
system but do not deeply affect either country. The 
most remarkable feature of these relations is that neither 
side made any major imprint on the life and history of the 
other. In Burma’s relation with the Laos kingdom (what 
is now part of French Indo-Ohina) the same impression is 
obtained. However, in the last stages, Burma’s physical 
proximity to the Laos States was instrumental in bringing 
French and British colonial rivalries to a head.
It is in Burma’s relations with China that one finds 
features of greater, topical importance. "One is that 
Burma always has need of strong leadership. A decade 
before my period, the Burmese were being driven like 
sheep by the Mons; then again and again amazing trans­
formations came about under effective leaders. The 
institution of kingship offered advantages to Burma 
because it offered so many opportunities for effective 
leadership, but also because there were no checks over 
this power it was open to abuse. The second feature is 
the precise nature of Burma’s political relation with 
the Chinese. The Burmese quite often have a sense of 
proportion, and in their chronicles and even in con­
temporary reference still talk of larokmaw, nthe point
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from which the Chinese looked11, and the farokpyemin,
p
nthe king who ran away from the Chinese", but on the 
other hand they still remember in song and play,Anhwratha’ 
entry into Nanchao, and also that of Bayinnaung. 'there 
is no tradition of vassalage to the Chinese, the Chinese 
base their claims to suzerainty on four major points; 
long historical tradition, records kept of tribute 
received, the military situation of the Burmese in Siam 
during their invasions under Chien Lung and the Anglo- 
Chinese convention of 1886. there is a record of Pyb- 
musicians playing at the Emperor’s court in the 9th 
century, but the historical claim dates really from the 
tartar invasion of Kublai Khan. 'The Tuans were of 
course a Mongol dynasty, and were later expelled,but in an 
case there was never any effective occupation, or even 
nominal gesture of permanent vassalage made, the King 
of Pagan fleeing his capital and being poisoned by his 
son for being such a poltroon.
the second point, of records kept of tribute received 
for example the one in 1795, also gives Great Britain 
as one of the tribute bearers; it must therefore be 
kept in mind that Chinese views on the nature of the
1. A hill spur near Prome about 180 miles North of 
Bangoon on the Irrawaddy.
2. the last king of the Pagan Dynasty 1044—1287 who fled 
on the advance of the Mongol troops on his capital 
Pagan.
political relations which the various nations had with her,
were, to say the least, -unorthodox and unacceptable at
least to the Burmese. Thirdly, the military situation
of the Burmese in Siam in the final stages of Ohien Lung’s
invasions, when it is claimed that the Burmese position
in was so desperate that the Burmese King considered
it wise to ask for terms. 'the situation was never
sufficiently dangerous to Burma. Ayudhya had been taken
and destroyed in 1767 and Phya Talc Bin had not yet rallied
enough forces to threaten Burma itself, and- indeed never
did so. The idea that the Burmese could offer no
effective defence, and that the Chinese withdrav</als were
1only brought about by Supply difficulties, xs proved 
wrong by the map of the campaigns. 'The main Chinese 
supply bases, threats to which finally caused terms to be 
proposed were situated on the Shan Plateau proper, and*on 
the banks of the Irrawaddy, and not behind the mountains 
of Yunnan. Burmese defence was effective enough, and 
thorough enough, to make it absurd that any people, 
especially a proud people like the Burmese, ruled by a 
swollen-headed conquering dynasty like the Konbaungset, 
would have asked for terms of vassalage, after such a 
good military shov^ /ing. Fihally, the Ang 1 o-Chinese 
Convention of 1886 must be viewed In the light of the
1 . G.E.Harveys History of Burma - p*356-
summary way in which the agreement was dropped, a few 
years later and two Tai provinces handed to France.
The third feature that is of importance in Burma’s 
relation with China, is that alone among the countries of 
the East, large Chinese communities have not remained 
distinct entities in Burma. One needs only to examine 
and compare the position of the Chinese communities in 
Malaya and Thailand, with that of the Chinese in Burma 
to realize this fact. Possibly it is due to the ease 
with which Burmese women of good class and families marry 
Chinese, and of course the ease with which they, and 
their offspring are accepted by Burmese society; Sino- 
Burmese in the third generation do not generally speak 
Chinese. There is no large scale sending of remittances 
home to Chinese as elsewhere in Asia. These factors 
have some significance in view of the Communist triumph 
In Ohina today.
Finally, the thesis under my handling presents 
perhaps just a picture of traditional Burma. The French 
gunners of Alaungpaya and Bsinbyushin" might have affected 
some details but the picture essentially is of traditional 
Burma. There is in the period ebb and flow but no true 
development. We have to look at Burma’s relations with 
the West before we can find any.
The Position of the Burmese king in the 
period 1752 - 1819.
The foreign relations of any country are motivated and 
influenced by the political nature and conditions of the 
country concerned, plus the geographical and economic 
circumstances. Today the geographical factor in the 
foreign relations of a country has been considerably aff-- 
ected by the nature of modern communications. The relation 
of French Indo-Ohina, for example, can be far more intimate 
with metropolitan France than with Siam or Malaya, while 
those of Indonesia are also more intimate with the Nether­
lands than with Indo-China or Siam. In the period with 
which we are concerned however, and especially in Burma,, 
it was one of the major factors governing the nature of 
Burma1s- foreign relations. But since the Burmese were 
not a seafaring nation, after the cessation of Hindu 
colonisations about 800 years before our time, Burmese 
foreign relations were mostly confined to overland contacts. 
The difficxilties of the overland routes over the mountain 
barriers restricted the scope in significant measure. It 
will be seen that political conditions of Burma were at any
2one time, the most important factor governing relations.
A modern analogy can be seen in the East European totalit­
arian states today. Yugoslavia, which before the war had 
its economic relations largely dominated by the close 
proximity of the East European and German markets, has 
been put under an economic boycott by these same countries, 
and it is obvious that in the foreign relations of 
Yugoslavia today, the governing factor is politics. Sim­
ilarly, economic factors in Burmese history, were largely 
governed by the political condition of Burma and its 
neighbours.
The foreign relations of Burma with her Eastern 
neighbours i.e. the Chinese Empire under the Manchus, and th 
various states of North and south Siam which was under a 
single central authority only later in our period, and the 
Lao states which now form part of the French Union, show a 
curious survival of the sort of relations which existed 
between Cesare Borgia and the Italian Renaissance principal­
ities. They have a sort of barren and stagnant quality, 
and it is curious how only the successive encroachments and 
domination of the Western European countries, especially 
Great Britain and France slowed them down to a standstill.
Like the Italian Renaissance principalities, the 
prince was the human main spring of these foreign 
relationships, and though the human and physical resources
and, also, limitations of the respective countries qualified 
the action of the prince, he was still the most important 
factor, and our first task must be to enquire into the 
position of the prince in Burma: how it arose, how far
it was accepted in the minds of the people, and how this 
acceptance conditioned the administrative machinery. 
Throughout history we have all the theories of the origin 
of kingship, from the patriarchal old man of the family, 
the elected military leader, the high priest and God, to 
the modern Scandinavian constitutional monarchy. fhe 
theory of Divine Right, to my mind never played a great 
part in the power of the Burmese kings, at least from 
Anawrahta onwards. The theory of Divine Right in its 
essence meant that some soul had Godfs exclusive blessing 
on the permanency of his tenure, but the Burmese idea 
springs from the Buddhism of the Indo Chinese variety and 
serves as a reinforcement of the theory of the fittest ruling 
by intrinsic merit. The Buddhist idea of reincarnation was 
elaborated further by the accepted belief that one*s own 
deeds of goodwill and rightful thinking conditioned the 
patuern of one’s next incarnation and so on successively. 
Thus to become a king proved ipso-facto that one must have 
had a very meritorious past and this contention was in the 
main accepted by the people. To carry this one stage 
further, if one were a great king, i.e. king over other
4kings, the more the merrier, then ipso-facto., the more 
meritorious one became, and therefore, the nearer Godhead.
It was a sort of mathematical calculation of claims, and 
called for the systematic elimination of possible rivals 
for god-head. fo become a Buddha or attain hirvana, 
one must first be a man animal, then a Buddhist, then, if 
in any given period, it could be proved by ostentatious 
merit manufacture, which only the prince could afford, or 
even by warfare that one was the sovereign of the largest 
number of Buddhists, it followed then that he was the most 
meritorious Buddhist of that period, and that he,most of 
all Buddhists, be the nearest to salvation. Thus kingship 
was something in the first place, to be won at all costs 
and risks, in the second to keep and to hold at all cost, 
and with un-Buddhistic severity, if called for, and 
thirdly to increase the gloi'y of, even if it meant in the 
light of modern ideas, quite unnecessary vjurs of aggression.
It may be argued that the tradition of family and 
princely blood counted, as admittedly, the chronicles 
make an attempt, which must have been sanctioned by the 
Alaungpaya family, to trace the lineage back to Anawrathta 
of Pagan, and so to the first kings who walked on this 
earth. But this fits into the pattern too. It han be 
seen that to be born into a great household and family 
carries many advantages and opportunities which can be
5grasped in man’s ascent to the supreme earthly goal of 
kingship; therefore, to have “been ‘born with such manifold 
advantages over otherLuddhists, argued that he or she must 
he of considerable merit in other worlds and so in this 
vjorld too. A great many people in history, like to hack 
winners, and potential hand waggon climbers are always bound
to he influenced hy the comparitive prospects of success;
1and an influential family was help indeed.
I have remarked before that kingship meant successfully 
gaining, and successfully holding, and this in turn meant 
violent attempts to maintain onefs hold. This development 
e:nq>lains the frequent rebellions of royal cousins, royal 
murder, and the severity of the kings whenever the security 
of the throne was threatened. It was not the arbitrary 
nature of power that was the hone of contention; it was the
1. Alaungpaya* s lineage is traced in the Konbaungzet.
Thus from Anawrahta to his son Sawlu, his son 
Sawyun, his son Alaungsithu, his son Narathu, his son 
Nara Theinkha, his son Nanda Thuriya, his son 
Theidda, his son Mingyi Yadana, his son Minnge Yadana, 
his son the Lamhu My os a, his son the Lord of Pauk and 
Myaing Min Pale, his son Mye~-He Mindiga, his son the 
half brother of the Lord of Ava Mohnyin Wapa 
AEawrahta, his son Myauk-Bet Nawrahta, his son Thinkay* 
his son Minne Yiun, his son Min Ye Htwe, his son 
Mingyi Shwe, his son Min Po Khin, his son Min Sit- 
Naing, his son Ihiri-Maha-Dhamma Yaza, who was 
Alaungpaya*s father.
In view of the mathematical i:> os sibilities of the 
number of descendants in the princely families, with 
their plurality of wives, it is not such an un­
reasonable claim.
right of any individual against another, to wield that 
accepted power, which was the cause of the rebellion.
The position of the king in Burma can be estimated ;
1 "T*from the following passages nI suppose that there is • 
not in the whole world a monarch so despotic as the Burrnan 3 
Emperor. He is considered, by himself and others, absolute 
Lord of the lives, properties, and personal services of 
his subjects; he exalts and depresses, confers and takes 
away, honour and rank; and, without any power of law, can 
put to death, not only criminals guilty of capital offences,, 
but any individual who happens to incur his displeasure.”
Then it continues? " * *. • despotism in its worst form : 
constitutes, as it were, the very essence of the Burmese 
monarchy, so that to be called its king is equivalent 
to being called a tyrant. 11
Then another account says^ s nThe Government of 
Upper Burma under the native kings was purely despotic.
The King’s power was absolutes his only restraints were 
his voluntary respect for Buddhist rales and precepts, 
general for all believers or particular to the kingly
1. Bather Sangermano’ss Bes. of B.Emp. p.60*
2* Ibid. p.61
3* G.U.B* Part I, Vol.II, p.469-
estate. Otherwise, he was the lord and master of the 
life and property1-of everyone of his subjects. No 
hereditary rank or title existed in the kingdom, except 
in the Royal Eamily. Outside of that the king was the 
source of all honour. Official position was the only 
sign of rank and all officials were appointed or dismissed 
at the King’s will. Dismissal usually meant erstwhile 
ruin, a step from the co-art to the gaol. On the other 
hand, anyone, not a slave or an outcast, might aspire 
to the highest office in the state.”
i
Then again from Sangermano, we gets
"Every subject is the Emperor’s horn slave; and 
when he calls anyone his slave he thinks thereby to do him 
honour. To express their sense of this subjection, all 
who approach him are obliged to prostrate themselves before 
him; holding theii* hands joined above their heads. Hence 
also he considers himself entitled to employ his subjects 
in any work or service, without salary or pay, and if he 
makes them any recompense, it is done, not from a sense of 
justice, but as an act.iof bounty. Iheir goods likewise 
and even their persons are reputed his property... *u
Ihe power claimed by the Burmese kings was asbolute, 
but the king believed that his exercise of power was 
sanctioned by two factors; one, his descent (by virtue of
accumulated merit) from the Sekya clan of Gautama Buddha 
who was descended from the first king on earth, Maha 
Thamata# The other was, the Abhiseka or his coronation. 
There were rrtahy forms of the Coronation, but the most 
important, the Muda Bhiselca, or Muda Beitheit called for 
rigid acceptance of responsibility under some fearful 
oaths, and the king who had undergone Bhiseka had the 
right to expect complete loyalty and subordination from all 
his people. The justification provided by birth seems 
to be a contradiction of the non-hereditary iDrinciple 
stressed by Bangermano and the compilers of the Upper 
Burma Gazetteers, but there is, I think, a reasonable 
explanation of this. The security of the throne was the 
major aim of the Burmese king and it was natural that he 
should attempt to prevent any one claiming hereditary 
territorial rights which if admitted might mean rebellion 
sometime# Therefore, the higher posts which called for 
some delegation of power, for example, the Governorships 
and the Viceroyalties of major provinces had to be filled 
by people whom the king thought he could trust; this in 
turn meant changes, promotion, and degradation at the 
beginning of almost every new reign# Hereditary right was 
in fact clipped to augment the stability of the realm, but 
the principle was not denied outright. In fact under the 
Burmese kings there were two levels at which the hereditary
principle was applied* One, in the succession to village 
headship the hereditary principle was largely accepted; 
one of Alaungpaya1 s first jobs when he was coming down 
the Irrawaddy in pursuit of the Talaings was to order an 
examination of the hereditary claims of all the headmen on 
his line of march and to confirm all those who could 
authenticate their heredity. Then later we have the 
Ameindaw (Royal Edicts) confirming headmen or headwomen of 
villages and village tracts, for example, giving the 
follovjing Edict of Bodawpaya issued in the month of 
Tawthalin 1789 - uln the inheritance that comes to the 
sons and. daughters from parents,there are inheritances 
which should he shared, and another inheritance, which 
should not he shared. Hereditary Yos, hereditary Bos, 
hereditary Kes and hereditary Hmus should he inherited only 
hy the eldest son and is the kind of inheritance that 
should not he shared.
Hereditary office should however only he conferred on 
those who have the full ability to undertake responsibility, 
Should, the inheritor he not capable and transfer the 
responsibility to another, or share it with others of the 
family, there will he ceaseless strife and then will the 
people not escape misery. In each town and village, let
10
there' he only one person to inherit office# Let no 
hereditary Kyi, hereditary So, hereditary Hmu and 
hereditary Ke he given to those who have no right to them* 
Let no two persons share hereditary office. If this is 
allowed, hereditary claims will multiply* If the holder 
must look for help, let him choose only the son to help 
him. Should the son he too young to help, and an 
outsider must he used, let that outsider relinquish res­
ponsibility as soon as the hereditary holder is capable of ; 
undertaking responsibility* Should the holder say unto the 
outsiders * May your son and the son of your son possess 
this right1, then even it shall not he so* 1
A Sittan (or sworn statement) given in 1782 is even 
more revealing* tfThe year 1145 B.K. on the fourth waning 
of Pyatho, the village heard' Hg<.a Ngwe of Sa Bon village 
in the Iwin Thin circles, aged 49, on being examined stated 
lifhe village of Sa Bon was under Nga Phyo; when he was 
not, his son Nga Myat Kyaw Succeeded; when he was not, 
my father Nga Sa Xa succeeded during, the time of His 
Majesty1 s father - Alaung Mintayagyi; when he was not,
1 succeeded in the year 1117 B.E*...,! There is even a
record of officials of provincial rank claiming and being
0
granted hereditary office. Then there is an Ameindaw
1. M.M.O.S. Yol.iii p.3 1. ?-ec ^ ^
2. M.M.O.S. Yol ii p.194.
which records the grant of hereditary office to a 
provincial official at MAgaung. The Ameindavtf runs as 
follows: - nYear 1214 B.B. 15th Waning of ’^aboung read 
by the Nakhandaw Minhla Minkyaw - ’Order for the appointment 
of the Mogaung Amatship and the conferring of powers. The 
Mogaung Amat Nga Tho Lone Nawrahta, Ne Myo Kammang Yaza,
Ne Myo Nga Tho Lone Yaza, have in unbroken hereditary 
succession, succeeded to the Mogaung Amatship, and 
accordingly, the royal uncle Bagyidaw, and the Royal 
elder brother have in succession granted office, and being 
a;frontier district, like unto Pho Saw Lone Saung Maing 
Nawrahta and Nga Iho Lone Nawrahta who were granted the 
umbrella, the petition for the succession to this right 
by the Mogaung Amat Ne myo Nga Tho Lone Nawrahta, Nernyo 
Kammaing Yaza, Ne myo Saung Maing Yaza, Ne myo Aga Tho 
Lone Yaza is granted this right while in office1 *u
Women were also admitted to the right of hereditary
succession and there are records of female heads of
village tracts being confirmed in their office*
1It is stated that the hereditary right of 
succession was operative in the case -of the Bhan Sawtwa 
and Myosa (Bhan Chiefs of two grades) also the Hengs and | 
Htamons (also Bhan Chiefs): in Burma proper, the Kes, the
Htaung Ke (prison officer). Kato Ke (Ferry Licencees), 
the Emus, like the Win Emus (keepers of the different 
quarters of the Palace grounds) , the Kyis, like the 0 8a 
Kyis and Thewe Thawk Kyis, (Sergeants in the Army) and in 
the lesser grades of Min*
The other spheres in which the hereditary principle 
was upheld, were the groups who furnished the fighting 
boatmen - the cavalry, the A this, the oil-well owners 
(Twin Sas (Twin Yos) * 'They were generally groups of 
families who had hereditary duties in the King’s service 
and were given privileges, such as sundry tax exemptions 
and service lands as recompense. There is also the 
formation of Thwe Thauk Groups of Forty Fifty formed 'by ■ 
the Burmese kings which are somewhat akin to the various 
orders of English chivalry like the Knights of the Garter, 
and the Bath, though also resembling the Phi Beta Kappa 
fraternity of academic America* For instance Hsinbyu Shind 
and Bodawpaya formed Thwe Thawk groups, with great care 
and at the most auspicious moments*
Hsinbyu Shin proclaimed t!From the time of my royal 
father, and my royal elder brother, till my reign, those 
who have served with their strong right arms and their 
brains, with valour and distinction - that they and their
1* KonbauPgaet p. 360.
descendants 5 who will have been comrades*~in~* arras, with us ,
shall not fade into obscurity; let them he selected and
formed into Forty ™Eifty Groups according to the respective
standards of merit and success.M The first group was
formed in the year 1126 B.E., on the Saturday the 6th
waning of Tawthalin, at the passing of the Burmese time of
12 hours - 2 Part and 10 Biz ana, and consisted of?
1* Mingyi Thado Thettaw She.
2 » The Governor of Prome Thado Yaza.
3 . The Wungyi Maha Thihathu.
4. The Wungyi Maha Sithu,
5* The Wungyi Maha 2eya Ottama Thinkyan.
6 . The Governor of Kyawkse Maha Thiri Zeyathu.
7» The Wmx ( comiaander) of the Eight Maha Nanda Thinkyan#
8 # The Hmu (commander) of the Rear Maha Kya Swa.
9• The Governor of Rangoon Thiri Uzyana.
10# Maha Nanda Kyaw Htin.
1 1. Thiri Zeya Teittha.
12. The Governor of Sagaing - Maha Bay a Kyaw Thu.
1 3. The Kyi (Minister of the Granaries) Maha Dhamma.
14. The Lord Treasurer - Maha Kyaw Htin.
15* The Commander of the Horse - Maha Hawrahta.
16. The Hmu (Commander) of the Front - Thiri,
Beya Thinkhaya.
It can he seen that this group consisted of the most 
important ministers, governors and commanders, and this
1. The instant in which the middle finger withheld hy
the thumb darts from it to give a fillip is called 
a carasi - 10 carasi makes a part, and 6 part, a 
bizsna - 60 biz anas make an hour - 60 hours a day (of 
24 English hours)•
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principle of forming people of equal ranking was observed
in the formation of the other progressively lesser groups.
1Bodawpaya also continued this practice.
The pride of race of the Konbaung dynasty was based
on two far-fetched but firmly held beliefs. One was that
they were the descendants of the first king in the world,
I'hamata, the story of whose accession is given in the
PMyamma Min Ochok Pon Sadan. “ The Konbaung chronicle 
■5itself, traces descent in the following manner - nQur
Lord the Enlightened one, who is the foremost among those
who attain Nirvana, came into possession of the four
truths under the Sacred Bo free, and after that entered
the blessed state of Nirvana. In the year of the Faith
2295 and the year of our Era lllj, B.E. (1751 A.D.) on
Wednesday the 8th day of the waxing moon of lagu, the
city of Jewels, Xadanapura, the Gity of Ava, fell into
defeat and obscurity, and like unto Maha fhamata, who
was revered as king by the people at the beginning of this
world the Coming One, Alaungmintayagyi being likewise of the
race of Addeissa Kula - Addeissa Wuntha, the race of the
Sun and the Moon, came into his inheritance and commenced
his rule over* the country and the many umbrella bearing
kings.** This is of ■ course a bare statement of the
1 * Konboung&et p.5 7 0.
2. Chapter 171*
5 . On page 9*
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Konbaung claim; details are also given which lay down 
the traditional Burmese conception of how the Bakya race 
came over to Burma to found the kingdom of 'i'agaung and 
how the succession came to Anawrahta of Pagan who is the 
first king that modern historians generally accept as an 
authentic historical personage*
"In this Baddakat world, in the country of J.ambudippa 
from the first of all kings with the right to the white 
umbrella, of the true race of the sun Kings, of the first 
King Maha COhamata rightly called Ivlaau, through his 
descendants, who were true Kshattriyas, there were 252>556 
kings, the last of whom was Okka Mokka, and then the 82,015 
Saki (Sakkvas) kings ruled in succession in Maxima Besa* 
Before the foremost amongst these 554-,569? Addeissa 
Bandu Sakka Thiha G-autama attained Buddha-hood, the king 
of the countries of Kossala and Pyinsalarit, desirous of 
perpetuating his noble race, asked for the hand of the 
daughter of the king of Kawliya, and was refused, and so 
was started a great war between the two kings* Ihe fhaki 
Win (Sakya) king was defeated, and Abiyaza, the king left 
his country, and coming into Burma, founded the kingdom of 
Tagaung* When he died his elder son Kan Yaza Gyi founded 
the kingdom of Arakan, while the younger, Kan Yaza Nge 
stayed in Tagaung. Then from the first Burmese king of 
the Sun Hace, Abiyaza, to his son Kan Yaza Nge, and to his
descendants, there reigned 33 kings at Tagaung. In the 
reign of the last of the 35? Beinnakka there was an 
invasion from Gandalarit (China) and the kingdom of Tagaung 
was destroyed. When King Beinnaka died, his people were 
divided into 3 groups. One group formed the 19 &han 
provinces of the East; one group entered the country of 
Ihonaparantan, of the Kanran fhet and Pyu; the other stayed v 
behind in the refuge of Manhi. At this time our Lord 
Budclha was born. Then,, finally Pyu Saw Hti came to the 
throne, and he founded Pag^h and so down to Anawrahta; 
from him to the Lord of the Golden Palace of Ava, Mohyin 
Min, this king’s younger brother Wapa Nawrahta, his son 
Min Ye Khin, his son Min sit Naing, his son Thiri Maha Damma 
Yaza, and his son Alaungpaya. Alaungpaya’s ancestor Wapa 
Nawrahta had been given command of the North Ko Thin Norse 
and the Town and district of Myedu as a fief* His son 
Myawkbet Nawrahta was given a daughter of Mahathihatura,
Bodaw Shin Me, and given the title of Nawrahta, was allowed 
to succeed his father in north Myedu. It was from this 
fief that he got the name Myawkbet Nawrahta. His descend- 
ants settled as local lords in unbroken succession. .
The other factor on which the Burmese king based his 
authority, the Abhisekka (coronation) was a veiy essential 
one. It was something more than the process of transforming 
a de-facto situation into a de-jure one. Joan of Arc when
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she helped to crown the Dauphin really performed a task
of great significance, for the act of coronation placed
Oharles above all rivals contending for the 1'rench crown,
sind considerably altered the situation in his favour. In
the Burmese coronation, however, the importance of the
ceremony did not spring from any mystical communion with
the Divinity, but from giving of vows for humane rule
according to the law, by the king, while his subjects in
return vowed support and obedience. When the Burmese
talk of the &ing being of the Sun race it is reasonable
for the casual reader to connect this belief with the
Japanese claim for the Emperor, or even with the sort
of magnificence which led to Louis Quatorze being dubbed
Roi Soleil, but the term is only a reminder of the king!s
descent from the first king Maha fhamata, who in his
wisdom and justice shed light, like unto that of the sun
on the dark night, i.e. the dark strife.and quarrels and
hatred into which the people of the world had sunk before
1they elected him to kingship.
1. H.G. Quaritch Wales* in his book on Siamese Court 
Ceremonies says that the taboo which calls for the 
revex'ting of one * s eyes from the monarch was 
common to Cambodia, Burma, and Ceylon. Ihe underly­
ing idea being that no mortal could endure the 
glory of divine majesty. He quotes the following 
passage from Manu ”be cause a king has been formed 
of particles of those lands of the Gods, he therefore 
surpasses all created things in lustre, and like 
the sun, he burns eyes and hearts; nor can anybody 
on earth even gaze on him.1*
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The story of Maha Thamatafs election is given as 
follows; T,It was through fear and untruth that the first 
king was raised to the throne* In the period before there 
was a king, people put forward conflicting claims to 
property, and would attempt to fence off lands, distinguish 
their possessions, hide their valuables, and mount ceaseless 
guard on them* Therefore evil persons went and stole the 
property of other persons; when these evil thieves were 
captured by the good people, they were sternly rebuked and 
freed on the first and second occasion but on the third 
occasion they were beaten and put to death, and therefore 
the taking of life was committed* Because the taking of 
life had been committed there arose the evil of lying and 
untruthfulness; it is thus laid down in the Sakka Wutti 
fhot* When there was all this tint ruth and lying, a group 
of wise people searched for a man of penetrating intell­
igence to distinguish carefully the truth from lies, and 
a worthy person named Manu was elected Maha Thamata* He 
was elected thus;- fBe you our Lord and govern over us 
and do thou criticise and put to shame (those who so 
deserve) and do thou esteem and raise (those who so 
deserve) in a righteous manner according to the laws*
For the responsibility of ruling thtis, out of the wealth
A.
that people create and fashion, one in 10 parts do thou 
accept from us* The person who was elected thus w
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to kingship and the people who elected him, plighted their 
troth each unto the other thus, and after troth was plighted, 
the king-elect underwent the three modes of Abiseka and v;as
I
raised to the throne.!t
nThe king was called Maha Thamata, also Khattiya,
and also Yaza* Maha Thamata meant fthe elected king1,
Khattiya meant ’the king who ruled the fields1 and Yaza
meant ’the just and wise judge*”*
It is cited in support of the above that today, when
the people of the Buddhist faith desire to consecrate an
ordination hall, it is considered desirable to get the
Government to relinquish all claims to the land, because
even though the land is privately owned, if the land were
to be cultivated 1 /1 0 of the produce was rightfully the
2Government1 s.”
The Burmese listed 14 different types of Abhiseka*
The Muda Bhiseka was the most important and the 15 are 
as followss-
1 * Khattiya Bhiseka 
2* Yaza Bhiseka 
5. Thakala Bhiseka
4. Wi Zaya Bhiseka
5- Zeya Bhiseka
1. M.M.O.S* Para. 1 71.
2. Ibid. Paras JL63-170.
)
) For crowning of a king*
- For the tranquillity of 
the kingdom.
)
) ]?or success in Wan.
)
2 0
6 . Thiri Pew at liana 
Bhiseka
“ For the greater obiquity of 
the king.
7. Maha Bhiseka - Por the increase of wealth.
8 . Mingala Bhiseka - Por the taking over of ele­
phants (or jewels).
9* Viwaha Bhiseka - Por the marriage ceremony.
1 0. Dr ay a Bhiseka - Por the talcing over of the 
kingdom.
1 1. Ahyudeya Bhiseka - £‘or long life.
1 2. Upayaza Bhiseka - When acceptance of the 
Crown-prince-ship.
13. Mahe Thi Bhiseka - When raising to queenship.
The Myarnma Min Ochokpon Sadan gives an account of
the important Muda Bhiseka.
1,1 When everything was in readiness, the Lord King of 
the Country, attired in the rohes like unto those of the 
Brahma Kings; the queens also attired in the robes like unto 
those of the queens of the Hat Kings, set out together on the 
great Tatana Palanquin. When the Mfngala Mandat (Auspicious 
structure) is reached the i'hathanabaing (Primate) and 
12 Puroheit (Ponnas) bring forth the Pit aka Sacred 
Book of the Lord Buddha1 s sermons# After they are 
placed in the Siha Thana building, and 108 monks recite a 
service, the Lord King bathed in the Maura Thana building; 
MiiU in the G-aza Thana building he washed his head. Then 
the king and queen sat in state, and 8 princesses attired
1. Vol.i, p.160.
2 1
in ‘brilliant robes prostrate themselves before the king, 
Then a jewelled right-whorled conch, filled with water 
from the sacred Ganges, held with both hands was placed 
respectfully on the king's head. Then the princesses 
say ' 0 Lord King, may you be steadfast in the laws 
practised by the Maha Thamata, the first king in the 
world - 0 Lord King, may you,never lose your temper with 
the lords of the kingdom? may you raise all the people; 
may you love and pity all the people as your own son; 
may you regard the lives of all the people as you would 
your own. 0 Lord King, may you shut yourself from 
greed and anger, may you banish the evil of Maw-ha. 0 
Lord King, may you only utter words of peace, may 
you only perform deeds of grace, may you plan only
plans of grace/ 1 and as they finish the beitheik water
1is poured over the king's head. Then 8 Ponnas of the 
true race, fill the right-whorled conch again with 
Ganges Water, and holding the conch with both hands, 
place it on the king's head, raying unto‘the kings nG 
Lord King may you endeavour to augment your glory and the 
glory of the religion, 0 Lord King may you love all the 
people as you would your son; may you endeavour to 
increase the prosperity of the people as you would your
1 . Ponna is the Burmese name fox4 Brahmins - the 
derivation is obscure.
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your own; may you guard the lives of the people as you 
would your own; may you not lose your temper with the 
lords of the country; may you "be steadfast in the law; 
may'- you heed the vjords of wisdom; may you defend the 
race.1* After the 8 Ponnas have completed saying this 
they pour the Sacred water over the King1 s head.
Then 8 rich men, holding a conch filled with Ganges 
water in "both hands on the head of the King say "0 Lord 
King, may you guard all the people as you would guard your 
own Life: 0 Lord King, may you guard the property of
all the people as you would guard your own; may you not 
lose your temper with the Lords of the country; may you, 
when you collect taxes, do so according to the law, and 
guard it according to the law; may you avoid people who 
know not the law; may you heed the words of the wise; 11 
after this the rich men would say i!0 Lord King after you 
have received the libation we have offered, may you prac­
tise according to our stated word, and after you have 
received 1 /1 0 of the people1 s produce as tax and after you 
have accepted the power and glory of kingship,may you 
px^ eserve the people lawfully; 0 Lord King if you should 
practise according to our word, may you prosper in worldly 
and heavenly things, and like unto the rising sun and wax­
ing moon, may your glory increase day by day,may the kings a
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many countries bow their heads before you, may there be no 
thieves and bandits, may the faith increase in glory, may 
the people daily call blessings on you, and may you live 
long to reign over us; and if you should be heedless of our 
word, may the Bhisekha vows which virtuous kings undertake 
be broken in you; and may the world be in turmoil, may 
great storms arise, and great earthquakes crack the earth, 
and the fires of hell rise on earth; may evil men abound, 
may birds of evil omen and witches, and souls in torment 
hover over the throne and create fear and confusion, and 
may the cobra and viper and tiger roam and devour,” (fhis 
is chanted in Burmese - the Pali version translated means - 
”And it shall be well if you should rule according to our 
word, and if it be not so, may your Lordship’s head be 
smote into 7 pieces*1)* After this the king taking a 
golden pitcher pours libation water, and while doing so, 
he says: 11 In that I have given all kinds of Dana (alms)
1 have attained this position of king, and if I should 
seek the prosperity and welfare of the people and holy 
monks, of the country; if I should ask only for 1 /1 0 of 
the peoples’ produce according to immemorial custom; if 
I should, apart from the evil-doers who are the enemies of 
the faith, regard the monks, novices and people of the 
country, as I would the sons and daughters born of me: 
then, may my*body be free of the multitude of disease, may
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live to be a great age, may I be victorious over all 
mine enemies, and may the white elephant treasure be given 
unto me#11 After vowing thus, the princes, princesses, 
those of the blood royal, the commanders and ministers, the 
vassal princes, and the people of the country make 
obeisance with gold and silver offering and call for 
the blessings of long life, great glory, the possession of 
many white elephants and the seven kinds of treasure, and 
for the enlargement of the kingdom, for the tranquility of
the kingdom. The princesses then ask the Chief Queen the
/
traditional questions, and the Chief Queen promises in 
turn to cherish with justice the people, as she would her 
own son.
After this, with the royal hand, sacrifice is 
offered to the 3 Jewels (Buddha, the law and the Sanghas), 
to the 9 Gyo, 'bo Sakya, the Brahmas, the Bommaso and 
the Lokkaso Nat spirits, the guardian nat of the faith, 
and the lhamadi Nat. The king and queen seat themselves 
on the golden throne and with many singers and dancers and 
bands, high festival: is held. Then badges and vestments 
of nobility, and titles are conferred on the princes and 
officials. Fiefs are granted and the artisans of the 
country are rewarded liberally. Then offerings and alms 
are sent to various pagodas, monasteries, and alms-giving 
continues throughout seven days.”
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1The Myamma Min Ochokpon gadan gives the following 
account of the Coronation oath of Aittawrahta of Pagan 
The compiler states that the account was taken from the 
facsimile copies of the inscription in the possession 
of himself, the Librarian of the Bernard 1'ree Library, 
the Kin Wuxl Mingyi r and the Bon Kyaw Sayadaw. The 
translation is as follows* "The year 1044, on the 
8th day of the waning y^atho, the Lord Anurrudda took 
the following oath: 'now the most noble lord, my
father is no more, I shall not find fault with, destory 
or oppress, those princes and princesses of the blood, 
those ministers and officials, who listened to his 
commands. I shall be as gentle as my father; if I 
should break this oath, may I fall into the 8 sins and 
10 punishments, may I descend into the 4 hells.' The 
princes, princesses, and ministerial officials then made 
this oath: 'To the most noble Lord, and his the true
Anurudda, we shall not plan death and destruction; to 
the people of the country or of another country, We 
shall not plan evil and offer hate; to the royal son 
and grandson and descendants of the royal blood we 
shall offer obeisance; but if we should break out" oath, 
then may we fall into the 8 sins and 10 punishments; may
1. Vol. 1 p. 271.
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we not receive the merits of almsgiving; may we descend 
into the 4 hells.1"
The idea of kingship, from what can he gathered from 
these accounts is a mixture of the hindu conception of 
kingship, and the Buddhist desire to find a link with 
Gaptama. The Hindu influence left its imprint on the 
Burmese Covirt ritual, in the foim of the Brahmins (Ponnas) 
that were in constant attendance on the king at all state 
ceremonies, including the opening and closing of state 
audiences granted to the envoys of the East India 
Oompany. Another link with the Hindu conception is the 
retention of the promise to regard 1 /1 0 of the produce as 
lawful tax. The tax was called "Thathamede"'1' and is 
still in use in a modified form today. The derivation 
of the word could possibly be from the Sanskrit; Dasa 
(for thatha) meaning tfen, and medkha (Madhu) money.
Still another link has to be examined, because we 
are told in the Satapatta Brahmana2 that the king Indra 
for a twofold reason, namely because he is a Kshatriya, 
and because he is a sacrificer, and there is a record
of an Edict of Bodawpaya which seems to have a similar 
significance: "We the Lord King of kings - of great
In the reign of King Mindon 1853-78 this tax was 
taken in cash.
S.B.E. Vol.XL! p.99.
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glory, have taken the Muda Ahisekha twice, while lesser
kings have dared not attempt it even once 5 have observed
the 10 kingly precepts, the 7 Appariyati precepts, the 5
Thingaha precepts and also have observed the 3 Saryiyati
precepts enjoined in all Boddhisattvas, and by virtue of
all these have become a Kshatriya.*1 The whole Hindu
conception of varna or caste is however based on the idea
of birth into a particular caste, and in the following
1passage from Manu we read s,Even an infant king must not 
be despised (from an idea) that he is a mere mortal, 
for he is a great deity in human form. 11 ,J-'hus the king 
is born a king (i.e. of the Kshatriya caste), but in the 
same Edict of Bodawpaya which has been quoted, the king 
goes on to raise certain followers of one of the princes 
to the Kshatriya status; the Edict lays down as follows;- 
11 That those who have served us, without faltering and 
withoiit fear; and their descendants in unbroken succession 
may be prominent, we, like unto those masters of worldly 
philosophy who gave praise to the Peithano Nat Spirit, 
attaining success in all that we plan, command that.
Nga Aung ^ in and 18 others of the village of Ne Yin in 
the territory of Kyaw Htin Yazathu, the teacher of the 
Pakhan Prince, be of the Kshatriya caste. We proclaim
1. Manu Shap.VII, in S.B.E. V.
it to be so; let the command be carried out immediately.” 
Given in the year 1165 B.E. ( 1S0J A.D.) on the 3rd 
waning of Nayon and read by the Hakhan Sa Hmyoung 
Hmu.
This Burmese attempt to link their kings with the 
Aryan kings of Vedic India has no known historical 
foundation and seems far fetched. The claim however iso* 
only for the kings and therefore, the fact that the 
Burmese are of Mongoloid or Malayan stock is to some extent 
irrelevant to the validity of the claim. The Burmese, 
in the light of the absence of all cultural traditions 
except that of n^dia, were probably a migratory 
collection of tribes, without an advanced civilisation, 
and the emigration of the Hindus, and their princes, with 
a superior civilization, could have provided the Burmese 
with a ruler.
The Hindu princes were, without much doubt, of the 
Kshatiya caste, and after Buddhism had taken root in 
Burma, the fact that Gautama Buddha also came of the 
Kshatriya caste would indicate the two aspects of the 
Burmese explanation of their kingship. Under the 
gradually overwhelming influence of Hinayana Buddiiism, 
the Brahmanic element tended to lose significance and the 
retention of the Brahmins at the court, was probably due 
only to the adcted colour and pomp desired in the kingly
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estate, plus the fact that the Brahmins hacl a well pre­
served tradition of astrological learning which was useful.
This traditional explanation of the autocracy of the 
Burmese king was accepted by the people, and so the 
various factors which could qualify this autocracy must 
be examined. These factors were, the respect for the 
Buddhist religion: its precepts and the monies of the
Buddhist Order* the common people’s belief in and fear 
of spirits, the influence of ministers in the risings of 
rival claimants for the throne.
The main tenets of Buddhism are of course universal 
love, and definite abstention from the taking of Life, 
plus respect for the Law, and therefore, for the monks who 
have taken the vows. Universal love was part of the 
formal responsibilities of the king, but in practice, 
ruthless persecution was handed out to anyone who imperill­
ed the security of the throne, sometimes, to anyone who 
was considered to have hindered, in any way, the greater 
glory or pomp of the king. This could degenerate of 
coiirse, into wanton c ruelty, under the cloak of safeguard­
ing the realm. Thus, the practice of Buddhism on 
the part of the kings was confined mostly to the accum­
ulation of merit, by the building of pagodas, temples, 
monasteries, reservoirs, bridges and irrigation works.
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•There were individual examples of favour and leniency 
shown hy the king, hut the universal emotion generated 
by the king was fear, and not love. The continuous con-;, 
script ion under the first 6 kings of the Konbaung dynasty 
against Manipur and Siam, with their attendant misery 
for the common people is sufficient commentary and proof.
Greater respect was shown to the monks. The fact 
that the great respect shown by the people to the monies 
could be used to buttress the kingfs position, probably 
had muchcto do with it. Merit also could be gained by due 
respect to the monks and there were kings like Mindon who 
were probably genuine in this.”*" The main point was that 
since it was an axiom that no monk could lie, his word 
was universally respected and accepted. He had access 
to the kings and ministers, and there was a special 
system to facilitate and expedite clerical correspondence. 
Monks could intercede successfully for the lives of the 
condemned; they obtained remissions of taxes in times of 
hardship. All this influence was however, regulated and 
contracted by the king through a hierarchical system.
At'the head was the Thathana baing - or Primate.
He was appointed by the King, and was invested with
1 . The part played by the monks in mitigating the
severity of the government is admirably set out in 
Para. 1-6 of Part I Vol.II of the G of V.B. and 
the S.S.
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supreme authority in all matters of dogma, as well as of 
ecclesiastical polity. He was assisted by a Council or 
Thudama of learned Sadaws or Senior abbots, varying in 
number from 8 to 1 2, The majority of the Sayadaws- were 
appointed by the king, and those so appointed were called 
la Seik fa -Sayadaw (teacher who has the seal)* A Maha 
Danwun or ecclesiastical censor was under the Primate and 
so was the Wut Mye Wun or keeper of the Pagoda Lands.
The whole country was divided into ecclesiastical 
jurisdictions, each under a G-aing Gyok, who had several 
Gaing Oks under him5 each of these in turn had a Graing 
Dauk, All ecclesiastical disputes in the diocese were 
settled by the Provincial bishops, and an appeal lay from 
their decisions to the Thudama at the capital.
The L-urmese Government however, reserved to itself, 
the right of punishing any offence which affected its own 
stability or was contrary to the public good* Thus beyond 
the 4 cardinal sins of fornication, theft, murder and false 
arrogation of supernatural powers, which brought immediate 
expulsion, the following offences brought about the 
immediate intervention of the civil authorities.
1) Participation in a conspiracy of some prince 
or rebel.
2) Harbouring bad characters.
5) Admission to the monastery of a novice or monk or
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or men who had evaded punishxaent, unless with the 
approval of the secular authorities*
4) The practice of alchemy, sorcery, astrology,
tatooing and the distribution of love charms, and 
talismans against wounds of whatever kind.
The monks were kept in touch with all Government 
orders and Acts * The Mahadan Wun kept a detailed register 
of all xaonks. Movements were also checked, controlled 
and registered* Mr. Taw Sein Kho has given the case of 
a monk called U Oho who in 1866 was suspected of being 
implicated in a plot to rebel. He disobeyed an order to 
reraain within the palace stockade and was arrested and 
sent before the Thudama. The Thudama unfrocked him and ■ 
the civil authority deported him to Mogaung.
The common people had a considerable fear of the nats 
or spirits, and the observations of leather Sangermano and 
Bishop Bigan.det vdio in their missionary zeal set out to
study the nature of the Burraese belief, lend soxae support
2to his view. Mr. H.L. Sales in his census Report of 1891 
writes that the Bishop endorsed his view "that it is from 
fear of displeasing the nats that the Burmese ordinarily 
does one thing or refrains from doing another.'’ Rather 
Sangermano wrote, "there is not a nation in the world so
1. G.U.B. Part 1 , Vol.II, p.5 *
2. Ibrd * p.16.
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given to superstition as the Burmese, not only do they 
practice judicial astrology and divination, and put faith 
in dreams, but they have besides, an infinity of foolish 
and superstitious customs.H ^  The existence of the nats 
was formally recognized by the Burmese Court and in the 
Lawka Byuha and the Shwe Bon Ni Pan the ritual to be 
observed is carefully set out. sir Richard 'i'emple 
has written about the 37 nats of the Burmese. In this 
belief in the spirits, there could have arisen a rival 
claimant to the loyalties of the people, but the king 
was regarded as far more powerful than the nats and spirits, 
The proof of that lies in the formal reading out of a 
Discharge Order at the graves of anyone in the king’s, 
service who had died5 a custom which still exists in 
Burma today. Apart from the spirits of the dead, power­
ful guardian nats were also expected to obey the king.
Bor example in the Siamese Campaign (1765 - 7) of Ne Myo 
Thipate the army was held up by the flooding of the river 
Menam after days of heavy rain, and so the General with his 
sword in hand, commanded, in the name of the king, the nat 
spirit of the waters to behave; and it is recorded that 
the rains ceased and the floods subsided.
The third factor, that of the potential influence 
of senior ministers, especially at the time of the
1. D. of the B.E. p#U4
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accession of new kings is of no great significance.
Burmese historians quote three occasions when the chief 
ministers intervened with success in the accession, i'his 
was when Yazathinkyan of the Pagan Period, the Minister 
U Pu of the pre-Konbaung Ava dynasty, and the Kin Wun 
Mingyi were those involved. They brought all their 
influence to bear to secure the succession of their nominees 
and they succeeded; each thinking that in raising the 
person who had no great following he could be more in­
fluential. The first was exiled soon after, the second
was executed, and the third, after falling out of favour
1
saw the kingdom pass away. Kingship proved too strong 
for them.
The threat of rebellion is often pointed out as one 
of the major influences that could be brought to bear to 
ameliorate the severity of rule in Burma, but an equally 
significant aspect of these constant rebellions was the 
sanction it gave to absolutism. Evei’yone could under­
stand and accept, the need of any government or ruler 
to defend himself - in advance, if necessary, when his 
life might be in jeopardy. The general acceptance of
p’the massacre of the kinsmen* strongly s^ p^ports this vrew.
1. M.M.O.S. Vol.II, pp.293-303•
2 . G.E.Harveys "History of Burma11 p.316*
rn
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The administrative system of the country, also reinforced 
the king’s authority, but that will be examined in a later 
chapter.
It will thus be seen that the autocratic position of 
the king was unassailed psychologically and constitution­
ally, It was confirmed and reinforced by the people’s 
complete acceptance of thejcingship as an institution 
essential to the well being of the faith. ' lor example, 
Harvey in some unpublished research gives the account of 
a Gadaw (Lady Wife) of a provincial official at Pakkolcu, 
who, in charge during her husband’s absence, asked the 
conquering ‘-English ’’What are you -English going to do?
Yoxi ought at least to have a nominal king. Religion can’t 
do without a king..,.”
Theoretically the king was accepted as supreme; in 
practice too no person, no institution, no belief in any 
significant measure reduced this supremacy. There never 
was any subject with the power of the Tokugawa Shoguns of 
Japan, and the ^eshwas of the Mahratfcas. The king decided 
all policy and his individual outlook and judgment 
decided the nature of all policy, home and foreign.
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CHAPTER II
The Territorial Boundaries of Burrna- 
Traditlonal and Historical.
\ i
The Myarnma Miii Ochokpon Sadan^says that the kingdom 
of Burma was divide:d into various countries or pi’o vinces
' r t
on the model pf the1 classical divisions of Majjima Detha.
1) The Regions to the North and West of the
I
Irrawaddy Iwas called the Thunaparanta Taing 
(taihg = country or province)*
i ,
2) The regions to the East and South of the^ -£raw/addy 
was called- the Tampa Dipa Taing.
3) The region-of There Hhittaya or Old Brome was 
called the" Thiri Khittayama Taing.
4) The region®-,of Ketu Matti )old Toungoo) was called 
the Zeya Vpttana Taing.
3) Bassein (Ppthein) - Otha - Pegu - Mart ah an was 
called Yamanya Taing.
6) The region?where gold was found called
Suvarnabhumi; the 57 cities of the Shans was 
called Suvarnabhumi Taing*
1. Vol. II, p-93-
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7) Mone and Yawnghwe was called Kambawza Taing.
8) Momeit and Man Maw was called Seint Taing.
The divisions given above do not really cover or give 
details of the territorial limits set by the b-mvn.ese and 
since one of the causes of Burmese aggression was the claim 
to suzex'ainiyy over all the regions which their greatest 
kings had once raided, it might be relevant to examine the 
territorial claims of Anawratha of Pagan, Bayinaung of 
Hanthawaddy (Pegu) , Hsinbyushin and Bodawpaya. The
■I ~\Myarama Min Ochokpon Sadan gives a summary of what the 
Burmese chronicles regarded as the.^umaeBe B'mpfre from the 
time of Anawratha to Kyaws^ va i.e. the period of Pagan1 s 
greatness.
1) To the ^ast - to the border of the Yun Gyi country 
i.e. to what is now Cambodia.
2) To the South East “ to the border of the G-on 
country i.e. to what is now Siam.
3) To the South - to the border of the Nga Kwetkyi 
country i.e. to what is now Malaya.
4) To the South West - to the island of Nagamabein 
i.e. to the Andamans.
5) To the West “ to the border of Patikhaya i.e. 
what is now Chittagong.
1. Vol.II, pp.115-120.
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6) To the ^orth-West - to the country of Kantu Nga 
Nar Gyi i.e. what is now the region of Homalin.
7) To the North - to the country of Seint (China) - 
the Sino-Burmese borders have never been clear; 
there is a considerable area where the Burmese 
and Chinese administrations has not been in 
existence for many centuries.
8) To the North West - the country of the Nga Thin 
Nga Yi birds; the meaning is so vague, the only 
reasonable conclusion must be that the territory 
in that direction had only the vaguest sort of 
connection with the Burmese Government, and the 
country to the N.W. of Pagan under the sway of 
the Burmese could only have extended to somewhere 
on the 8han Plateau.
Anawra.thaT s empire-was, in great measure, a question
of prestige. < The kernel of the Burmese dominion was 
probably just the Central Bry Zone and the Sittang Valley 
down to the Talaing uountry of Ilanthawaddy. He was, 
however, the first of the conquering Burmese monarchs, and 
the s\iccess of his arms, plus the great impetus he gave 
to the Ilinayana form of Buddhism in this part of the world 
probably opened up relations with the outer regions of the 
claimed territory.
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The ne^ cb great conqueror in Burmese history, Bayinnaung 
carried on a life-long series of campaigns and undoubtedly 
he had most of the Lao states, Siam, and the Shan Chinese 
States under his control for varying periods. His claims 
were s-
1) To the East - the Lu Country - the Gon Country,
and the Yun country, and the district of Mainglon
Khabin which was beyond the Yun Country on the 
borders of the Akyaw (Cambodia) Country. The 
tradition was that the king of Cambodia and the 
king of Burma had a say in the question of 
succession, but that tribute was paid only to 
Burma. It is supposed to be 12 days march from 
Chiengmai or 184 English miles. , This would place 
the area round about Tonking. The Lu Country or 
the 12 Pannas of the Lu or the Sib-Song Panna,
is the region of Keng Yung; the Con Country 
is the state of Keng Tung; the Yun country is 
what is now the Siamese province of Chiengmai.
2) To the south East - the Linzin country. Lin
Zin is Luang Prabang and Vientian; the claim
is made on three invasions carried out by 
Bayinnaung who placed his nominee on the throne 
and took a princess into his harem.
4  o
5) To the South - the whole of Siam to the sea. 
Ayudhya itself was taken twice and the Burmese 
nominee was placed on the throne; the period 
of vassalage lasted about 20 years.
4-) To the South Wegt - to the island of Oeylon -
there are Portuguese records of Burmese embassies 
to Oeylon; the claim is presumably based on 
the absence of any effective deterrent or barrier 
to the envoys'- passage to Oeylon.
5) Tq the West - the border of the kingdom of Aralcen. 
There were amicable relations between the 
Arakanese and Bayinnaung; an Arakanese princess 
was given to him, and he in turn gave the right 
to the revenues of the three towns of Syriam, 
Mindon and Kama to an Arakenese Prince.
6) To the North West - the whole of Manipur - which 
acknowledged suzerainty till the time of 
Taninganwe. (1714—33)*
7) To the North - all the 8 Shan States of Kaing 
Sanda, Mo Wun, Mo Na, Hotha, Latha, Maingmaw and 
Sikhwin, to the borders of China. The Burmese 
armies built pagodas in those regions, and later 
these were pointed out by the Konbaung as proof 
for Burmese claims. There was a yearly tribute 
of bees-wax and other articles of local produce.
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8) To the Sast - all the country of the Shans to the 
China border5 this is now the 9 Burmese Shan 
States of Mohnyin, Mogaung, Momeit, Mone, Hsenwi, 
Yawnghwe, Hsipaw and Mobye, plus the region of 
Kaingma, Maing Ngalyi which is supposed to be 
North b'ast of Hsenwi; Kaing Ma being 9 *^ miles 
from Hsenwi, and Maing Nga Lyi being 90 miles 
from Kaing Ma.
Chi eng Mai, '-'-'owngoo, Prome, Ava and Martaban had 
Burmese Viceroys. Luang Prabang, Vientian and 
Ayudhya were under vassal kings.
All this was of course the extreme limit of Burmese 
claims and their validity did not extend beyond the reign 
of his successor Nanda Bayin^ but the claims to most of the 
areas were still kept up. The dedicating inscription in 
the Shwe Tha Lyaung pagoda set up by Min Ye Kyaw Swa, the 
Viceroy of Ava in the year 952 B.E. (1590 A.D.) lists the 
following provinces as part of the realm.
1) The country of Mahanagara.
2) The country of Khemavara.
3) The country of Zin Yone.
1. The constant conscriptions caused frequent rebellions
in Burma which weakened the power of the Burmese kings 
to impose their rule over the newly conquered states. 
See G.E. Harveys nHistory of Burma*' p.553*
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4) The country of Tama Leittheit.
5) The country of Ayudhya*
6) The country of T hunap ar anta.
7) The >*S4
.pOO of Tampadipa.
8) The country of Kambawza.
9) The o 0 1 1 of Seint.
Then in the dedicating inscription in the Yaza Mani 
Sula pagoda set up in 1649 A.P. the following list of 
countries was given* Ayudhya had by no¥/ thrown off its 
allegiance and was not included.
1) The country of Thunaparanta where the great 
province of Sagu-Salin-Legaing-Hpaung Lin-Kale 
and Thouiightut are situated.
2) The country of Tgjapadipa, where the great provinces
of Pagan, Ava, Piny a and Myinsaing are situated. .
3) The country of Kambawza, where the great
provinces of Hsipaw-Yawnghwe and ^one and others 
are situated.
4) The country of Seint, where the great provinces
of Man Maw, Khwe Lon and others are situated.
5) The country of Therekhittayania where the great
provinces of Therekhittaya Udde Tarit, Padaung and 
others are situated.
6) The country of Yamanya, where the great province
of Hanthawaddy, Digomba (Dagon, now Rangoon),
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Dalla, Kuthein (Bassein) , Yaung Mya (Myaung Mya), 
Martaban and others are situated*
7) The country of Khema Vara, where the great 
provinces of Kengtung and others are situated*
8) The country of Haribonza where the great provinces 
of Chiengmai and others are situated*
9) The great country of Maha N agar a, where the 
great provinces of Keng Yung, Maing Si and others 
are situated.
It will be noticed in the Royal letter sent out to 
the East India Company^ representative that they 
invariably referred to the two countries of Thuna Parent a 
and Tampadipa, by name and the others generally. They 
were probably so mentioned because these two were, in 
effect, the metropolitan districts. The capitals of 
the Burmese kings were generally situated somewhere in 
this area,'1* and the great majority of the Burmese, as 
distinct from the other indigenous races of British 
Burma, lived in this area.
The Knnbaung kings of course started from scratch, 
for the preceding Burmese dynasty had collapsed in the 
face of a gieat:M;onwe^ tblli. The very nature of their 
insignificant beginning compelled them, when they had
1. J.B.R.S. 1915 Enriquez "Capitals of the Alaungpaya
Dynasty.
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seized power, to recover control over the traditional 
■boundaries of their greatest predecessor *s kingdoms, and 
Burmese foreign relations in our period probably owe a 
great deal to this factor.
'faking a broad view, the British Province of Burma 
corresponded more or less with what could be considered 
as the area of mox'e or less permanent Burmese hegemony.
The balance sheet could be adjusted on the one hand by the 
imposition of British control over Tenasserim and the 
Myitkyina area, and on the other by the loss of the &ib 
Song Panna and Chiengmai. Tenasserim was listed in the 
dedicating inscription of the Bon San. fu Lut Monastery 
set up by Hsinbyushin in 1765 as part of the Siamese 
kingdom, and Mergui in the preceding century, had 
relations with the Bast India Company as part of the 
Siamese domain. The Myitkyina area never enjoyed or 
suffered Burmese control.
The Sib Song Pannas on the other hand were not 
directly under Thibaw, but there had been a tradition 
of dual vassalage, to China and Burma, and the map
submitted by the Hluttaw to the British at the time of the
annexation included this area. Chieng Mai had been for
most of 200 years, under Biirmese influence and had been
independent of Siam before that. It had however definitely 
been incorporated into the Siamese polity before the first
4-5
Anglo-Burruese War, and the British had no valid claim to 
Ohiengmai *
1'he traditional boundaries of Burma must on any
examination of the claims, be regarded with extreme
caution. ‘i'he tradition of calling the various provinces
by names like I1 amp a Bfpa and l^ hunaparanta indicates a
desire to associate Burma with the classical countries of
Buddhist India, and though the original idea could have
come from the custom of the Indian colonists who chose to
name their colonies after the mother province or country
like Tamralipti from lamluk on the mouth of the Ganges
or laruma in Java after Taruma in Gape Gormorin or Ussa
1for Pegh from Orissa there is no direct evidence of 
Hindu colonization in all the provinces with classical 
names. The general vagueness must finally force one to 
assume that the traditional boundaries were really wishful 
thinking and had all the characteristic vagueness of such 
thinking, and that the real heart of Burma proper or even 
most of Burma proper was the Central Dry Zone, while 
Burma as an effective single unit of common allegiance was 
just British Bxirma, but slightly less than the present 
day area of 257 ,000 square miles with an extreme length 
of 1 ,20 0 miles and an extreme breadth of 5 0 0. llhe
1 . Coedes-Les Etats des " Hindouises(pp.57-58) .
Burmese could never really claim the Chin and Kachin Hills, 
but there was no other organised administration to do so, 
and the fact that they could send columns up the valleys 
sometimes as Alaungpaya and Bodawpaya did, could have 
provided a basis for claim to suzerainty over the hill tops 
to where the hill tribes invariably retired when they were 
threatened, even in British times.
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CHAPTER III
Hie Administration of Burma- under the Burmese Kings.
11'lie Myaroma Min Ochokpon Sadan says that the 
administration of the country was on the lines laid down 
by King Tha I/un who reigned in 16§9“48# It quotes the 
following Ameindaw (Edict);
T,To the Sawbwas, My os as, Ministers of the first and 
second grade, great clerks, Generals and Colonels, Adjutants, 
and Censors, titled Thwe Thauk Gyis (term for heads of 
fraternities), the provincial Governors, township officers 
and headmen of the various countries of the Shans, Yuns 
(Loos) and Myanma (Burmese), the great King of righteous­
ness, the Lord of Life, Thiri Thudama Yaza Mahadipati, who 
reigns from the golden city of Yadanapura and before whom 
kings of many countries bow, proclaims "Let the Golden 
Iiluttaw sound out in unison the Edicts and rulings that 
have been proclaimed since the beginning of the reign, with
1. Vol.Ill, p.13.
2. Ameindaw - (AmeIn = Order., Law - Royal) therefore 
a J*oyal Order. Appointments - judicial decisions 
and rulings were all Ameindaws if they originated 
in the king.
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regard to all Eoyal and state matters. Let the Ministers 
of the Interior (Atwin-Wun) decide on all cases affecting 
the Boyal servants of the Interior (Palace employees).
If it should be a military matter, or a State case affecting 
us, let the Hlut decide. Let the Atwin-Wun decide all 
cases of dispute arising in the Interior within the Palace. 
The Governors of the City, (meaning capital), the Town 
Clerks, the Superintendent of the Jail and the jailors, 
when there are cases of theft, arson and other crimes in 
the city area, surrounding the palace and without the 
walls, let the Myowun decide. Let the Win Emus and Win 
Sachis (commanders of the 4 quarters of the Palace Grounds) 
decide only on the cases arising in the precincts of the 
4 quarters of the Palace Grounds. If it should be a 
military matter or a State case affecting us, let the Hlut 
decide. Let the Commandants of the North Horse and the 
Southern Horse, the Great Clerk of the C a v a l r y  Commandant, 
the Gpeat Clerk of the Shan Horse, the great Clerk of the 
Burmese Horse, let the Myin Sis (local cavalry commanders) 
decide on those cases, including land and water tax, arising 
in their villages and districts, if they should concern' 
cavalry men. Let cases of dues, taxes, fees and legal 
perquisites arising in the lands assigned to the elephantry 
and cavalry be decided only by the Myin Wun (Commander of 
the Cavalry) and Sin Wun (Commander of the elephants) • Let
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the Superintendent and clerks of the Service lands decide 
on all cases concerning the Athi people (hereditary groups 
of men set aside for general service) if they should arise 
in the towns and villages 'belonging to the Athi. If it 
should he a military matter or a state matter concerning 
us, let them take Sachun (orders in double pointed palm 
leaf) orders from the Golden Hlut taw. Let the chiefs 
of the war boat establishment decide together with all 
officials concerned in the case affecting the men of 
the war boat establishment. Let the Kyi Wun (keeper of 
the Granaries) decide on cases affecting the Kyi Wun, and 
the Anauk ^un (Superintendent of the Palace Pear) decide 
on cases affecting the Anauk Wun. In the matters 
concerning the men of the Lamaing lands (Poyal lands) let 
the Lamaing Wun (Superintendent of the Poyal lands) make 
full records and submit them to the appropriate depart­
ment. In matters concerning the Wuttakan lands 
(Ecclesiastical lands) let the Mghadan Wun (Ecclesiastical 
Censor) submit to the appropriate authorities. In 
matters of taxes in gold or silver, let not the Kyi Wun 
have any say; let the tax in gold be sent to the Shwetaik 
Wun (Keeper of the Treasury) who shall take appropriate 
steps; let the tax in silver be put in the charge of the 
NgweKun Wun (Superintendent of the 'lazes in silver; 
silver was the medium of exchanges there was no coinage
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till late in the Ronbaungzet Period)• Let the Se Wun 
(Superintendent of the Irrigation Works) have sole charge 
of this department. Let the rates of recompense paid to 
the servicemen he as in the time of our ancestors. Let 
the Myolat Wun have charge of the Myo Lats and Yun Lats 
(towns and villages which had not been attached to any 
department or person) and let them be under unified 
control, according to rulings laid down by the Ministers 
of the Golden Hluttaw. And according to the powers 
entrusted to them in the Royal domains, let the 
Thenapati (the commander-in-chief) Maha Remyo Zeya,
Maha Ihihathura, Maha Thiri Zeya Kyaw Htin, comprehensively 
and strictly issue the Ame indaws (Royal Edicts) or Hma &as 
(procedural rulings) and Sakhway (Orders)n. In the year 
999 B.E. (1657 A..D#) the day of Nayon, by the Pyauk 
Kyi Emu Zeya T'aman.
The two points of significance that I can deduce 
from this A-meindaw are, one, that the Hluttaw obviously 
had overall control under the King, and that in the 240 
years from Tha Lun to 1‘hibaw, the administrative system 
had hardly changed, for the types of officials mentioned 
are still in existence in the time of the last Konbaung 
King and their appointment orders implicitly enjoin them 
to take cognisance of the traditional and customary pattern 
of official behaviour and conduct. The British envoys
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to the Burmese Court used to he considerably annoyed with 
the Burmese for being such sticklers fox* custom and 
precedent. • The shift in power that one sees in English 
history, the changing importance of the different admin­
istrative functions can be traced to a change in the
social pattern - change in the quality and quantity of
resources needed to run a centralized state, and generally 
the shift from a rural economy to a mercantile and urban 
industrial economy. There was no such shift in the 
social pattern in Burma and the economy of the country 
hardly changed in substance or form. It was only when 
the West assumed power in Burma that the country, from a 
self-sufficient economy, changed into a producer of agric­
ultural commodities for the export market, while the 
superior technology of the West displaced its handicrafts 
and cottage industries. Without a substantial need for 
change it was natural that the Burmese not only failed
to change their administrative system, but assigned to
the same type of functionaries the same significance 
through the years. There are still in England today 
various state functionaries whose office originated 
centuries ago but whose significance has radically changed.
The King, or the unchallenged position of the King 
was the essential factor in the administration of the 
country. There were certain coronation vows and duties,
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and the Buddhist religion and monks had a certain amount 
of influence in the exercise of power, hut the idea "being 
that only if the country was tranquil could the Faith 
prosper, and the prosperity of the Faith being the accepted 
basic life aim of the community (meaning the overwhelming 
Burmese Buddhist majority) , the King was allowed to proceed, 
even to extreme limits to ensure this tranquility. This 
in effect meant a perpetual state of emergency; the 
King’s Edicts were always legal in the 'way arbitrariness 
is legal in time of martial law, and so the King’s 
behaviour could almost always be e:nplained and condoned 
and in any case no one dared to do otherwise.
The King’s position being established, the chief 
instrument of his power, the Golden Hluttaw must be 
examined.The derivation of the word Hlut has two meanings 
in Burmese; one is delegate, to let off from one’s 
authority (i.e. to pardon any offenders) to give, and
the other, to offer or to sacrifice. The latter deriv­
ation could have come from the records in the Twin Thin
o
Taik Wun’s Mahayazawun in which is stated that 11When a 
marriage of the children of the officials, and rich men 
and ordinary people is to take place, then to the teachers
1 . Harvey p,„329 say a that fthe king never issued a command
which jurists would recognize as law.*
2. Mi.M.O.S. Vol.Ill, p.162.
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must be offered as sacrifice, the first flower (virginity) j 
The former derivation is more likely in that there |
p
is an inscription dated 99^  B.E. in which is said 15if 
1 should give to the & three Jewels, may I receive the "boon 
of enlightenment which I seek, in that I (Hlut) give or 
offer, may I escape from the state of impermanency."
Then again, there is conveyed a sense of finality, 
from the manner in which the .word Hlut is used in some 
dedicatary inscriptions dated 793 B.E# ( 14-31 A.D.)
(The Mohnyin Mint ay a Badon Inscription). It is stated 
uIn the good work of merit performed by Hga I-Ipaing, may he 
receive merit like unto me and pouring libation water with 
the Royal hand, the vessel was broken.tr The idea was, 
that like the finality of the act of breaking the vessel, 
so, was the giving of the article, a final relinquishment 
of ownership.
The second syllable of the word Hluttaw, i.e. Taw, 
is a word used as an indication of connection with royalty, 
e.g. Han Taw - (Han meaning palace - Taw meaning royal) - 
Uyin Taw (Uyin meaning garden - Taw meaning royal). The 
traditional version of the origin of the Hluttaw as an
1. It refers to the claim of the Aris, a debased priest­
hood who held sway in Pagan before Hinayana Buddhism 
was introduced from the South.
2. Given in the 1892 edition of the Inscription of 
Burma, published by the Government of Burma, p. 165).
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institution is admirably summed up by the Gazetteer of 
Upper Burma and the Shan States. 1 The extract is as 
followss f7The following story is told as to the origin 
of the terms Hlut and Tan, and the reason for the number 
of four Wmigyifs presiding over the Supreme Gourt.
-Narapadi Sithu, the i<Ling of Pagan had f;ive sons - 
Zayathu, Twetyontaw, Dingathu, Thethu and Zeyathanhlca.
He had once a very bad boil on one of his fingers, and 
suffered great agony from it. One of the minor Queens, 
the mother of Zeyatheuhka, took the finger in her mouth 
to alleviate the pain, and kept it there until the boil 
broke. The King was touched by her devotion and promised 
to grant any favour she might request. He assembled his 
five sons one day and made them sit in a circle and 
placed a white umbrella in the centre of them, and said 
that he towards whom the umbrella should incline was to 
be' king. The umbrella leant over towards Zeyathenhka, 
the youngest of them all. The King remembered his promise 
to the lad1 s mother and accepted the omen and Zeyathenhka 
was named Heir-Apparent. The brothers remained on very 
good terms with one another, and it was arranged that they 
should meet together every day to discuss and administer
1. Part I, Vol.II, p.471.
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the affairs of the country. The place of meeting was
called Yon or Eon "The Assembly” and this name has been
given to every Court or ^ouncil ^ouse ever since. After
a time the four brothers said that affairs of State pressed
hardly on the King and offered to relieve him of the
burden entirely. He agreed to this, and henceforth
the meeting place for the discussion of affairs of state
was called the Hlut, the ’’freed” or ureleasedn, the
Supr.erne.eCourt. The four brothers then bore the whole
burden of affairs (Wun = burdah) and were called Wungyis,
and this name and the number of four was ever afterwards
maintained for the chief officers of the Court.”
The story is ‘substantiated by the existence of the
Pyanchi Dhamathat, (or the Pyanchi Code) compiled by
Pyanchi one of the four elder brothers who composed-the
first Hlut, out of case rulings made. The Burmese 
2tradition, states that the four elder brothers of the 
King Htilominlo, unhappy at the King being inconvenienced 
by his visits to each of them, asked for permission to 
erect a building in the palace grounds, and so was started 
the tradition of siting the Hlut in the position it §d:ways 
occupied in the layout of the palace buildings*, ,TIt is
1. M.M.O.S. Vol.Ill, p.168.
2. M.M.O.S. Vol.Ill, p.163.
3* M.M.O.S. Vol.Ill, p.180.
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to the right of the Tegani (Red G-ate) in front of the 
Myenan (Aiidience Hall) ; there were two parts in the 
building, one called the Zetawun Saung and the other 
the She Saung*11 In the Zetawun Saung a throne made of 
Yamane wood with figures of lions at the base was kept 
tor the Kingls use when he should attend* Then there 
were set:.places assigned to the princes, ministers and the 
assistants who attended.
The King attended at times, or the Heir-Apparent; 
if not, a Senior Prince or Princes normally attended.
The form of address in the Hlut for all appeals varied in 
style to indicate the presence of the King, Heir Apparent, 
prince or princes. The Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the 
Shan States gives a good account of the office routine 
of the Hlut, which, written on the authority 'of the Court 
Manuals and ex-Ministers, conforms to the historical 
Burmese account.
In the reigns of Mahadhamma Yaza Bipadi and Thibaw,
i.e. on the two eves of ruin for the reigning dynasty 
there was an increase in the number of officials, but the 
following is the customary list of officers for the 
HTuttaw, which was generally adhered to by the other 
Kings of the Konbaung Dynasty.
1. Part I, Vol.II. £.47
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4 Wungyis
1 Myin Sugyi Wun (Master of the hor.se),
1 Athi Wun (Minister of the Corvee)
1 Myetaing Amut (Superintendent of Land Records, 
generally a Clerk of the Council on Saye Daw Gyi) .
4 Wundauks (Assistant Ministers).
4 Rakhan Daws (King’s messengers or heralds),
4 Saye Daw Gyis (Great Clerks of the Council) -
2 Myin Saye Gyi (Clerks to the Master of the h0use) .
4 ■ Amein Daw Yes (King’s clerks),
4 Alma Daw Yes (Drafters and dispatch writers) ,
4 Athon Seyes (Superintendents of Government Y/orks) .
4 Awe Yauks (despatch writers for the Provinces).
4 Myanma I'hankhan (officials connected with Burmese
Envoys).
2 Shan Thankhan (officials connected with Shan E&t*cus 
voys),
2 Yun Lhankhan (officials connected with Yun or
Laos Envoys) .
2 Cassay Sarpyan (writers of Manipuri despatches).
1 Tayok Sarpyan (writers of Chinese despatches).
4 Athi Sayes (Clerks of the Corvee departments).
4 ' Amein Daw Yas (Bench'Clerks).
1 Lhissa Daw Yes (Register of Oaths).
1 Neya Cha 'Thwe Thauk Gyi (Usher of the Council) .
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1 Hlut Saunt (Watchman of the Hlut) •
1 Lethnet Talk Wun (Superintendent of the Arsenal).
1 Lethnet 'i'aik Soe (Assistant to above) .
1 Kathaung Myaung laik Soe (Officer of the Hluttaw
expense chest).
1 ICa Thaung Myaung Taik Saye (Olerk of the above).
1 Let Saung Yu Tailc Soe (Officer in charge of
gifts received)•
1 Let Saung Yu Taik Saye (Olerk to above).
Among these officers, the Wungyi, the Myin Su Gyi Wun, 
the Athi Wun and the Wundauks were of the superior grade, 
and had letters patent with a preamble setting out their 
duties, granted to them.
The following is the preamble in the appointment 
order of a.Wungyis1 nThe office of Wungyi meaneth that, 
in the Yasa Htani (Royal Kingdom) and in the great Golden 
city (capital) possessed by us, the Noble Lord of Life, 
the Gneat Emperor, and in the numerous tributary countries 
far and near, all the multitudinous affairs of state should 
be administered, that the Faith should shine and prosper, 
and that the Royal service should prosper, and that till 
the time of my Royal descendants the royal kingdom 
should be prosperous and contented, all this should be 
kept ever in mind. And in that you are fully aware of
1. M.M.O.S. Vol.III.p.188.
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the responsibilities toward the faith, the king, and the 
people, and bearing in mind the qualities of past Agga 
Maha Thenapati (Illustrious Commander in Chief), you are 
appointed to this office- Act in unity with the Wuns 
(the other holders of office.u
The following account is given of the preamble to an 
appointment order to a Wundaukshipt 11 The office of 
Wundauk (Wun meaning minister, Dank meaning prop or 
support or assistant) meaneth that, inasmuch as our Wuns 
having to keep in mind the present and the future, have 
to administer all affairs of state in their entirety, 
and therefore, their responsibilities being so compre­
hensive and wide, may sometimes be forgetful and heedless, 
the ref ox* e in all the matters which the Wuns are given 
to administer, if there should be any forgetfulness, if 
the case according to your resolution be thus and so, 
and the procedure or ruling be thus and so, or if in 
another case, it hath been submitted to us in thus and so 
a manner, and our orders have been so and so, then ye 
shall remind accordingly. The Hluttaw being the refuge 
of the Hoyal slaves, the poor people, when there are cases 
of persecution and various other cases and the appeals 
come in from all the various towns and villages of the
1- M.M.O.S. p.188, Vol.III.
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country, then -without confusion, examine thoroughly, and 
in matters to he sent up to the Wuns, or in matters for 
our golden ear, send them up together with full state­
ments, and judgements. And in that the Royal servants 
who labour in our service day and night might not be 
noticed, let all these be brought to the notice of the 
Wuns, and in that ye are fully aware of the duties towards 
the Faith, the Ring and the people, ye shall serve with 
ceaseless vigilance.n
Ihe preamble in the appointment order of the Myin 
Su Gyi Wun .(Master of the Horse)^ !tThe office of Myin 
Su Gyi Wun meaneth in that our Thwe Ihauk Su (fratern­
ities or groups) and cavalry companies, given lands to 
live on, and serving without default; far and near, with 
and without horses, let them serve without dissension, let 
them lack not for horses, let them not wander from group 
(cavalry group) to group. If the number of troopers is 
a full hundred or more (in a district) let those who are 
qualified be commissioned and made to increase the number 
of horses. Let the troopers and sergeants work the lands 
allotted to them. Let not the men of the Thwe lhauk 
companies be confused with the others. When the office 
of hereditary cavalry company commanders should fall 
vacant, let the sons and brothers be examined and
1 . M.M.O.S. Vol. I?, p.l.
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appointed in place. Should there he no sons or brothers, 
let the most sensible senior man be appointed. Let Thwe 
Thauk Su men be assisted to render good service. Vi/hen 
among the Thwe Thauk men there should be no quarrel, see 
that large words (causes of dispute) be made small, and 
small ones made to disappear. Let your discharge of 
duties be accordingly .tJ
The Athi Wun had charge of all the Athi groups 
scattered throughout the country, and his appointment 
order was couched in the same style as the Myin Su Gyi 
Wunfs, with the difference that instead of oavalry men, 
he had charge of the Athi (Corvee) groups.
There were originally only nine departments under 
the general heading of state and Religious affairs, but ■ 
in the time of Bagyidaw 1819-18®7i a tenth department, 
that of Foreign' Affairs was started. (Bagyidaw was the
Burmese King defeated in the first Anglo-Burmese War.)
1The ten departments were*
1. Department of appointments - dismissals, creation 
of new posts, promotions, swearing in of new 
incumbents.
2. Department of Justice - rulings and commentaries 
and amendments.
5* Department of Education and Religiotis Affairs of
1. M.M.O.S. Vol, III, p.205, and G.U.B. Paxt I, Vol.II,
pp. 472-5.
collection and preservation of inscriptions, old 
records, compilation of histories, of ecclesiast­
ical lands, state examinations, charities etc.
4. War Department - of the land forces and navy, of 
garrisons, etc.
5- The Supreme Court - concerned with criminal and 
civil cases, examination of hereditary claims 
and disputes.
6 . Department of Revenue - of all kinds of revenue 
except 7.
7 . Department of Agricultural Revenue - of Land
Tax, Water Tax, Carden Tax, etc.
8 . Department of Works - of the construction and
year round (Set Hnit Yar Thi) upkeep.
9 . Department of Messengers or Postal Carriers - of
the fast runners, fast boat and horse, etc.
lo. Department of Foreign Affairs.
There was no separate department of Foreign Affairs till 
1827 when one of the Wun Gyis took charge; previous to 
this all the four Wun Cyis acted in consultation.
Fach Sayedawgyi was placed in charge of the routine 
work of two or three departments. He had under him one 
experienced general clerk, and then again two or three 
assistant clerks, with the additional help of four or 
five trainee clerks. He was expected to produce complete
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statements on any file required, including a progress 
report.
In the Department of Appointments, the King per­
sonally directed the appointments of Viceroys, the three 
grades of princes, and the granting of fiefs. The Iilut, 
however, had a say in the choice of the Heir-Apparent and 
in view of the occasions when the Hlut at the sudden death 
of a King, was the highest authority, this was a read 
povjer and not a nominal one. In the appointment of
officers of the arrned services, from Thwe Thaulc Gyi 
1upwards the application had to come from an individual
who had been endorsed by the men who were to come under
his immediate command, by the superiors of his area or
district right up to the head of the cfepartment. The
application was then forwarded after strict examination,
and if the Hlut recommended appointment the King could not
o
refuse (in custom) unless he could point out grave defects 
in the chosen person. There was a similar procedure in 
the appointment of the civil officials from village head­
men upwards. The appointment was sent out in copy to 
six departments for filing; copies were also sent out 
to the persons superior and subordinate to the appointee. 
In the Department of Legislation^ the local officer
1. M.M.O.S. Vol. IV. p.157.
2 . Itid. Vol. Ill, p.199.
3 . Ibid. Vol.IV. p.196.
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sent up reports; these were called Sa Ka Gyet (comment) 
and through the various levels finally reached the 
Hluttaw. rfhe Hluttaw then gave various rulings (some 
of which were classified as temporary) , which were called 
Hmat Tha Gyet; a digest of these reports and rulings 
was known as Hmat Sa (notes). These notes were concise, 
and generally did not exceed three pages of the Parahaik 
(notebook). fhe original report and rulings were however 
kept filed. i'he report, ruling and the decision together 
were called Upade (law), but this was not final or legal 
till it had been submitted to the King, who issued an 
Edict proclaiming such and such a ruling and decision 
as law. There are no records of the legislation of the 
earlier Konbaung Kings, hut Mindon and Thibaw had a spate 
of legislation some of which were printed. They ranged'1' 
from Land Revenue, Monopolies, Custom and x^cise,
Currency to Arms Acts for Burma proper and the Shan 
States•
The Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs dealt with 
the supervision of the monks and monasteries, erection of 
religious buildings and schools, and the encouragement of 
various branches of learning, ranging from astrology and 
the medical Hoce; of the Portuguese captured at Syriam
1 . M.M.O.S.'Vol.IV, pp.201-208. ’
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1 . 2 m  Anaukpetlun* s reign to wood and ivory carving, music,
and examinations*
The War departments the work of the Hlut concerning
military affairs was comprehensive, in view of the fact
that the Wungyi was also dubbed Gommander-in-Chief
(Thenapati) when he took office. Thus all Wungyis were
regarded as military officers, and in the more important
campaigns, one or two Wungyis took the field^ . Being a
Body comprising the highest military officers in the land,
with control of promotion and dismissal, together with
responsibility over the maintenance - and upkeep of the
s e rvic emen, the Hlutt aw was a Gene ral He ad Quart er s.
The organisation of the army will be dealt with later.
The Judicial department of the Hlut was in practice
the final court of appeal, though in cases of importance,
regarding hereditary.,’ territorial and other claims, it
was the practice to bring the parties before the King
to have the case reheard. Bor this, however, express
Royal permission was required, which, if granted, was
given through the Hlut, In the Hluttaw, the Wungyis alone
were competent to pronounce judgement in all cases,
criminal as well as civil. If there was pressure of work,
1. G.E.Harvey: ,fHistory of Burma71 p.189*, Hall, "Europe 
and Burma, pp26-27* and M.M.0.3. Vol.IV, p.214.
2. M.M.O.S. Vol. IV. pp.215-231-
3. Mahathihathura and Maha Sithu in the reign of Hsin 
Byu Shin and BodawpayU; Maha Bandula in Bagyidaw* s 
reign.
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or in urgent cases, petitions were read be'fore the 
Wundauks, who made their notes on the suit, marked points 
for enquiry, and passed the file to the Sayedawgyis.
These officers passed them on to the Sayes, who wrote out 
the plaints and defence, and returned the papers, through 
the .Sayedawgyis to the Wundauk. The whole proceedings 
were then submitted to the Wungyis who passed judgement.
The Revenue department; There were two officers, 
the Shwe Taik Wun and the Kyi Wun, who with assistants, 
for each district, and Senior officers at Toungoo, and 
Martaban were in direct charge of the receipt of revenue 
(in cash or kind). The Thath&meda tax was introduced 
later in the ICQnbaung -Period, in Mindon1 s reign, hut before 
that there was a system of taxation which seemed to have 
taken more from the people, though less was sent to the 
Treasury.^ The revenues were under the following general 
headings.
1. Kin Khun (tolls).
2. Thittaw Khun (Forest dues).
3. Twin Htwet Khun (Revenue from mines, i.e. Twin 
Htwet meaning from pits).
4. Ze Khun (Revenue from hasaars) .
5. Ku To Khun (Ferry tolls).
6 . Htwet Kon Knun (Bxport dues).
1. G-.U.B. Part I, Vol.II, p.413-
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7- Win Kon Khun (Import dues)*
The Kin Khun was collected at stations sited on the
■boundaries of provinces. The stations were under the 
charge of the Kin Wun (Minister of T011 Stations) and each 
station had an officer called the Xazamattike in charge; 
they were generally men who had once heen Buddhist monks. 
The traditional number of toll stations was JO in Burma 
proper and 17 in the Shan States. The due ranged from 
Rs.l-as.J to Rs.J-as.l)2 as for 10 yoke of oxen. One 
anna was charged for one manload. In the toll stations 
on the river, e.g. at Sampenago, Kyauk Talone, Mingun,
Mu Totthalot, the due was Rs.l~4as. on each boat going 
upstream and downstream. The sum of annas four was 
collected on each passenger.
The Forest dues covered timber, bamboo, roofing 
material, ivory, beeswax and other forest products.
Rs. 12-§ls.8% was collected in the forests of the metropol­
itan areas. In the other parts of the country'Rs. 15% 
was collected. The Provincial Wun or District officer 
was also the Porest Officer. In view of the scanty 
population, the.large areas of virgin forest, and the 
lack of foreign demand, the degree of exploitation of' 
the forest probably did not call for systematic conser­
vation, which became necessary in British times. The 
forest duties realized in Thibaw1s time amounted to
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Rs.6 ag.lakhs-/***
(The revenue from the mines was essentially based on 
the reckoning that all mines belonged to the king. There 
were variations in the tenancy and leasehold rights in 
the different varieties of mines. For example, the oil 
wells of the Yenangyaung area, where the 'traditional
lessees were a group of families who kept hereditary
2rights.
Then there were the jade mines, ruby mines, silver,
gold, amber, lead, copper and sulphur mines. The king
generally took the best stones, and apart from a flat
7>licensing fee took percentage royalties.
The revenue from Bazaars, was divided into two kinds. , 
The first dealt with the farmers of bazaar revenues of 
the Metropolitan bazaars., and the second with the 
provincial bazaars which were given to the Eaters (or 
fief-holders) of the towns and villages, who sold them out 
to tax farmers.' In Thibaw’s time, the bazaar taxes 
coming into the Bing amounted to about Rs. 1-gT lakhs 
The bigger provincial districts like Martaban and Bassein
1. G.U.B. Part I, Vol.II, p.424.
2 . Captain Hiram Cox in Asiatic Researches Vol.VI, 1799* 
G.U.B.. and S.S. Part I, Vol.V, p.2 5 8.
3. G.U.B. Part I, Vol.II, p.221.
4. Ibid. Part I, V0itfu, p.425.
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in the time of Bayinnaung were stated to be worth about 
100 ticals of silver (14,000 rupees) and subtracting the 
other heads of revenue from this sum, the bazaars should 
be worth about 10% of Rs. 1400.^
In the actual collection, 2 annas a stall was taken 
from sellers of silk, and 1 anna per yoke load for those 
who sold grain or other produce. Rood stalls and sellers 
of ngapi (fish paste) paid % anna.
The revenue from ferries was likewise placed under 
two headss one the metropolitan ferries and two, the 
provincial ferries. The King farmed out the metropolitan 
ferries, while the provincial officers farmed out theirs. 
In Thibav/s time the ferries brought in about Rs.8000.
The revenue from exports was nominally 5% there 
being considerable restriction on the erxport of rice, 
cattle, horses, elephants, timber (plank timber) gold 
and silver, the amount exported was inconsiderable and 
restricted to such articles as lac, ivory and wax.
In fact the foreign merchants generally spent the proceeds 
from their goods on ship-building. It was worthwhile to
1. M.M.O.S. Vol.IV, p.307.
2. G.U.B. & S.S. Part I, V01.II, p.425-
3 . M.M.O.S. Vol. V., p.8.
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■build ships in Burma where first class teak wood was 
available, it cost £12 a ton for a ship, coppered and 
equipped ready for sea in the European style, while in • 
Calcutta it cost £17 and at Bombay £20.1
The department of revenue from imports was divided 
into two; Inland and Maritime customs. The main articles 
of Inland import were from China and were silks, copper 
articles, brass articles, slate pencils, carpets, furs, 
satin piece goods, fluids, wax, hats, combs and paper. 
Edibles were also brought in and included dried pork, 
ducks1 eggs, walnuts and apples. They were taxed at the 
Made Be Wun (from the Pali devana= customs).
The Maritime Customs house was at Syriam (later at
- 2Rangoon) Akyab, Martaban and Basse in. The maritime 
customs authorities kept 24 hour patrol, stopping boats 
at a distance from the harbours. After the port
authorities had been satisfied with the bona fides of
the ship, it was piloted into the harbour, and all the
1L
guns and the rudder were taken out and stored. The
1. Hall. Europe & Burma, p*77»
2. M.M.O.S. Vol.V, p.5 .
5. Ibid. Vol.V, p.8.
4. Ibid.Vol.V. p.8. Sangermano - D.B.E.pp.176-177•
Hall, Europe and Burma, pp.78-79*
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chief Customs Officer at the ports in this period was
1always a European, probably because the Burmese were not
a sea-faring race and found it more convenient to transact
affairs at seaports, through a foreigner,
There was a separate department that received tribute 
2and presents. There were the gifts offered at the 
Coronation, the New Years gifts, and the tribute received 
yearly, biennially and triennially from the Sawbwas °1 ‘^he 
Tributary Shan states, and the provincial officials.
The intervals between the presentation of presents depended 
on the distance of the capital of the province concerned; 
the three occasions for the reception of tribute were, the 
New Year, the beginning and the end of the Buddhist Lent.
There are no records of separate tax returns but an 
abstract of the tax returns of 1885  ^is as follows:- 
Gross receipts Rs. 5,800,594.
Expenses of officials Rs, 201,948.
Expenses of King. Rs. 525,000.
Net Receipts. Rs. 5,275,646.
1» Hall, op,crt* p.7 8,
2. M.M.O.S. p.9* Vol. 5 .
5* Ibid. Vol.5, p.1 2.
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The Departments of Agriculture and Land Revenues 
In theory, the state was the owner of all land, but in 
practice land was either Ayadaw or Ledaw (Royal), Boba-. 
Baing (piuvate property), or Myelat or Taw (waste)*
Wasteland was open to anyone who desired to settle upon
Royal land became so
1) by Ameindaw, or order declaring any waste land 
to be reserved for the kings
2) by forfeiture of private lands for offences 
against the law;
5) -by simple confiscation or seizure at the King!s 
will of private lands;
4) -by the King inheriting all lands left ownerless
by failure of heirs or ultimate heirs, called
Zonpyet, Amwe-Pyet *
Wuttakan land may be considered a special class of 
state land. It was land assigned to a pagoda or monastery 
by gift, whether of the king, or of a private individual.
Wuttakan lands were not gifts in perpetuity but seldom
were they withdrawn, except in the case of a gift to a 
particular monk. A list of all the Wuttakan lands in 
the country was inscribed on marble slabs in the close of
1. This is another indication of the underpopulation of 
the Burmese Umpire. This would imply the absence of 
rack renting and thereby greater freedom and perhaps 
happiness for the mass of the Burmese, most of whom 
(1891 Census 64% of both sexes of the agricultural 
class) were directly dependent on the land for a livmg
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1
the Mahamuni Aralcan Pagoda in Mandalay.
Private land was acquired:
1) "by cleaning waste land - Dhamma - Ugya. Sucli 
land includes both land on which the ancestors 
of the present owner settled in times too remote 
for record5 as opposed to land acquired more 
recently, by sale or mortgage, and also recently 
cleared land which is essentially state land 
and was given by the village headman to the 
applicant. Custom varied as to the length of 
tenure which gave complete rights. Broadly 
speaking cultivation by a man and his descend­
ants for 3 or 4 generations secured rights
. , of transfer and inheritance. The land then
%became Bobabaing.
2) by inheritance.
■3) by gift of royal land from the king.
4) by transfer of any kind
The privileges of the owner of private land were first 
that he could alienate his land by sale or mortgage;
1. The Mahamuni Arakan Pagoda housed the great image of
Buddha taken after the capture-of Arakan by the Crown
Prince in Bodawpaya* s time 1784 A.D.
2. The probable derivation is from Dhamma - chopper -
bgya - first falls i.e. land on which (someone’s)
chopper first falls.
3* A modified form of squatter rights was sanctioned in 
British times when the Irrawaddy delta was being 
cleared, there was a period of tax-exempt ion for 
squatters who cleared land for cultivation.
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secondly, 011 bis death, the land passed to his heirs,
and thirdly, he was not liable to eviction.
Dhamma-Ugya or Bobabaing land which had been
acquired by mortgate or purchase was called Danekitta.
The Ahmudan or the soldiery held lands on a
service tenure. Amudan-sa for infantry, Si-Sa for
cavalry, according to the terms set forth in patents
\
or Sittans. Alienation of such land was forbidden, but no
\
attention was paid to this, for at the time of the 
annexation very little service land was in the possession 
of its original holders.
There was no land tax, only rent, on royal land.
The rate was tisually % of the out-turn, sometimes 1/& and 
in some places 1/5 and even 2/11 was taken. Farmers of 
the revenue tried to make as lauch more as they could from 
the cultivators. Hereditary tenant rights of royal land 
wens recognized.
The revenue from royal lands was collected by the 
Ledaw Ok, appointed by the Hluttaw. The Kayaing Wun and 
Myowuns were his seniors and from whom he took orders.
The title was changed to that of Le Saye when the King 
demanded irrigation tax. The he Saye or Le-ok, the 
Thugyi and the Ywalugyis made assessment rolls, showing 
the lands cultivated, how much proved profitable, and whet 
the probable amount of out-turn would be, and these
75
statements were checked by the Wun; the statement was
then forwarded by the Ka-Yaing-Wun to the Le-Yon at the
capital, and this department conveyed the orders of the
King as to the disposal of the revenue. Sometimes it
was sent up in silver, sometimes in kind; occasionally
ox'ders were received to give rice to the monks.
1fhe revenue returns for an unspecified year m
Thibaw!s reign, excluding the suburbs of the capital,
the Shan States Myelat said the houses of the poverty 
stricken, disabled, scholars and privileged amounting to 
68,505 houses was%-
4-05*925 houses, 011 agreed
assessment rate gave ™ Thatthameda of Rs.4,059*250
from which was subtracted 
10% for various expenses of 
collection - 405*925
then again remissions for 
religious purposes of - 29 *764
435 * 689 _455*689_,_
Revenue submitted through
the Hlut - 3,623,561
Revenue from various other
taxes under 76 heads 4,679*602
Revenue from royal lands 
-value 011 831,319 baskets 
of paddy 665_?015
"8,968,373
Expenses Military and Civil - ^,108^168
~~5 7860', 2X0
1 . Konbaungz e t p.1641.
These figures make interesting comparison with the
i
British Government returns for the year 1890-91*
Total demanded 8,826,802 
79*732Total Remissions
Ret demanded 8,147,020
The cash basis of Thibaw*s period probably gives greater 
precision to the figures but it is reasonable to assume 
that on a basis of the two sets of figures one can 
arrive at a very rough idea of what the revenues of the 
Burmese Government were worth in the time of the earlier 
Konbaung Kings. The expense account of Thibaw's specify 
that it did not include his personal gifts, and was 
composed of various salary lists; the pre-Mindon 
Konbaung Kings on the other hand did not give salaries, 
bxxt settled the revenues from various villages and 
towns, on officials and favourites. Sangermano accuses 
the Burmese King of having allocated most of the villages 
to the members and hangers =■ on of the Royal family, but 
since there were 8,000 villages and towns from which 
Bodawpaya once assembled 8,000 men at arms (one from 
each), it was probably not so.
1. Gazetteer of Upper Burma & S.S. Part I, Yol*11, p.449'
2. Sangermano, D.of B.E. p.73*
syr")
However the payment of salaries made under Thibaw 
would probably cover this seeming waste of the king’s 
revenue. In fact it might have been more than covered, 
if the presents which were expected to be brought was 
taken into account, and, the sort of extortion practised 
by Ryder Ali, in India, who allowed his officials to 
fatten, and then at periodic intervals, made them dis­
gorge under torture, though in a milder form, must have 
contributed to the King’s coffers.
The other bKonbaung Kings of our period, however, 
ruled over a great ex' territory than Thibaw, and taking 
the constant drain on man power as a factor for the 
effective stabilisation of the population, one could 
take the figure of 771?686 fox' the districts of Rangoon, 
Basse in, Prome, Henzada, Toungoo and Tharawadcly, and 
362,797 lor the Arakan division and 50,000 for 
Tenasserim as a general indication of the population 
of the remaining territory, this would give about 1.1 
million extra, 15% as in Thibaw’s time might be regarded 
as tax free leaving about 950,000. On the same scale 
as Thibaw and taking revenue in relation to taxes, we 
coxild get about 190,000 houses, probably a net for the 
King of roughly 17,000,000 (17 lakhs) for all heads as 
income. The total would then give about Rs.35 lakhs.
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The Shan States sent tribute of gold and silver 
flowers and on the basis of the estimated value of the 
Bung a Mas^ each was worth about Rs. 15000. ^his in 
total could scarcely cover the value of the return 
presents given. The indirect income from Burmese 
officials stationed in the Shan States is the only source 
of net income that can be taken into account. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the holding of the Shan States 
gave only a trumpery kind of prestige and nothing very 
tangible.
2The Department of Works* all public works in the 
land were under the control of the department, and were 
executed through it. It was divided into three main 
heads.
1) Set Hnit Yarthi Aloke (12 seasons) or year 
round responsibilities.
2) Asauk Aloke - construction works.
3) Set Aloke - manufactures.
The first main head was divided again into four 
types of works
1. Mills - 1 British Malaya" 1826-1864. p.54. '
2. LI.M.O.S. Vol.V. p.36.
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a) Ne Sin Aloke - construction of temporary 
buildings-.
d) La Sin Aloke - works connected with sacrifice 
and charities.
c) fa Hnit fa Khar Aloke - works connected with 
the great annual occasions - like Lent, New 
Year, etc. where the buildings were slightly 
sturdier in construction.
d) Ahtoo Aloke - special work.
fhe second main heading was divided into two 
typess
a) Yazahtarni Aloke » concerned with the great 
buildings of the metropolitan area e.g. 
monasteries, palaces, bridges.
b) Awe Aloke - concerned with the construction 
of the defence of provincial., towns, such as 
walls, moats, and forts - irrigation canals 
and ponds, court houses, jails and service 
quarters.
fhe third main heading was divided into three 
typess
a) Arsenals and Ordinance work.
b) Ship engineering department (this only came 
in Mindon and Thibaw’s reigns).
c) fexti'le manufacturing ( ditto) .
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Another department in the Hluttaw administrative 
system was the department of Posts (in Burmese Sa lDe Sa 
Yu i.e. sending and bringing letters), l’here was a post 
by fast messenger called Ohay Lyin Daw, i.e. ^oyal Fleet 
of Foot - which called for a relay system 'of fast 
runners, but both in the capital and in the provinces it 
was only used when urgency called for it. Normally, the 
Hlut sent out the bearers in the establishment, and the 
provincial authorities sent on messages to the surrounding 
towns or villages for handing on. Then there was the 
post by horses or elephants. ilhe post was organised 
only for official use and there was a very elaborate 
system of grading in the formal terms of address of the 
letters and summons.
The Hluttaw seen in the background of its compre­
hensive duties could have been an organ of such importance 
in the government of the country that it could have 
acted as a balance or check on the power of the king. 
However, there were various features in Burmese life 
under the kings which completely negatived this 
possibility. In the Burma of those days, life moved 
at an even pace, and a leisurely one at that; there were 
no dangers from abroad-, and diplomatic, political and
1. M.M.O.S. Vol.V, pp.78-85-
economic pressure from the outside world, which would 
have called for the extensive delegation of real authority 
in policy making and execution, like in Great Britain 
since the Tudors, simply did not exist in significant 
measure. The essential small-time nature of Governmental 
'business, with the only emphasis in affairs concentrated 
on the accumulation of merit, and the glory of the king, 
did not call for an organic shift of power, and the 
position of the king in relation to the Hlut remains 
unchanged throughout our period. Another factor which 
has to be considered in assessing the Hluttaw strength 
is that the Hlut could not expect the support of the 
people. They were the nominees of the monarch, and had 
risen to high office by virtue of successful association 
with the king. The welfare of the people was only 
incidental in their duties, as being the welfare of the 
king’s subjects. the third factor was that the king 
could always bring about a Hlut member’s instantaneous 
disgrace or death, and the long apprenticeship in avoiding 
the king’s anger before they became Hlut Wungyis would 
make them particularly subservient to the wishes, desires 
and whims of any king on the throne. The fostering
1. G.U.B. Part 1, Vol.II pp.502-503*
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of favourable relations with the king was a factor of
significance in the administration, and opportunity for
intimacy with the king was of great importance to the
A twin Wuns of the Bye Talk - which we must now examine.
'The word Atwin Wun (Atwin - Interior $ - Wun =: Minister)
means Interior Minister, and they were technically in
direct charge of the affairs of the palace, but especially
to take any business from the Hlut to the king.^
PPreamble to the appointment of Atwin Wun.“
”The office of Atwin Wun meaneth that, together 
with the superintendence of our internal (palace) affairs, 
all the affairs of the state should be fully and com­
prehensively submitted to us. In that you are fully 
cognisant of the threefold duties to the Paith, King and . 
country, let ye serve in accordance with the customary 
duties of an Atwin Wun of the Golden Palace.”
There were four? Atwin Wuns in the administrative 
body, and under them were four Akunwuns (Revenue 
Officers in charge of the four Cardinal exteriors).
Then four Akhun Saye (Revenue Clerks). Thfen four 
Thandawsins who were second in rank to the Atwin Wuns.
They wea?e always in attendance at audiences to take down
1. Sangermano D. of B.E. p.66.
2. M.M.O.S. Vol.IV, p.19. pp.171-175.
the king’s orders, and to transmit them to the Hlut.
They also read petitions aloud to the king at private 
audiences•
There were also eight Bye Taik Thansins -who were
clerks of the Atwin Wuns.
The Atwin Wuns had the right of holding up cases from
the Hlutj if they considered further investigation
necessary. Another duty of greater significance was
their responsibility of adding to or deleting from the
subject matter of a case, before submission, and this
must have been a great weapon.
The word Bye is a Mon word, meaning bachelor and
the building itself - Bye Taik was built next to the
king’s apartments. The closer relations with the
king is reflected in the fact that the Atwin buns were
1in general control of the finances and the army.
They slept in turns two at a time in the palace. They 
went to the Bye Taik at seven in the morning and every 
second day, they were relieved at three in the afternoon. 
At nine in the morning the Ministers came in from the 
Hlut, and discussed whatever business there might be 
with the Atwin Wun, and then went in with them to the 
king's morning Levee (Hyi-La Khan, i.e. submission or
1. M.M.O.S. Yol. V. p.12. G.U.B. Part I,Vol.II.p.4*74-•
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presentation in unison) • In the afternoon there was 
another informal audience called Bo-Shu-Hkan, Because 
military officers were then admitted with the Atwin Wun 
to see the King. In the evening abotit eight, the 
evening reception was held, and at this time, also, the 
members of the Hlut were present. Business of a special 
character was usually settled in the day.
fhe Taya Yon was the Civil Court - largely of 
appeal.1. It was situated outside the inner.palace 
enclosure near the Hast Cate. It had a two tiered roof 
and was slightly smaller than the She Yon (dealt with 
later). The Court had two to four judges, two to four 
Nakhans, four Tayasayes (clerks) and four to eight 
Ameindawyas (officially recognised pleader of the High 
Court). All cases of value over Rs.500 would come right 
up through varioxis other courts from the village head- 
raanfs courts. Any case of value over Rs.5000 went up 
to the Hluttaw and even to the King. The Taya Yon Judges 
were enjoined first to advise the parties at law to ob­
serve fair play in their dealings with each other; then, 
if the law was cited in complaint and defence, he was to 
give decisions on the Manu Dhammathat. If that did not 
cover the case to use the Manaw Thera Code; and if that 
still did not cover the case, to use the commentary of
1* Gazetter of U.B.& S.S. p.4-77 .M.M.O.S. Vol.II.p.97.
8 6 .
1.
Kaingsa Mann.
2.
Another court at the capital was the Criminal Court, 
the She Yon which dealt with cases of theft, arson, 
prostitution, grave diggers (the supervision of), weights 
and measures, offences against the law on alcohol, 
slaughter of animals, rape, dacoity, robbery, sedition, 
etc. It also supervised the policing of the capital, the 
stocks and pillories. fhe She Yon Court was presided 
over by thes-
2 Myo Wuns (Governors of the Royal City)
4 faunghmus - assistants.
4 Myosayes - bailiffs.
1 Bhwepyiso - alderman.
4 Htaungsachis - gaolers.
A third court at the capital was the Anouk Yon, 
or the Women1 s Court, which supervised the affairs of the 
women of the palace, and the wives of officials.
5.
It has been said that the Burmese recognised 
six classes of judges. First the parties themselves who 
may compromise, second, the parties may accept the 
decision of a private arbitrator, third, the parties may 
accept the decision of an official arbitration, fourth,
1. M.M.O.S. Vol. IV p.5^ . Forchammer s*An Essay on the
sources and dev. of Bxirmese law." p.77«
2. M.M.O.S. Vol. IV pp.27-39. G.U.B. p.477*
3. Quotation from a Mr. Pilcher’s pages by the G.U.B.
& S.S. Part I, Vol. IV. p.403.
the parties may accept the decision of the District
Officer or Myowxux, fifth, the parties may accept the
decision of the Ohief Court at the Capital and sixth,
the Hluttaw and the King; the last being final•
The procedure is begun by the presentation of a
written plaint. Then a Kakhan (assistant) is ordered
to examine and report.. On the basis of his report a
hearing is fixed, advocates are chosen, and the case is
heard. After hearings, the issues are fixed by the
judge, the onus of proof is put on one or other of the
parties. If the parties agree to the decision both the
parties ate pickled tea (letpet) and the decision be-
1.
comes final. There are four forms of ordeal.
1. The oath ordeal (the Burmese had a terror of oaths).'
2. Candle burning ordeal - the party whose candle
stayed alight longest is judged to be right.
3# Ordeal of chewing rice - the party who finishes
fix'st is judged in the right.
4. Khetauk - or molten lead ordeal.
The Kin Worn Mingyi gives the following description
2 0
of the Burmese Judicial system.
1. Sangermanos Description of the Burmese Empire p.72.
2o G.U.B. Part 1, Vol.II p*!85.
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1) If both the parties to a Givil suit were 
residents of the same place, the jurisdiction 
lay first of all with the local Thugyi (head­
man)™ whose decision was final if both parties 
ate Letpet.*
2) If the parties were not residents of the same 
place or if one of the parties was dissatisfied • 
and wished to appeal, the case was taken to the . 
court of the District Myowun, whose decision 
was final if both parties agreed and ate Letpet.
5) ■ If the parties were dissatisfied with the
Myowun*s decision they could appeal to the
courts at the capital called Saing Ya/Wun Bin
1Pyrn Bin Sushin and Hgan-Shin, and the decision 
of the court was final if both parties ate 
Letpet*
4) If the parties were dissatisfied, they could 
appeal to the Chief Civil Court (Taya Yon) whose, 
decision was final if both parties agreed and ate 
Let pet.
5) If the parties were dissatisfied with the 
decision of the judges of the Civil Court, they 
could appeal to the Hluttaw. The decision of
1. These five courts dealt with appeals from the specific
groups or classes of people.
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the Mingyis was final a In very important 
cases however, the king might order a private 
or public retrial or re-examination, and c'onfirm 
or reject the Hlutfs decision. 1‘his, of course, 
was final•
Against all this background of an elaborate appeal
system, it must be kept in mind that the district officers
right down to the Ihugyis, had charge of both executive
and judicial functions* Then local prestige and influence,
plus the expense and worry of carrying appeals up to the
capital probably confined appeals to a minimum, and
thereby enhanced the position of the rural authorities.
Another feature is the judicial custom of sentence
always waiting on confession or admission. But the
1use of torture in many frightful forms is a most un­
favourable commentary on this custom. On the whole, 
justice was probably extremely arbitrary and in view of 
the pernicious system of payment of■officials, high and 
low, a good deal of corruption and even extortion w/as 
accepted as part of the evil consequences of having 
failed to avoid any dealings with the Burmese' officials.
The last major department was that of the Taik 
ayarshi, literally officers of the buildings of stone,
1*. Shn,germanos Description of the Burmese Empire, p.69 
M*M.0.S• on Administration of Justice. Vol.IV.
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but really meaning the various officers in charge of
1housing and guarding various valuables, The chief 
among which was the shwe Taik (the Gold storage of the 
Treasury).
The cadre was?
1. Shwe Taik ^ un (Chief Treasurer).
A-. Shwe Taik Su (Treasurers) .
4-. Shwe Taik Sayes (Clerks of the Treasury).
1. Thaw-Kaing (Keeper of the Keys).
The Shwe Taik was not only the treasury, but also the
depositary of the archives of state. Here were kept
x^ ecords of all land, genealogies of hereditary officials,
2revenue re rums, and many other documents.
Provincial Administration?^ The -Burmese had a 
system of Viceroys and Governors, Township Officers, 
and Village Headmen. The Konbaung by nasty however mod­
ified this substantially by restricting the number of 
princes with provincial charges. The post of Viceroy 
was left mo3?e or less suspended after Alaungpaya^ brother 
the Viceroy of Toungoo rebelled in his nephew Naungdawgyis*
1. G. of U.B. 8c S.S. Part I, Vol.II, p.4-92. M.M.O.S. 
Vol.IV. pp.88-91•
2. The Shwe Taik was burnt at the annexation of H.B. in 
1885-
5- Sangermano? D. of B.E.pp. 66-77* Taw Sein Kho-
Selections from the Records of the Hluttaw. Snodgrass 
narrative of the Burmese War pp. 199-201. B.B .Gazettes} 
Vol. 1.pp.4-4-S-4-4-7• M.M.O.S.On the village chapter 
pp . 24-5-249 ,254-258,509 ,514-, 24-6.
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time. The princes were normally kept at the capital, 
similarly the Governors of the greater provinces. They 
might visit their charges once or twice a year, but 
generally the provinces were left in the charge of 
deputies. These deputies, in the name of their absent 
chiefs, had nominal charge over the district or province, 
but there were villages, towns and various enclaves in 
his province over which he had no jurisdiction, for 
they were the appanages of the various members of the 
royal family, Ministers and Military Officers at the 
capital; or of servicemen of all kinds who were controll­
ed by their local area or group commanders who came under 
the appropriate head of department at the capital. The 
position of the district officials was complicated 
further by the presence of the Nakhan, who was really 
the King*s spy, and by the fact that the post which he 
held had been wrested from someone else, who would report 1 
any misdemeanour or even invent one. '^his would involve 
the bribing of the queen or concubine, Y/ungyi or A twin 
h'un, through intermediaries, and combined with the 
absence of a regular salary, and the presence of the set 
sum he had to send either to the Eater of the district 
or the court did not make for flawless civil and judicial 
admini s tr at i on.
Nevertheless, he was the man-in-power on the spot,
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and great deference was shown to him. Mr. G-.E, Harvey 
tells me that U Tin, the compiler of the M.M.O.S. was 
a Myook (township Glerk) at Pagan early in the 20th 
century under the British, and once he witnessed the 
hush that fell on the chattering throngs in the streets 
as U Tin approached - 1 there was a dead silence* he 
said. The awe inspired by a Township Officer under the 
British cannot be explained by the power he possessed; 
he was a very minor official indeed but the old traditions, 
in which the custom of torture during examination of 
suspects was so dreaded that dacoits on being captured 
invariably knelt and mouthed rapidly a stream of con­
fession, after which he was immediately despatched, were 
still very much in mind.
The last unit of provincial administration was the 
village, with the village headman, and his equivalent, 
the Myingaung and Thwe Thaukgyi. This was a fairly 
compact and well-defined unit, with a practically self- 
sufficient economy. Everyone in the unit knew the 
antecedents of everyone else, and indeed it was their 
duty to do so. The headman or Thwe Thaukyi was a 
hereditary official, with generations of authority 
behind him. He knew the needs and moods of the village 
and being a local man could be far more efficient than 
a strange nominee of the central authority. He was
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classified as a Min (Lord) in the official social 
hierarchy, and his Gadaw (lady wife) had the right of 
presentation at Court; he also possessed various minor 
insignias of rank.
Finally to summarize, the Burmese system of 
Administration, it would be relevant to state that the 
Burmese had an old saying. “The three great calamities - 
fire, floods and government". It might be an exaggeration 
but taking a broad view, the people of the country seemed 
to have achieved happiness and comparitive content, in 
spite of, rather than because of their Government* They 
were quite happy in the idea of kingship but the manner 
in which the king’s authority reached the life of the 
common people, could not in the nature of the system, be 
considered satisfactory or happy, The higher provincial 
authorities whether Eaters or personnel specifically 
assigned to a locality were equally the worst type of 
authority, i.e. absentee authorities who left subordinates 
as deputies. The deputies were on the whole parasitic and 
real administration comes only at the level of the 
village and circle headmen, and their equals in rank, the 
Myin Gaungs (Cavalry sexyjeants) and Thwe Thaukgyis and 
Pe&ins (War Boat Commanders) of the various service 
areas for the administration of which they were responsible
The general pattern of community life in Burma based
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on the self sufficient economy and life in the village, 
■unless there were major wars or civil war raging, was 
probably quite tranquil and happy, 'there was 110 pressure 
on the land, the need for shelter and clothing in the 
equable climate was at a minimum, and the fertile soil 
and favourable climate also reduced the hardships of 
food seeking. the essential gloom of the national 
religion was modified, as the Burmese saying has it 
s,Paya le phoo yin. Leik~u le tu yin,” ("and as we go to 
pray at the shrines let*s also dig for turtles’ eggs”); 
they contrived to get a lot of fun out of their 
religion, and still do.
The key features of the'adrainistration must be, 
arbitrariness leading to waywardness at the top, and 
abuse at the lower levels; clumsiness and inefficiency 
in exploiting the full material and man power resources 
of the country, and finally the acceptance by the people 
of kingship as the natural and essential basis of 
Government. There were never any attempts to change 
the nature of the system.
The administrative system was geared for internal 
purposes, and no provision was made for the maximum 
benefit that could be derived from foreign relations* 
There had been -an ancient tradition of princes setting 
out to foreign lands to acquire learning, but it was
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part of the religious tradition, and by our time had 
been whittled down to pilgrimages to holy places. The 
overland routes to the Eastern neighbours passed through 
thinly populated and difficult country and the insignif- • 
icant amount of trade rendered any special instructions 
to the frontier officials unnecessary. Another factor 
is that allihe frontier regions to the North East and 
East were under the charge of vassal chiefs rather than 
Burmese officials, and Burmese foreign contacts were 
restricted normally to the continuance of vassalage of 
these border states. Noreign relations thereby tended 
to have violence as a characteristic, when they do
appear. Either these regions shrunk when the Burmese
/
grew we all and failed militarily, or the Burmese made 
violent attempts to enlarge them.
The self-sufficiency of the economy, plus the
difficulties of communication, combined with the nature
of the border administration made any organic growth of
foreign relations in our period negligible. Noreign
relations were therefore based almost entirely on a
hostile attitude, and viewed only in the way it affected
the prestige of the Burmese king. The actual procedure
in the conduct of foreign relations was for the frontier
chief to send in reports of embassies or of invasions
or raids teg the Hluttaw^. The Hluttaw might recommend___
TT KonBaungz ettP. 45*8 an370T5 when "tine T3hamcT and Nentuhg
Sawbwas reported the Chinese invasions, and Konbaungzet 
■ p«5?2 when the arrival of a Chinese Embassy was reported
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as it saw fit, the course of action to he taken hut 
naturally in the nature of the system, what the king 
willed, took place. The administration had no great 
say in the decision, and only existed to execute the 
king1s commands.
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CHAPTER IV
The Population of Burma in the time of 
the Konbaung Dynasty.______ _
The Burme s e 1 ike the t o tal it ar i an g o ve rnme nt s of 
the 20th century, had need of the most complete type of , 
information about the nature of its resources, both human 
and material, and like them used an extensive system of 
espionage to keep close check. The various subjects, 
knowledge of which was considered essential, have 
changed from time to time, and the Burmese administrative 
machines, might not have been adequate for most purposes, 
but the popxilation figures were essential*. They were 
essential for taxation purposes and for the fixing of 
district quotas for levies in time of need. The first 
recorded census taken in our period was in 178? under 
the order of Bodawpaya, the one previously recorded was 
in the reign of 'i'halun in 1658* It would seem that the 
long time interval between these two censuses woiild imply 
a large measure of ignorance on the part of the Burmese 
government, at the opening of our period; but this 
could not really have been so. The village unit of 
administration was quite effective and each new headman,
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male or female, submitted reports on the exact boundaries 
of his village tract, and the amount of tax he was 
ejected to send in. The palace system of granting 
fiefs (to eat, as the Burmese say) also implied some 
knowledge of the relative worth, and thereby resources of 
each fief, for they were granted to a strictly graded 
class of people. The queens and princes would, for 
instance, receive the larger fiefs of approximately the 
same value, then the ministers and generals, and con­
cubines and other favourites as authors and composers, 
and poets would receive what the Burmese court called 
"appropriate1 (Htaik-tan-lyaw-Swa) towns and villages 
to eat. The fact that the type of dresses worn,
houses built, material used and names given were so
1jealously graded that one is reminded of the account 
of the training of a third generation American millionaire 
who was taught to shake hands cordially, normally, 
tepidly and very languidly; then to offer 3 fingers,
2 fingers and finally ones then to nod, nod coldly, 
then to ignore. The various unfortunates ranged from
1. There was the white umbrella, the white umbrella 
with gold fringe; the gold umbrella with gold 
tassels and without; the red umbrella with gold 
fringes and without; the black umbrellas for 
various grades. Then the types of jewellery on 
ceremonial clothing - some with precious stones, 
some with fewer rows, some without, some with gold 
embroidery.all over, some at the hems only, some^  
without. Then the houses with gilt roofs; some with
(continued next page)
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other third generation millionaires of impeccable ante­
cedents 5 those with a parvenu grandfather, those with 
a grandfather not American horn, those with a mother 
who had 'been divorced, and so on down to the lowest 
inferiors to ignore whom could not possibly cause any 
danger and for whom there was no potential use.
The implication of this story of course, is that 
there was detailed knowledge of everyone concerned. 
Colonel Burney, however, in his article for the Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society (January 1842) saids 
UI am inclined to place much reliance in the census of 
Burmah taken in the year 178p, for I learnt at 
Ava\ that the old King, Mindaragyee had used the most 
severe and extraordinary measures to obtain correct 
returns and that he was employed nearly two years on the 
work. He displaced many, and even put to death some 
of the provincial officers for bringing him incorrect 
or false returns, and he had recourse to spies and 
secret agents, whom he sent to various districts to make
enquiries, to ascertain the real number of houses, and
2bring him the lists.
(continued from previous page)
7 tiers, others with 5 and 2, and just 1. Some with 
windows, some without, some with carved gate posts, 
some without.
1. Col.Burney was the British Resident at the Court of 
Ava after the 1st. Anglo-Burmese War.
2. J. B.E.S. Vol.pl, pp.19-53-
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This would imply that the knowledge possessed by 
the Burmese Government was out of date and secondly that 
the Government authorities did not care to transmit 
correct returns. Burney however, estimates the 
deficiency in the returns at 10% and I propose to regard 
that as quite adequate; anything more than 10% would 
have heeii quite difficult to hide. fhe 1783 census 
records of course no longer exist and the Konbaungzet 
only mentions the ordering of one, so I shall rely on 
what Burney has to say about the census, after due 
allowance has been made for a reasonable rate of increase
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Number of Houses liable for Public Service in 
the different Shan States and Districts subject 
to Ava, as taken by the Kyi-wungyee1s Pather, the 
Myen-wungee, about the Year 1800.
States and Districts No.of
Houses.
Kyaintoun. •    ....  5,000
Ky ain Khyaing....... 1,000
Main Youn...... . 5,000
Thainni..........  30,000
41,000
Mouch.......... .. 3 j 000
Maintaait   39 000
Mainpun  .....  5 00
Heloun...........  100
Kyaintoung ....  2,000
Kyain IChan........ 200
Nyaung Yowe.......  4,000
Oarried forward 539800
States and Districts-No.of
   ^   Hous e s.
Drought forward 33,800”
Legya .   ^O000
Main Kain.......   2,000
Youkzouk......... 4,500
Thigit..........  200
Isaga.......   500
Thibo...........  3,000
Main Youn........  3,000^
Main Loun.......  300
Yhounzay........ 100
Naung-mwon......  50
Main Pyin. ...  50
Tabet........... 900
Toungbain  .....  3,000
Total 76,400
\ wii 1 ■! wi« iiiti ■" rnrtr f r r r n n — trr ■ *hii nn.MMM i ■ m  i «
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It would be interesting in relying to a large 
extent on Burney* s account of the Census of 1783 and 
the Census of 1826 to glance at some of the other 
estimates made by various Europeans who visited Burma in 
our period.
Q 1Major kymes was told by someone whose authority 
he had reason to trust that the towns and villages 
of the Burmese dominion amounted to 8,000. Symes 
however went on to assume that each town and village 
contained on an average 300 houses, and fixing 6 
persons to a household gave a total population of about 
14,4*00,000. His cal'Qulation of 6 persons to a house 
is on any estimate a reasonable one, but from the census 
returns given above, we get only an average of 50 
houses to a town or village, and on this figure, Symes
would have reached a reasonably accurate estimate.
2Captain Hiram Cox wrote a letter to Sir John Shore, 
Governor-General dated 27th November 1797 ip which he 
states that he understood the population of Burma proper 
to be about 4,000,000. He went on to calculate that 
since there were about 8,000 towns and villages in the 
Burmese Empire and allowing each town and village to 
contain on an average 200 houses, then on the basis of 
7 persons to a house there would be 11,200,000 persons
1* SymessEmbassy to Ava. p o, rfl4-3l5 »
2. J.B.R.S. Vol.31, pp.28-29.
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in the Umpire. In a subsequent letter, however,
addressed to Lord Mornington, Governor-General dated 15th
1September 1798 he calculated that the Burmese Umpire
contained about 194,000 square miles with a population
of about 8,000,000. Here again Cox seems to have erred
only in the over-liberal estimates of the average
number of houses a town or village contained.
2Crawford made two estimates of the population from 
an ingenious calculation based on the petroleum consumed 
in Burma. Considering that the slightest margin of 
error would be glaringly reflected in his final estimates, 
this method was remarkably accurate. His two estimates 
based on petroleum gave 2,147,200 and 39300,000. A 
third estimate made by Crawford was based on the density 
per square mile of the province of Bassein, which had 
been occupied in the ^nglo-Burmese War of 1824-26; and 
which gave 24 to the square mile. He applied it to 
the estimated area of Burma and obtained the figure of 
4,416,000. Crawford made another estimate based on 
the house tax levied about 179^ 011 '^he Burmese and 
i'alaingsof the Empire. He calculated a gross receipt 
of 4,400,000 ticals (a tical was equivalent to about
1. J.B.R.S. Vol.5 1, ;)0.29•
2. Embassy to Ava p.55 and pp.467-4-68.
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}'2 ounce of silver) . Allowing for the Burmese habit of 
combining 2 or 5 families into one house.,' he calculated 
the total population to be 1584,000. Adding to this 
figure the number1 of Karen, Chino and other wild tribes
f
based on the application‘bo the whole Bmpire 
of the proportion of wild tribes to the major races in 
Bassein, he obtained the total of 2,414,000, exclusive 
of tributaries.
The Reverend Malcolm states that he was informed 
by the Chief Wungyi at Ava that the last census gave a 
total of 500 ,000 houses. This would give a total
i , . 2population of about 2,100,000 and Rather Sangermano 
gives 2,000,000 and presumably 2,000,000 was the official 
Burmese estimate of the population.
Regarding the population of Burma in the time of 
Alaungpaya (1752-1759) it would be reasonable to assume 
that in view of the constant fighting taking place 
throughout this period, and indeed up to the period just 
preceding the 1785 census, there was no significant 
increase in the population by 1785 and that it was 
approximately the same as that of the 1785 census.
Apart from the casualties in the wars, and the absence
1. Malcolm’s Travels in South Eastern Asia. Vol.I.p.208
2. Sangermanos D. of B.E. p.7
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of the men from their homes, there was a large scale
emigration "by the Gainings of the lower provinces.
For example in 1770? 5,000 Talaing troops rebelled and
rescuing their families, fled with those lalaings who
1would followi, into Siam. On this occasion alone some­
thing like 50,000 Talaings must have fled from Burma.
1 . Konbaungset p.504.
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CHAPTER V
The Armed Forces of the Earlier Kohbaung 
_ _  _  Kings . __ _ _________
On the basis of the accepted theory that the
Burmese king had a right to the service of all his
subjects, it is theoretically true that all the males
of the country could be drafted into the armed forces,
and that the Burmese could be regarded as a, nation of 
1soldiers. In practice, however, the Burmese organised 
their military personnel in the following way. In 
times of peace or when there was no state of emergency, 
there was a standing army, half of which was stationed
on duty at the capital or palace grounds, end in the
2surrounding suburbs* These troops were raised from 
various provinces and towns, and the towns and villages 
from which they were drawn were generally exempted from 
taxation.'" There was a system of allocating lands
1* Symes, Embassy to Ava, p.517* Sangermanos D.of B.E.
p.79*
2. Yule, Mission to Ava p.253* Symes, op.cit* p.317* 
Havelocks Memoirs of the Three Campaigns in Ava, 
p.353. G.U.B. Part I, Vol.II. p.500.
3* Yule, op.cit. p.253*
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for housing (Ne Mye) and cultivation (Lok Mye) and
these lands were normally out of the jurisdiction of
the provincial authorities, and came directly under the
1appropriate minister or general.
There have been various estimates of the number of 
regular troops, and it is interesting to compare the
p
estimate of the regular troops in service in 1879 with 
that given by the Burmese as the regular establishment.^ 
Tie 1879 account makes the cavalry 2 ,5 0 0 strong, and the 
total of the Inner, Outer and Miscellaneous regiments 
at 15,250. The Burmese account gives the foot regiments 
at 159588 and the cavalry at 5,292. It might be argued 
that in 1879 9 the army was that of a truncated Burma, 
which had lost two wars against the British, and had 
been comparatively neglected during the twenty-five 
years’ reign of a pacific monarch. The two kings 
Mindon and Thibaw however, in whose time these estimates 
seem to have been made, were fully intent on maintaining 
their outward state to gloss over the mortification of 
the annexations, and, in view of the administrative
1. Appointment order of the Myin Sugyi Wun and Atwin 
V/un - M.M.O.S.
2o G. of U.B. Part I, Vol.II, pp.498-9 9.
5. M.M.O.S. Vol.II, pp.241-271.
1 1 0
personnel being kept at the old levels, and even being 
increased (Thibaw had eight Hluttaw Wungyis instead of 
the usual four) the regular military establishment must 
have been approximately of the same strength as in the 
days of the earlier Konbaung kings.
Another factor that would make it so, was that the 
regular troops were raised, by the Konbaungzet dynasty, 
from special districts which were hereditary recruiting 
grounds- rPhey were Shwebo:9 Madaya, Alon-Tabayin and
1 fMICanni." I he Konbaung dynasty had risen to power with
the help of their kinsmen and friends from these very 
Burmese, Upper Burma districts. The generals, ministers, 
and officials of Alaungpaya were his comrades-in-arms 
from these villages and the victorious campaigns of the 
early Konbaung kings must have created a strong tradition 
of regular service in the armed forces. These districts 
were in the heart of the truncated Burma of Mindon and 
Thibaw and in the circumstances, the regular cadres, 
based on a hereditary tenure of land, were probably 
the same as in the time of Alaungpaya, Hsinbyushin and 
Bodawpaya. '^ his theory is supported by the fact that 
in the 1785 Census taken by Bodawpaya the My in or Cavalry
1. G. of U,B. and S.S. Part I, Vol.II, p.500.
2. J*B.R.S„ Vol.Jl, p.22
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Jaghires wei'e returned at 7>895 houses, -which at the
standard rate of 7 persons to a hOLise gives a population
of 55>265«* Taking the males at approximately half, i.e.
2 7,5 8 0, *it could then "be calculated that there would he
from 5>000 to 6 ,0 0 0 troopers in the regular cavalry
1regiments. The names of these regiments weres
Q
1) Kathe (Manipur)
2) Akkapat.
5) Ye Bet.
4) Shwe Pyi Yan Aung.
5) My in So Oyi Myamma My in.
6) ft » » Shan "
7) !' n '* Zimme Pa.
8) Nauk Taw Pa.
9) Lamaing.
10) Nan u Mingala.
11) Mingala Ye Nyun.
12) Si Taw.
Another feature of the Burmese regular establishment was 
the organisation of the war boat personnel. They were
1 . M.M.O.S* Vol.II, p.268.
2q The Manipuris were called Kathe and the Burmese
regarding their horsemanship of a very high order,
soon came to recruit their best cavalry from the^
Manipuris whom they periodically captured in their 
raids.
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stationed in the river, i towns- and villages with the 
same system of tax-free state land for their subsistence 
and -imbursement. They formed territorial enclaves in 
the provinces and were directly under their own officers 
local and central. There were about 500 boats in 
operational order, at any time, and this at the rate of 
5 0-60 men for each boat, would give a minimum of 25-30 ,000  
strong hardy men.'1' There was an artillery force too in 
the establishment and it was mainly composed of the 
descendants of the Portugiiese captured at Syriam.
The procedure when there was need for larger forces 
was for the king, to issue through the Hlutoaw, orders 
to the Governors of the Provinces to provide their 
contingents. The levy was proportioned to the population 
of the province or district, estimated according to the 
number of registered houses it contained. The Aw,ey?uhs 
(Provincial Governors) then sent out orders to the local 
officers. _ The mode of raising the levies differed in 
detail in almost every district, but a common method
1. Bymess Embassy to Ava, p.320. G.U.B. Part I,
Vol.II, p.5 0 2.
2. There was in Thalnnis time a List of 112 towns 
and villages which were called Thin Letnet Kaing 
(places of groups of men-at-arms) towns and villages, 
and they were graded into Htaung- (1 ,000) Tars (1 ,00*'£ 
and Kyeits (tens). The towns of Taungdwingyi and 
loungoo for example were expected to provide 1 ,00 0 - 
men each - Pachangy, (now Pakokku) was fixed at 400 
while Moksobo (now Shwebo) was fixed at 2 00.
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was to group .families together to form what was called
one house**" to furnish 2 soldiers and sometimes more.
The selection of the conscript rested with the village
Thugyis, though the conscripts were at liberty to
provide a substitute, either by paying a sum of money,
2or cancelling a debt.
A feature of this mobilisation seems to have been 
the practice of calling for a greater quota than was 
required. The idea was either that the expenses of the 
conscripts could be covered by the men who bought them­
selves off, or that the recruiting officers lined their 
pockets. An alternative idea could be that, as in the 
case of the Germans who allowed for 10% casualties when 
they were massing invasion barges on the French channel
1. Symess Embassy to Ava, p.3 1 7, says 2-4 are required 
to furnish 1 soldier. Yules Mission to Ava and
G. of U.B* and S.S., Part I, Vol.II, p.499 says 16 
families were required to furnish 2 soldiers.
On the basis of 7 persons to a family, this would 
me an 28-50 p e opl e f or Iso Id ier . fjie M • M. 0. S. p. 266 
lists 10 persons as the Home or Peai? Supporter 
of 1 soldier - I have therefore taken 14 as the 
.probable number of persons required to support one 
soldier.
2. Sangermanos D. of B.E. p*79»5 G.U.B., Part I, Vol.H 
p.499* Symess Embassy to Ava, p.317*
3* Sangermanos op.cit. p.79° Yule - Mission to Ava, 
p.252. Snodgrasss Narrative of the Burmese Nars, 
pp.199-2 0 0.
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ports9 allowances had to he made for possible casvialties 
and failure to fulfil the quota, so that the required 
number of men would in any case be forthcoming.
As regards the total number of fighting men that 
could be raised estimates vary. One states that the 
greatest force in their history amounted to 70 ,000
i
troops, of whom 66,000 were a mass levy. Another 
estimate (made by the same writer) contends that even 
under the Alaungpaya dynasty the country could not put 
more than 60,000 in the field.^
The Burmese O^onicles in the account of the Siamese 
campaign of Alaungpaya and Iisinbyushin, and the Chinese 
and Manipur campaigns of the latter king gives a somewhat 
similar figure. Alaungpaya in his Siamese expedition 
started off from the capital with a force of 44,000, but 
sent back 4,000, and reached the walls of Ayudhya with 
just 40,000.5 I-Isinbyushin in 1125 B.E. (1765 A.D. ) 4
sent off 3,000 horse and 20,000 men to Chiengmai, under
1 . Cambridge History of India, Vol.V, p.559*
2. G.E.Harveys History of Burma, pp.272-273? 353-355*
3• Konbaungzet p.3 0 6.
4. Ibid. p.350.
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lNemyo Thihapate, then in 1126 B.E. he sent another 3,000 
horses, and 2 0 ,000 men to attack Siam via the peninsula 
under Maha Nawrahta. Then in the next month he led an 
army of 25?000 into Manipur. .So that the total force 
he could put in the field at this period was 6 ,0 0 0 horse 
and 65?000 men. Then again in the year 1128 B.E.
(1766 A.D.) he sent 200 elephants, 2,000 horses and 20,000
 ^ o
men to Ohiengmai which had rebelled, and then subsequently 
the Chinese invaded from the North; this necessitated 
the sending of 200 elephants, 200 horses, and 2 0 ,0 0 0 men 
by land and 15,000 up the river. The total in this 
critical period was 4-00 elephants, 4,000 horses, and 
55?000 men. In the next wave of invasions^ he could 
muster just about the same number of men. In the 
third invasion^ the total forces sent to meet the Chinese 
was still 62,000. In the next active military period 
however, in Bodawpaya1s reign, when he decided on an
C'
invasion of Siam,^ the Ohronicles set out a list of the
1. Ibid, p#375«
2 . Ibid, p.4 5 0.
3* Ibid, p.441.
4. Ibid, p.441.
5 . . Ibid, p.5 9 5.
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regiments, and the total came up to 13?400 hoi’ses and
134,000 men.
'the difference in the numerical strength of the 3 
Konbaung kings is probably due to the fact that Alaungpaya 
only reigned 7 years, and that when he began his reign, 
he started with just the volunteers from his home 
districts. Hsinbyushin on the other hand was an e^er- 
ienced warrior prince ruling over a unified Burma, and 
probably his 60,000 men, in a-period of great strain and 
danger, represented the true strength of the Burmese -&rrny. 
Bodawpaya had had no practical experience within the time 
of his father or brothers, being frequently left behind 
to escort the royal ladie.s back to the capital or to 
help guard it, while his father and elder brothers 
campaigned. He had come into the full inheritance of the 
Konbaungzet success and possibly his army was swelled 
enormously by camp followers.
1he Burmese formally classified military personnel
1into 6 categoriesi
1) Body guards and hereditary household troops, 
called Mawla.
i. m.m.o.s. vol.iv, pp.250-251.
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2) The hereditary servicemen from the service 
jaghires (fiefs), called Bn Ta*
3) The troops from the villages and towns listed 
as troop-raising areas, called The Ni.
4) -The troops of allies and vassals, called Thaka.
5) The troops raised from prisoner-of-war colonies 
- for instance the Manipuris and Chiengmai 
prisoners of war captured hy Tha Lnn raised 
troops on occasion* These troops were called 
Ri Pu.
6) The road-makers or prisoners, were called the 
Ala Wika.
This sounds too .formal like most other Burmese classif­
ications, hut is probably correct as far as it goes.
The internal organisation of the Burmese army can be 
ascertained to some extent from the following mobilization
order of Maha Bandoola, at the beginning of the 1st
1Anglo-Burmese War of 1824-26*
nTo the .Bo’s Sitkes, Nakhans, and Tat Hmu Officers, 
the Lord Commander-in™Chief - Maha Bandula commands - 
in the troops that are to be raised let no man who is, 
poor of sight, affec'ted with cataract, heavy-eyed or has
1. Refs M.M.O.S. Vol.IV, p . 258 - Letwethondara1 s (he
was the great poet.of Alaungpaya*s time, who served 
in the army) Theininga Byulia Sit Thamaing or the 
Art of War pp*127-130.
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asthma, or Dula (a vague Burmese term for any disease 
from rheumatism to incipient syphilis), or walks in 
his sleep, ox1 has malformed limbs, or is under 20 or 
over 50 years of age, or is muddle-headed - he recruited; 
let all so afflicted he left out. Let anyone who is 
fit to join the ranks he equipped with 2 Pyis (about 20 
lbs) of rice in a shoulder sling bag, one pair of 
leather sandals, one large needle for extracting thorns. 
Let the summons go out to all the towns and villages 
with military quotas. When the men-at-arms arrive 
beneath the Golden Beet (i.e. at the capital) and are 
taken into the troop formations, let every 5 
formed into a Taos a (literally eating from one pot).
Let each Taos a have 1 Ivloka, 4 Mena, 1 copper pot, 1 
chopper, 1 axe, 1 pick, 1 spade, 1 curved chisel, 1 
flat chisel, 1 awl, 1 mallet. To each gun, there should 
be a rope of 14 feet length, 10 ticals in weight of 
fuse, 1 viss of powder, 100 balls, 50 cartridges, 5 
flints, and 1 steel striker. Bor every 2 0 J3as let
there be 1 Akyat (CoriDoral). Bor every group of 10, 
there should be 7 musketeers, 2 Carriers. Let the 
Akyat be equipped with a Maung Aung spear. Over every 
group of 5 Akyats let 1 Thwethauk be placed in command. 
Over every 2 Thwe Thauk let 1 Tat Hmu be placed in 
command. Over eveiy 5 Bat Hmus let 1 Bo be placed in
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command. On the march, let the men he grouped into 5 
groups, and let 5 of the 5 march in front of the group 
officer, and 2 behind- Let the Akyat march in the 
midst of 10; the Thwe Thauk ho in the midst of 50; 
the Tat Hmu in the midst of 100, and the Bo in the midst 
of 5 0 0, Let there be no confusion on the march; let 
not the Van, Main body, and Hear become mixed. Let 
them keep a distance of one march (6 miles) in between 
them. When on the march let 2 men of intelligent 
perceptions be appointed Tat Hmu, each to command a 
troop of 20 horse, half to carry guns and half to carry 
spears. Let one Tat Emu be stationed 2 miles in front 
of the Nga Ya Bo (commander of 500) and the other be 
stationed 2 miles in front of the main centre force 
of the Bo Gyoke (General). Let them be in touch with 
each other.
The front Tat Hmu should ascertain whether the 
camping site (selected) is suitable or not, whether 
there is fodder for elephant and horse, whether the main 
body should halt or rest, and together with intelligence 
of the enemy should, without stop, daily, send in reports 
on fast horse to the 500 Bo. The 500 Bo shall then 
transmit reports through the second. Tat Hmu to the 
responsible authority, the Bogyoke.
1 2 0
When the camping site is reached, before the 
elephants and horses are unsaddled, let pickets he 
placed on guard duty in all 8 directions (Nth-N.B. - 
East - South East, South etc*) up to a distance of 2 
miles from the main force, let the elephants and horses 
he unloaded only when this has heen properly done, and 
after this let the men prepare their food and eat.
When night arrives, let 1 Kyat (10 men) have one 
fire, and 1 man he on guard duty (in turn) to watch the 
fire and see that the elephants1 and horses’ tethers are 
secure. Let each man1 s veapon he kept near, let everyone 
he wakeful. Let the main hody, and the van and the rear 
order their Tat Sau (heralds) to strike the gongs, and 
shout 3 times in the night. When the army is encamped 
at any camp, let the officers of the 500 Bo Command 
report to the Bo and then with swords in hand repare to 
the Bogoke before retiring for the night, to discuss the 
situation, tactics and strategy. Let this order he 
sent out to the officers of the army.”
Maha Bandula*s Order gives the formal organisation 
of the army up to battalion strength, and leaves out the 
higher echelons. The ranking after the 500 Bo was 
extremely loose. Normally, above the 500 Bo there would 
he a Tat Paung Bo (officer commanding many Tats or 
battalions. He would he in charge of 3? or 5 °r 10 (as
12 1
seen in the Chinese invasions) and his responsibilities 
seem to have been for limited periods and specific 
purposes, after the accomplishment of which, the Bo 
Gyoke or General would be free to change or modify his 
command*
1
The Bogyoke was the officer in command over more than 
one Bat Paung Bo* There was another rank higher than 
Bogyoke,the Bo Hmu; he was in command over more than one 
Bogyoke and was also termed Sit Bayin, i.e. Lord of War.
It is usually reserved for use during campaigns when the king 
or a senior prince was in charge of the whole army. The fact 
that it would only be used in this manner, when the incumbent 
had a far greater title, of prince or king, makes the occas­
ions very few. In the Chinese and Siamese campaigns of our 
period,the great leaders Nemyo Bhihapate,Maha Nawrahta,Maha 
Sithu, Mahathihathura were referred to throughout as Bogyokes 
Maha Nawralita and Mahathihathura made the ultimate 
decisions in their respective campaings, but their sen­
iority seems to have arisen more from their ranking at 
court than as field officers. Mahathihathura was both 
a Wungyi, and a brother-in-law of the king. 1‘here is
1. Bhe xaodern Burmese equivalent i.e. Lt.General Ne 
Win, who in Burmese is called 1 Bogyoke He Win - 
but the Military attache at the Burmese Embassy in 
Longon, Major General Bun HIa Oung was also entitled 
to be called Bogyoke.
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however a specific occasion when a Bo Hmu was officially ' 
appointed - King Bagyidaw in 1186 B.E, (1829 A.D.)
appointed the Wungyi Thado Mingyi Maha Min Khaung to be
Bo Hmu.^
Another feature of the organisation was that • 
whenever someone was appointed to the command of an 
army as Bogyoke there were also appointed 2 Sitke’s to 
assist him* They were normally the two senior regiment­
al officers in command, Then 2 other officers, a 
Nakhan and a Tat Ye were appointed, The Nakhan was 
the chief Military Police Officer and reported to the 
Bogyoke on the morale of the men; the Tat Ye kept accounts
and was in charge of the clerical work.
The higher ranks, when the composition of the 
armies of our period is examined, were composed almost 
wholly of all ranks and kinds of ministers and officials 
at the capital, together with the provincial governors 
and eaters of towns and villages.
The equipment for the Burmese army was very 
primitive. For each company comprising 100 privates 
and lj officers, there had to ‘be lip pairs of leather 
shoes (or sandals) 113 calabash gourds (for water
1. M.M.O.S. Vol. IV, p.262. Letwethondara*s The Nin 
G-a Byuha Sit fhamaing, p.131 •
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bottles) 20 copper pots for cooking curry, 20 copper 
pots for cookinr; rice, 20 Ya Ba (Yaba was a large 
lacquer tray out of which 5 ^en could eat) 20 Mo Ka 
(waterproof covering, like a tarpaulin or oil cloth),
160 large nails, 20 axes, 20 hammers, 20 Dama (chopping 
swords) 20 saws, 111 swords, 10 small gongs (used rather 
as the trumpet was) for the Akyats, 1 medium sized gong 
for the use of the Yhwethaukgyi, 1 gong painted 3 parts 
red, 1 part gold for the use of the fat Hmu, 1 red 
umbrella for the use of the ...fhwethaukgyi, one horse 
for ditto, 1 red umbrella with gilt' fringe for the use 
of the Tat Hmu, one horse for ditto, one silver-handled 
sword for the use of the fhwethaukgyi, and then 10 
spears and 10 guns.
Alaungpaya when he started his resistance against 
the falaing conquerors of Ava in 1752 A.D. could not 
even provide a musket apiece for his small group of 
followers and since the country could not produce muskets 
they Vi/ere decrepit, out-of-date specimens which had been 
brought into the country over a period of time. They 
were either of French manufacture or condemned muskets 
from the English arsenals in India.' It was estimated 
that in 1795 A.D.^ the Burmese had about 209000 muskets
1. Symess Embassy to Ava, p.319a J.G-, Scott* Burma p. 19
2. Symess op.cit. p„319*
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in the Royal arsenals, and since Burma had suffered no
major defeat since 1752 A.D. it is hardly likely that
Alaungpaya had ever collected more than this figure.
Their artillery, as mentioned "before, was manned by
a corps of Christian gunners, but though there were some
people who could cast guns and try to model them on the
1European pattern the artillery probably never amounted 
to much, and at the height of the Konbaungzet power, 
Bodawpaya, in his march into Siam in 1786 A.D. started
pout with a train of 20 guns but even these were only
old ship* s gins mounted 011 low carriages. The Burmese
however, did have a lot of very small calibre guns of
one to three inch bore, and these jingals were used
constantly and with good effect.*^
The Burmese, like the armies of chiangmai and
Ayudhya who relied on fighting elephants u,sed to 'keep '- 'v
hundreds of trained elephants for fighting from ancient 
4times , Originally the elephants carried towers from which 
spearmen and archers fought, but in the Konbaung period, 
jingles of one to three inch calibre were mounted on 
them. Seven musketeers were stationed round each 
elephant in the fighting for mutual support, and the
1. Yules Mission to Ava, p.lip*
2. Symess op.cit. p.llj.
5. The Cambridge History of India, Vol.V, p.560. G-.U.B.
Part I, Vol.lie p.501.
4. Yules The-:Book of .Sen Marco Polo. Vol.II. p.99°
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proportion ox elephants, horses and foot were normally 
in the ratio Is 10 s1 00.
The commissariat department was just as casual.
The soldiers in any case did not want much, and they 
could eat almost anything, including leaves and insects. 
The procedure, as seen in the Siamese campaign was tor 
advance parties to collect food from the nearby towns 
and villages which was then dumped at intervals along 
the line of marche When there was a long siege 
ahead as in Ayudhya in 1767, the soldiers were set to 
cultivating the paddy fields.^
pThe regulars had some sort of uniform. But most 
of the conscripts do not seem to have had any issued 
to them; they probably had, however, something to 
distinguish them, such as a piece of red cloth tied round 
their heads.
The discipline of the army did not extend to an
understanding and adoption of Western parade ground form­
ations and precision. Bandula* s orders implied that the 
companies ambled along in more or less a state of confus­
ion. The army*s loyalty and obedience to orders was
1. Sangermano: D of B.E. p.80.
2. Havelocks Memoirs of the 5 Campaigns in Ava, p.353*
Congers Personal Narrative of 2 Years Imprisonment 
in Burma p.106.
5 • Sangermano % op.cit. p«7 9•
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however, strictly enforced and based on a frightful 
though effective system* The recruits were normally 
required to leave their families behind as hostages in 
the hands of the provincial authorities,^ while the 
officers1 families were taken care of at the capital.
It was customary to execute the family of even the most 
high ranking officer^ in front of the whole army, or in 
public, if he should be convicted of any major fault.
In the army itself, every single officer was 
directly accountable for any misdemenour on the part of 
anyone in his command, but he also had the power of 
life and death over his charges."’
The recognized tactics used by the army were not 
generally regarded ’ as such, and often the accusation 
was made that they were destitute of any. This
1. Konbaungzet, p.504.
2. Ibid. p.531,
3. M.M.Q.S. Vol.IV*p♦264, in which an account is given 
of muskets being stolen from Saw Taing Khan1s com­
pany; of Biirnya Set’s regiment, and part of the 
Viceroy of Prome’s division. The company and regim­
ental commander fled, nd the executioner had al­
ready laid hands on the Viceroy of Pro me for 
execution when the 2 officers were brought in. The 
2 officers who could not produce the Thwethaukgyi 
and Akyat who were in charge of the muskets, were 
executed.
4. Sangermanos D. of B.E. p*80.
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misconception seems to have arisen from the fact that a 
lot of time was spent either in the Burmese stockades 
being attacked by Siamese, Chinese, or British, or the 
Siamese, Chinese, and British defensive positions being 
attacked by the Burmese * 'Stockading must however be 
admitted as one of the favourite tactics of the Burmese.
A Chinese account says that cavalry were placed on either 
flank of the main body to close in upon the enemy. If 
victory appeared doubtful, the army rapidly entrenched 
itself under cover of heavy fire from artillery and 
small anas. When the smoke cleared away, the stockade ,
i
was complete and the men inside were ready to defend it.
In 179zl*j Ql British Officer reported to the supreme 
Government at Calcutta^  "It is their custom to fortify
o
every time they move, as the ancient Romans did.'1' 'I’he 
Burmese seemed to have displayed skill and judgement in
X
the formation and defence of stockades.
A,'.description given is as followss ,?lhe unvarying . 
element was a continuous wall, sometimes as high as 
twenty feet of solid timber, the stem of bamboos or 
trunks of saplings from the neighbouring forests. At
1. Harveys History of Burma, p*255*
2. Political Consultations April 7^h 1794*, No .37*
5 . Snodgrasss Narrative of the Burmese War, p.21.
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the top run horizontal beams which held all firmly
together. At intervals were loop-holes for musketry
fire* Within the enclosure, which was square or
oblong, were raised platforms of earth or wood from
which small guns could discharge over the paling.
Inside, and outside the stockade were trenches, and on
the external face were often Ahattis formed of trunks 
1and trees.
lietwethon&ara the great Burmese poet .who served 
in the armies of the last pre-Konbaung King of Ava, and 
iinder Alaungpaya, liaungdawgyi, ,E.sinbyushin, and Singu 
wrote a treatise on the art of war called the “Theninga 
Byuha Sit Ihamaing and some of the more interesting 
features of the hook are given helow:-
Ihe formations used in an army's march.
1) “Like the sha Iilinkan (like a rug or carpet) 
the van, main hody and rear ’being of equal 
strength.
2) “Like the Pyathat (like the many tiered roof 
of a Burmese Palace) rather like a triangle - 
a small van gradually spreading out into a 
strong rear.
1. Bitchie and Evans: “Lord Amherst11 p.95*
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3) "Like the Pan Pone Tawng«(Like a basket) - 
rather like a wide-mouthed narrow-based basket - 
the rear being smaller than the van.
4) "Like the Ma Xo Si" , (like a Ma Xo -.toura),
in which the van and rear were approximately 
the same size and smaller than the centre.
The 2 formations used in approaching the enemy; -
1) "Like the moon**- in which the king or general 
stayed in the centre and in concentric circles 
the regiments were station round him.
2) "Like the sun, - in which the king or general 
placed', himself at the head of the army and the 
army ranging itself behind him, followed him 
wherever he led.
The 6 formations used in attack;
1) "Like the wing of a Galon11 (a mythical bird) in
which the general commanded the centre, while
the 2 wings spread themselves out on his left 
and right.
2) "Like the waves"- in which the attack was 
delivered in successive waves.
3) "Like the chief bull in a .cattle herd" - in
which the attack was delivered in a concentrated
rush at the point of initial contact.
1J0
4) “Like the bow" - in which the centre was
slightly behind the wings, whichvere spread 
out.
5) “Like the Ma Kan5’™ (Makan - Great Fish) in
which there was a van, centre and rear, and
2 flanks of equal strength*
6) “Like the snake1' ~ in which the offensive was 
made as sxipple as a snake; giving way here, 
adv on cing to th e en emy re ax*, s orne w he r e else.
The 6 ‘defensive formations %
1) “Like the bridge across the river1' - i0e. the 
whole ai*my in close-packed ox*der, shoxildei* to 
shoulder in a*horizontal mass*
2) “Like the claws of a scorpion'* - in which the 
2 wings were extended like the scorpion's 
claws from the main body.
3) “Like the front of a cax>t“ - in which the
levies were placed in the centre, and the best
troops or regulars were ranged round them.
4) “Like the be e-hive" - in which the main body
stayed in the middle, and the rest of the
army packed itself round it.
5) “Like the crow's feet" - in which three 
separate columns radiated from and in front
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of the main body, while another column is 
ranged behind it.
6) “Like the tripod” - in which the army would 
divide into 3 equal parts which would be 
placed at the points of an equilateral triangle. 
The treatise lays down that against the defensive form­
ation “like the front of a cart” the “like the wings of 
a Galon” attack was to be used. Then against the 
“like the tripod” defence, the “head of a cattle herd” 
attack should be used* Against the “like a bridge 
and scorpion claws defence formations the “like the 
waves” attack should be employed. Against the “like 
the crow’s feet” defence the Makan (Great Fish) attack 
was to be used.
And finally against the “like the beehive” defence, 
the snake attack would be employed.
This treatise was not just an anachronistic 
formality; we will find accounts of the use of these 
tactics in the Siamese wars*
It has been said that “The great conquest of the 
Burmese under the Emperors Alompra and Zempiusciem must 
not therefore be attributed to a native courage which the^  
are far from possessing, but to the vigorous discipline 
which kept them in awe,^ and the British found that
1. Sangermanos D of B.E. p.80.
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during the 2nd and 3^d Anglo-Burmese wars of 1852, and 
1885 5 the Burmese soldiers were reluctant to face 'British 
bayonets and guns and generally retreated at most 
encounters*
However, it must be remembered that in Oriental 
warfare, the fall of a leader, or his personal example 
is usually of the greatest significance in the conduct 
of his troops* The leaders in the days of the early 
Konbaung kings of our period were great officers and 
ministers who had risen to power from very obscure 
beginnings largely because of their courage.
They were the 68 chosen commanders of U Aung Zeya, 
the Lord of Moksobo, who with this 68 set out to defy the 
Mon conquerors of Ava in 1752* fbe odd'S:; against them 
would have daunted anyone not possessed of great courage 
or faith in high destiny# A decade later, these same 
people were leading the common people of Burma against 
the might of the great power of China at its zenith, 
conquerors of Turkestan and Central Asia, and destined 
after its failure in Burma to subdue the Gurkhas, and 
no one doubts the courage of the Gurkhas today#
For the first Anglo Burmese war of 182^-1826 
before the Burmese had ever tasted great defeat, the 
accounts given by eye witnesses and observers paint a
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clear picture of something to he proud of. A Colonel 
Bowen reported 1 they fought with a ferocity; an 
obstinacy I never witnessed in any other troops; they 
fought desperately, reserving their fire to the last 
moment and seldom missing their object.*** Another 
account says "They blindly charged with their spears on 
our bayonets; they neither gave nor expected quarter, 
but continued fighting long after all hope of success or 
escape had gone.^
Summing up the worth of the Burmese army, it should 
be reasonable to say that though the Burmese broke before 
the British as the French in 194*0 did before the far 
better equipped and better led Germans, they were a 
proud, energetic army, believing in its high destiny.
Its morale was never broken by heavy* defeat, and was 
kept high by the loot and slaves obtained from successive 
campaignss in effect a dangerous weapon in the hands 
of the Burmese kings of our period and in the limited 
sphere in which it was engaged, of first class importance.
1. G.S.Harveys ‘ History of Burma, pp.237-238.
2 . Ibid. p.2 3 8.
154
CHAPTER VI
The Eastern Neighbours of Burma at the opening 
of the period 1752-1819.____________
The greatest neighbour Burma had towards the East 
was of course the Ohinese Empire, and it is necessary 
to examine the nature, the strength and the attitude of 
this Empire#
The Chinese Empire 0f our period was that of the 
conquering Manchu in their most energetic and successful 
phase. The Manchus had extended their hold to China 
proper in 1644 with the help of Wu San Kuei, Chinese 
General in charge of the Shan Hai Kuan Gate1 ^ nd With 
him had pressed on to the control of all China. Wu 
San Kuei having thrown in his lot with the Manchus, had 
determined to finish off the Mings and in 1662 marched
into Burma with 100,000 men^ and had successfully
)
secured the surrender of the last fugitive Ming Emperor 
by the Burmese. Wu San Kuei in turn had been
1. Li Ung Bin: Outline of Chinese History, p.317*
2. Li Ung Bin: Ibid. p.329*
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liquidated as a dangerous and over-mighty subject by 
Kang H*si, the grandfather of Ohien Lung, The Manchu 
grip on the boundaries of the old Ming - m^pire was 
tightened and made official and the boundaries of 
the Empire were slowly extended until they more or less 
coincided with those of China under the great Wu Ti who 
reigned from B.C.140-87 B.C.
In 1735 the Emperor Yung Cheng died and Chien Lung 
came to the throne. He was the fourth of the Manchu 
Emperors, and was described as one of the shrewdest and 
strongest rulers in the history of the world, and taken 
all round, was the most capable monarch that ever occupied
t 1the Chinese throne. No monarch ever gave himself more 
freely to the task of administration. Few kings, even 
on the Burmese frontier, could escape that vigilant eye. 
Couriers covering 200 or 500 miles a day kept him in 
daily touch with the farthest corners of the Empire. In
p
ten days, messages from Burma reached Peking.
It will then be seen that at the opening of our 
period, China was a great and vigorous Empire, many 
times the size of Burma, ruled over by a vigorous and
1. E#H. Parkers Burma with special reference to her 
relations with China, p.80.
2. Luce - J.B.R.S. C.I.fs of Burma in the 18th century. 
Vol.15 Part II. p.119.
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ambitious man* The theoretical basis of his power how­
ever had some resemblance to the situation in Burma.
The difference lay in the Chinese belief that the 
Emperor was chosen by heaven as being the worthiest, 
while in the Burmese conception the king while ruling 
because he was the worthiest, owed no gratitude to 
anyone but himself.
I'he Chinese Emperor stood at the head of the state, 
and was regarded as the father of his people. But 
it was in view of his mandate from heaven that he 
compelled the loyalty of his subjects and, especially, 
his ministers. In fact even his highest ministers were
mere clerks, whose sole duty was to transcribe faithfully
2.the Imperial Commands. He in turn, was believed to 
be able to retain his mandate only through his virtue.
If he persistently proved himself unworthy, heaven 
might transfer its decrees to someone else, ,j:hus, a 
successful rebel might also claim to have received the 
divine commission.^
1. Latourette. The Chinese - their History & Culture. 
Vol.II, p.26. Li Ung Bin - Outline of Chinese 
History - p.34*7*
2. Li Ung Bin p.4*55j who quotes the Emperor Chien 
Lung’s words.
3. Latourette. op.cit. Vol.II, p.27.
4. An interesting point that the Chinese and Burmese 
had in common was the taboo on the king’s real name.
(continued next page).
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All official authority as in Burma was derived from
the king. He was the supreme source of legislation
and of justice. In practice however, most of the
Emperor1s power had to be delegated. China was a world
power, and the Viceroy system theoretically called for
a greater degree of decentralization, while the
Konbaungzet ruled over a much smaller territory and
hardly dared to delegate any power to the provincial
authorities; but there is some resemblance in the
factors that forced some decentralization and qualified
the absolutism of the king or Emperor. These factors,
may be described as precedent, public opinion, custom,
official inertia, together with the great distances
involved in the supervision and checking of provincial 
1officials, the legal codes of the past and the
p
elaborate formalities and ceremonial of the court.
(continued from previous page).
The C h i n e s e  affected to insist upon the Burmese 
King&!‘ alwhys naming themselves in his letters, and 
in speaking of them Chinese use what they suppose 
to be the family and personal names, thus Meng Tun 
(Maung Waing) and Meng Eeng (Maung Khin) for Hsin 
Byshin and Tharawadday. Ref• E.H .Parker: p.80. 
Latourette China - Her Culture and History, Vol.II.
P  • 2 8 .
1* The Burmese Empire was dominated by the great high­
way of the Irrawaddy, and by relays of fast war 
boats a Governor could be created or executed quite 
speedily - the time distance between Ava and Rangoon 
was about 5 days.
2. In China as in Burma, there was a vast horde of 
palace functionaries, the chief of whom received 
high ranks.
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The Central machinery of Government like the 
Burmese, was meant to assist in imposing the king’s laws, 
edicts and desires on the country*' Below the Emperor 
in the capital and acting for him were numerous bodies 
which supervised national government* The highest body 
theoretically was the Hei Ko donominated in English as 
the Grand Secretariat* This body originated under the 
Mings. Admissions to it were regarded as the highest 
honour for a Chinese official.' Its functions however 
were nominal since the members had duties which kept 
them away. In practice the highest was the Chun Chi 
Ch’u, which translated very freely was the "Grand Council
p
or Council of State”.
There were then three other major bodies*
1* Latourette* op.cit. pp.29-31* Li Ung Bin op.cit.p.34-9
2 . Li Ung Bin in his 11 Outline of Chinese History", p.411
informs us that the name meant Council of Strategy 
and took the dominant position among the organs of 
state in the time of Yung Cheng during the bitter 
fighting against the Dzungars. In 173^ its 
authority began to take on permanency and its 
authority extended to other than military matters. 
Under the older system everything passed through 
the hands of the Grand Secretariat and state 
secrets often leaked out. The members of the Chun 
Chi Ch’u usually had othei* substantive appointments. 
They were recruited in most cases from the ranks 
of the General Secretaries, presidents and vice- 
presidents of the Metropolitan boards.
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1) Gens orate (established in 1658) - a most 
intriguing body for -which no other Eastern 
system of 'Government is seen to have any 
parallel. Its duty was to watch and check 
officials, check Imperial State documents, and 
through the mediums of Memorials, to the 
throne, take exception to some of the Emperor’s 
acts of which they disapproved. The last power 
was a very genuine one, and evidently taken 
seriously by most people for in the long years 
of Manchu rule there were only fifty cases of 
Gensorate officials being punished by the 
Emperor.
2) The Office of Transmission, whose duty was to 
open, record and transmit memorials to the 
throne on routine business.
5) Court of Revision, which exercised general
supervision on the administration of criminal 
law “ together with the Board of Punishment and 
Gens or ate, it formed what was known as the 
nTliree Supreme Tribunals’’ which acted as the 
Court of Appeal.
After these three bodies, there were various other 
bureaux and boards,' the six chief being
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Li Pu - Board of Civil Office (Appointments, etc.)
Hu Pu - Board of Revenue.
Li Pu - Board of Ceremonies.
Hsing Pu - Board of Law.
Kung Pu - Board of ks.
Ping Pu - Board of War.
It will have Been noticed that there were many points 
of similarity in the central machinery of the Ohinese 
and Burmese Governments. The Chinese system, however, 
seems to have divided the administrative functions in a 
more efficient manner, and to have avoided the Burmese 
concentration of all government under the king in the 
hands of one Body - the Hluttaw. However there is the 
same lack of facilities for a voice in the Government 
By elected representation, and the same absence of 
provision for the effective conduct of relations with 
foreign powers of equal standing.
The provincial administration of the Manchus was 
theoretically Based on a greater degree of decentraliz­
ation than was the Burmese provincial administration of 
the KonBaung dynasty, But there were great similarities
V
in the use of espionage on the higher provincial officers, 
in the system of appointments and postings direct from 
the capital, and in the swift and complete disgracing of 
any official who was held responsible for anything that
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the king or emperor disliked*
The first step in the provincial administration of 
the Manchu empire was the division of China proper into 
eighteen provinces - Sheng.
Then these eighteen were divided into Fu or 
prefectures.
T’ing or sub-prefectures independent of a Fa.
Chou anothere=-mit independent of a Fu.
Chou subject of a Fu*
Then a Hsien (district) subject to a Fu or 
independent Chou.
The chief provincial officers were
Tsung TU )
)
or ) Viceroy or Governor General
Chin T’ai )
then the Hsun Fu )
Fu Tuan  ^ Governors
)
Fu T1 ai )
The viceroy of course was the head of the province. 
He was usually placed over two provinces except in 
Chih 1/i and Szechuan. Under him in each province was 
a governor. The viceroy’s power was supposed to be 
that of a monarch, subject of course to the Umperor. 
Theoretically the governor also had the same position in
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relation to the viceroy, hut in practice the two
officials were often in conflict and acted as a check 
on each other.
Unlike the •Burmese provincial authority, the Chinese 
received a small salary, which was inadequate tor the 
upkeep of the far greater state kept by the Chinese 
officials, and therefore, the same defect - of financial 
corruption was present. As in the case of the Burmese 
officials Uribes were necessary to secure appointment, 
and to receive re-appointment after the expiry of the 
usual 3 year term of office.
The Viceroys and Governors were expected to trouble 
Peking as little as possible, but 011 the other hand, they 
were responsible for anything that went wrong.
The Chinese -Empire derived its revenue mainly from 
under the four heads; of land tax (which under the later 
Manchus was a combination of poll tax and substitute for 
forced service or labour) tribute, customs and the salt 
monopoly. The land tax was supposedly on the assessment 
of 1713 > but in practice 10 to 50% additional tax was 
collected. Tribute was collected in produce5 silk, 
copper and grain being the chief articles collected.
In addition there were miscellaneous sources of 
income, such as the octroi (as in Burma) and fish and 
tree taxes.
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The potential man power of China does not seem to
have been effectively exploited under the Manchus, hut
it would be relevant to have some idea of the population
of China in our period. The population of China -under 
1the Manchus especially in the 18th and early 19th 
centuries seemed to have increased rapidly. Many 
estimates have been made, partly based on census returns 
and at the time of the emergence of the Konbaung dynasty 
in Burma (1752) it would be reasonable to assume that 
China had a population of approximately 190 - to 200 
million, which would make China in man power resources
1. Latouretue; The Chinese - their Culture and 
History. Vol.II, pp.8-9*
2. "What appears to be a fairly conservative set of 
figures arising out of a careful examination of 
the studies made by Western scholars gives the 
following totals. '1
1650 - 70 million.
1710 - 140 million.
1790 - 342 million.
Another set of gigures gives
1741 - 147,410,539
1771 - 214,600,350
I793 - 3 1 3, 281, 295.
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about 100 times stronger than the Burmese.
The Chinese military establishment, after the great 
rebellion of Wu San Kuei in 1665? and before the large 
scale European entry into the China scene about 1850, was 
based primarily on the need to hold down China as a 
conquered country.
The relation between the sovereign and his people 
was that of a master and his slaves. Excepting the 
sovereign everyone was a Nuts'ai (slave) both in theoiy and 
in practice. After the Manchus came into power all 
Chinese military officers were required to refer them­
selves as Nut'sai in all.communications addressed to the 
throne♦
The descendants of the original conquerors of China 
were grouped under banners of varying colours. The 
original eight became twenty four but they were often 
referred to as the 'eight banners1 ♦ These twenty four \; 
were divided into three groups5 Manchu, Chinese, and 
Mongol. At the time of the conquest of China, the 
Banner men totalled 200,000. This number was later 
raised to 250 ,0 00 and eventually, since membership was 
inherited, reached 300,000. Half of the to tail, was 
stationed in Chih Li, to provide' for the defence of the 
capital. The contingents were stationed in Manchuria,
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Sinkiang, Kansu Shensi and Shansi, with garrisons in 
other strategic centres*
The heads of the major divisions of the banners 
were ’Tartar Generals’ who outranked the Viceroys, and 
nominally served as a check on them.
In addition to the Banner Army, another force com­
posed of Chinese existed. They were called the ’Green 
Camps’ and were organised hy provinces. In 1856 they 
totalled 600,000 hut were really far fewer, since the 
officials padded pay x*olls. Bach province had a 
commander of the Green standard, hut in practice the 
Viceroys had contingents directly under their command.
The Chinese took their soldiering more seriously 
than the Burmese did, for their officers had to take 
the district or Hsien service examination, then a 
provincial examination as. well as a final degree which 
involved a journey to Pekin. The impression one obtains 
from this examination of Chinese administration is that 
although from their more polished and maturer civilization, 
which, excluding the over-weening conceit that imagined 
China to he the whole civilised world, the Chinese gained 
an objective approach towards affairs which 20th century 
minds would approve of, it was open to the same kind of 
abuses as the Burmese administration. The two most 
significant points that one notices is that the character
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and ability of the Emperor were the major factors in 
the efficiency ■ and strength of the country and the 
direction of policy. The second point is that since 
the empire was large and the Viceroyalties correspondingly 
so, the effect of delegating so much authority to the 
Viceroys, while hanging the threat of disgrace and death 
over them, for any harm that might befall the Emperor* s 
prestige, tended to prohibit the Viceroys from applying 
to the centre for assistance; and if in the course of 
local vainglory Chinese affairs suffered, then wholesale 
deception would be in order. This second point plays 
a great part in our period in the relations between 
China and Burma. It' will be shown later how the Viceroy 
of Yunnan misjudged his own strength, blundered and 
tried to cover up his mistakes. An additional feature 
of the Chinese and Burmese administrations was that 
there was no tradition of regular diplomatic relations.
The Chinese frontier Viceroys like the Burmese, reported 
on the affairs of the territory bordering their respective 
provinces,"** and on the arrival of foreign embassies, first 
reported their arrival to the court before letting them 
proceed.
Proceeding from the acceptance of the policy of the
1* Kohbaunzet p.614* E*H.Parker, Burma- Relations
with China, pp.82 and 95-
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Emperor and his particular ideas denoting the nature of 
foreign relations with the non-Chinese world, it would 
he relevant to state that Chien Lung the ruling Chinese 
Emperor at the opening of our period had inherited from 
his father a policy of imposing Chinese administration 
over the non-Chinese peoples round China proper- Tibet, 
for example, had to accept in 1751* two Ambans (Represent- 
atives of Pekin) to supervise its political affairs and
*1
to influence the succession.
The nature and attitude of the ruling Chinese Emperor 
had the utmost significance for Burma, for given an aggress­
ive administration in China, conflict with Burma was 
almost inevitable, since the boundary between the two 
states was somewhat indeterminate, and the regulation 
of the rude tribesmen on the frontier who were guilty 
of depredations on travellers and on their more civilized 
neighbours on both sides of the border, might at any 
time become a source of friction.
The Chinese historians have recorded the nature of
relations with Burma and from the chapter on *'Southern
2Barbarians” in the T*ang dynasty it is learnt that “the 
Viceroy of Si Chwan (Szechwan) Wei Ko begged permission
1* Latmurett.e; The Chinese - their History and Culture, 
Vol:i, p.542.
2. Parkers Burma Relations with China, pp.14-15*
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to offer some barbarian songs and moreover told the 
1Piao (Pyu has been accepted as one of the ancestral 
races of the modern Burmese race — see the Myazedi 
Inscription) state to"send up some m u s i c i a n s The 
implication was that Hanchao (the present state of 
Yunnan) having exercised suzerainty over the Pyu, and 
having now become part of China, the Pyu were a vassal 
race of a lower order.
The Chinese next claim that two Burmese states 
sent tribute between the years 1127 and- 1163  ^but since 
it was also recorded that in the middle of the 10th 
century the first Emperor of the Sung dynasty "drew a 
line" beyond which he was determined to have no political 
concern, and the Nanchao state was not under Chinese
3
Oontrol up to the time of the Mongol invasion of Kublai 
Khan it is difficult to believe this. Disbelief grows 
when we consider the fact that Anawrahta, the Burmese 
emperor at Pagan had invaded what was thought to be 
the Thai half of the Nanchao empire^ and that the period 
1127-1163 was the heyday of the Pagan dynasty.
1. G.E.IIarvey: History of Burma, pp*43-44.
2. Parker*, op.cit. p.20. G.E.Harvey: op.cit. p.48 
3- Parker; op.cit. p.22.
4. Parker; op.cit. p.23* G.E.Harvey: op.cit. p.30
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In A.D.1254^Kublai Khan himself captured Yunnan
(Nanchao or Tali)' and in 12?1 the Svan-wen-ss or Mongol
Comforter-in-Chief of the Shan provinces demanded tribute
from Burma* The Burmese king Narathihapalp did not
submit but sent them back with a Burmese official •who'
o
carried polite messages*
In 1275 Imperial Ambassador was sent by China, 
but after some difficulties over court etiquette, the 
Chinese were executed by the Burmese king. The Burmese 
went on to provoke the Mongols and in 1277 attacked the 
Chinese protected state of Kahnge C70 miles above Bhamo). 
One account says that a Mongol force of 700 men^ com­
pletely routed the 50,000 Burmese at the battle of 
Ngasaungyan) , but another says that the Mongols had 
12,000 horsemen.^ However, the Burmese were routed, 
the Mongol archers creating havoc amongst the Burmese 
elephantry. The Burmese king hoxvever was still defiant
1 . Parker: Burma Relations with China p*27*
2. Parker op cit* p.29*- Harveys History of Burma p.64.
5* Parker op cit. p.51
4. Yule: The Book of Sen Marco Polo p*99*‘
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and continued to send his troops to raid Yunnan, and the
Mongols were once again compelled to act. Hasr~uddin,
the Mongol Commander with some Mongol troops and 10,000
Szechuan troops marched down and at Kaungsin smashed a 
1Burmese array . The Burmese king was thrown into a panic 
and since the Chinese troops did not retire at once, for 
they were establishing garrisons in the area, he thought 
they would “be coming down to Pagan and abandoning the 
frenzied plans he had made for defence,fled down the 
Irrawaddy to Basseit} where he stayed with the governor, 
his loyal son Uzana.
The M0ng0is however, did not come down, and in
p
1285 Harathihapate sent a monk to crave pardon . The 
king was completely discredited by now, and when he went 
upstream after receiving a favourable reply from the 
Mongols, he was stopped at Prome by Thihathar, another of 
his sons, and there forced to take poison.
The death of the king was the final touch needed
to let loose the forces of disintegration already strong 
after 4 years absence of central authority, and the 
Prince of Yunnan, Ye-su Timor seized the opportunity to
1 . Parkers Burma, Relations with China, p.31 •
G r . E.Harvey: History of Burma, p. 6 ? .  Hall: Burma p.2 6 .
2. Parkers op.cit. p.32. G r . E .Harvey: op.cit. p.6 8 .  
Hmannan Part I, p.360.
j
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destroy the Pagan Empire. He fought his way <3own with 
a loss of 7>000 men, and occupied Pagan * He sent out 
detachments to enforce submission and Burmese tradition 
has it that some of them even reached Tarokmaw (the 
point from which the Ohinese looked) below Prome.
Burma, after Pagan had fallen , was divided for 
centuries into a number of warring petty states and the 
Chinese Annals state that during this period (approx­
imately from 1287 to. the rise of the 'ioungoo dynasty 
in 1551) there were 8 Suan-wei-shi or Comforters holding 
Chinese seals and warrants and they were the Comforters 
of
Meintien or Burma
Chfeli or Kiang-Hung (Sib Song Panna)
luh-Pang or North Iheiimi
Lao chwasor Luang Prabang
Pa-peh Ta-Tien or Kiang-sen
Great Kfulah or probably Korat
Luh-ch1wan or Pong (possibly Maing Maw),
Pfing-Mien Ma-Sa (doubtful)
This claim was substantially true, for Chinese recognition 
was of some value to the warring princes, and ethrough
1* Parkers Bxirma, Relations with China p*-55*
Hall: Burma p*2 7. G.E.Harvey: History of 
Burma, p.&9*
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this period there were frequent applications for recog­
nition.*^
i'his was the traditional Chinese policy of fragment­
ation adopted for states beyond its effective control and 
given the conditions that were in force in Burma during
this period, it was successful in preventing the rise of
pany strong unified state. ,J-'he Chinese endeavoured to 
keep order in the ring and were always ready to listen to 
the complaint of any small state if another attempted 
to interfere by forces for example fhohanbwa the 
Shan chief of Maing Maw (Luh-chwan) attacked Iiange.
Hsenwi and Lu Kiang and the Chinese deprived him of his 
title. He apologised in 1442, but the Chinese sent down 
a column in 1446 to demand him from the Prince of f-va 
who had captured him, and obtained his surrender.
After this the Chinese seem to have lost touch with
the Burmese and by the time of fabinshweti the Chinese
4annalists have been judged to go largely by hearsay.
This in effebt would imply that even the shadowy claims
1 . Parkers op.cit. pp.40-43, 49-51.
2 . Coedes: 
P.392*
Les Etait Hindouises D’Indochine et D1Indonesie
3. Parlcers 
Vol. II,
Burma,« Re1ations w ith China, p.43 * 
P*97*
Bmannan
4. Parkers op.cit. p.?l*
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of suzerainty made toy the Chinese had lapsed, and that 
they had no effective contact with the Toungoo dynasty 
fox* a century. The Emperor Chien Lung admitted that 
the Burmese had not sent tribute after 1586.^ The 
strongest Burmese monarch of that dynasty had in fact 
raided the Chinese protected Shan states up the Taping
p
and shweli rivers into Yunnan in 1562 and the Burmese
Shan States seem to have remained in Burmese hands from 
x
that time.
The Toungoo dynasty, which in 16J5 Lad moved its 
capital to Ava, next comes into contact with Chinese 
affairs when in 1658 Yung Li the last Ming Emperor ashed 
the Bhamo Sawbwa to intercede for him at Ava for 
refuge. His present of 100 viss of gold21" perhaps 
influenced matters and he was permitted to enter -tsurma.
The Chinese administration had slackened with the 
downfall of the Mings, and because of the time interval 
before the Manchus were in a position to impose control,
1. Parker; Burma, Relations with China, p«74.
2. Harvey; History of Burma, p. 165*
5. Parker; op.cit. p.6 8*
4. Harvey: op.cit. p.196.
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Chinese freebooter• arraies raided deep into Burma and the
i 1Shan States* Then in 1662 Wu San Kuei came down into 
Burma, and forced the surrender of Yung Li. Prom that
pdate till 1750 the Manchus were busy consolidating their 
position in China and seem to have left Burma to herself. 
The Burmese did the same for their dynasty was in decay 
and sinking into oblivion.
The Manipuris on their ponies had started riding 
into Burma from 1724 for loot and slaves, and the 
Burmese king's levies were so weak, and ill-armed that 
the Manipuris thought they did not possess fire-arms, 
though the Burmese had started using them two centuries 
ago.^ They came again in 1755-1757> 1758, and 1740 and 
raided right up to the Irrawaddy and. the Burmese king 
failed to cope with them. The weakness of the Burmese 
king encouraged the Burmese Governor of Pegu to rebel 
in 1740, and set himself up as king among the discontented 
Mons, who had almost recovered from the ravages of 
Bayinnaung1 s and Nanda Baykds wars. The Mons, however,
1. Harveys op.cit. p.1 9 8.
2. Parkers op.cit. p.75*
5* Pemberton: Report on the Eastern frontier of British 
India, p.59* Hmannan HI, p.377*
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Y/ould have none of him and there was a general Mon 
rising in the South, aad.d Mo&Mngdom was re-established.
Prom 1742 they started raiding right up to Ava and the 
hapless Burmese king was caught between the two scourges of 
the manipuris and Mons. It was because of this situation 
that we get one last mention of Sino-Burmese relations 
before the rise of the Konbaung Dynasty.
In 1750 the Burmese King Maha Damma Yaza Dipati 
sent men to Yunnan for help\ but received none; only 
an officer came down to report on the situation in Ava.
The whole history of Chinese relations with Burma 
reeks of Chinese pretensions. The Chinese conception 
of suzerainty as far as rurma was concerned, sprang more 
from a profound conviction of superiority rather than 
from any desire or ability to guide, control and exploit 
the -Burmese. Kublai Khan, a non-Chinese and a Mongol 
conqueror was the first person to interfere so effectively 
that a dynasty was overthrown. Wu San Kuei’s expedition 
found Burma at one of her weakest moments, but he did 
not stay long. The essential factor is that Burma was 
out of the range of effective control, and though it 
pleased the Chinese mind to think otherwise, the Chinese
1. G.E.Harvey: History of Burma, p.215-
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knew really that Burma was not a dependent state. The
Chinese attitude, however, was such that it would be
possible that if ever the Chinese v^ ere to have a strong
emperor again, they would arrange some kind of
diplomatic mission, and then proclaim that the Burmese
after these many years had seen the error of their ways,
and had sent tribute ag'ain. It must, however, be kept
in mind that the Chinese regarded their Emperor as
the Universal sovereign till the second half of the
19th century,and?3&£hsc&&* to treat with even the powerful
European powers who had repeatedly humbled her, as
equals, Eor example when China was forced to give an
Imperial Audience to the envoys of Japan, Russia, the
United States, Ureat Britain, Brance and Holland in
1875? without ceremonies, inconsistent with their
representative character, it was so arranged that the
audience was held in the Tzu Kuang Eho, the hall
reserved for the reception of envoys from tributory 
X
states. In view of this pathological refusal to 
recognize the sovereignty of other states, it is not 
surprising that a small and genuinely weaker state like 
Burma, with a tradition of vassalage in her period of
1. Li Ung Bin op,cit. p.550.
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fragmentation, the Chinese attitude was one of con- 
descension and patronage.
it is against the background of this Chinese attitude 
that we come to the Konbaung Period.
Burma’s other important neighbour on the East is 
Siam, but the Konbaung kings had never heard of the 
word £>iam. it was Ayudhya to them and Ayudhya today 
is a vastly different conception from the one the Burmese 
had at the opening of our period. ‘^hey had a classical 
name for Ayudhya - Dvayawaddy which was the name of
o
the old Mon Khmer empire preceding the Thai period, but 
this name was not the one commonly used. f‘he Burmese 
knew the kingdom as the Todaya Kingdom, i.e. Kingdom 
of Ayudaya. The kingdom with which the Burmese were 
concerned was of course the Tai kingdom, and it will be 
necessary to examine briefly the origin of the kingdom.
The Shans, Laos and .Siamese of today all came 
from the race which called itself Tai,^ and their 
earliest known home was somewhere South of the 
Yangtse Kiang. Early in the Christian era they came 
under Chinese suzerainty, but in the middle of the 7^
1. Ayudhya itself is a classical name - it came from an 
Indian city.
2. G. Coe dess Les Etats Hindouises D’Indochine et 
D*Indonesia p.1 10.
J. Halls Burma p.28.
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century managed to shake this off to found the kingdom 
of Hanchao. The Chinese pressure was however, still 
exerted, and this combined with the lust for wandering 
led the Tai to emigrate, as far West as Annam, South 
to Ralieng, and Hast to South-East Ghina. The territory 
of what is now Siam, was then part of the Mon Khmer 
Cambodian empire and the early Tai emigrants must have 
acknowledged Cambodian sovereignty in this period. In 
1253 Kublai Khan conquered Nanchao and there was a great 
wave of immigration to reinforce the Tais in the 
Cambodian Empire. This wave of immigration made the 
Tai strong enough to deYy the Cambodians and in 1238 
Bang Klang Tao, the chief of Bang Yang and Pha Muong 
the onief of Mong Kat - two Tai princes, combined to 
capture the Horth Cambodian capital of Sukhotai. Bang 
Klang Tao was installed as king with the title of Sri
Intaratiya. ^ About 1275 Ramk1 amkeng, the third son
o
of Bang Klang Tao came to the throne'1-, and in his reign 
the power of the Tai increased rapidly. He claimed the
cities of Phre, Suwan p’umi, Ratburi, Petchaburi,
1. G. Ooedess Les Etats Hindouisee D*Indochine et 
D*Indonesia p.327* Woods History of Siam p*51*
2. G. Coe dess op.cit. p.328. Woods op.cit. p«53»
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Nakon Sritammarat, Eaheng, Mesot;, Tenasserim, i'avoy,
Martaban, and Pegu owed allegiance to him#' The truth 
of all his claims of course is impossible to establish, but 
there is some foundation for his claim to Hanthawaddy.
A highly intelligent Tai called Mogadu (Wareru) entered 
the service of Eamk’amheng and after a gwift rise eloped 
with his daughter to Martaban, where he murdered and 
took the place of the Governor Aleimma (the clever).
The period saw the decline of the Pagan Empire, and the 
Mons of Pegu under the Mon Governor Tarabya joined with 
Wareru in a great revolt, occupying the country up to 
loungoo. i'he 2 fell out and Wareru became the sole 
ruler of Lower -thrcnia# He demanded and obtained recognition
pfrom his old master Ksmk* aamkeng.
In 1550 the Prince of dt^ong (or Suvanpuri- 
Suvannabhumi - the land of gold) founded a new city s.t 
Ayudhya after having hacked out a kingdom from another 
chunk of the Cambodian Empire. He called himself king, 
with the title of Hama Tibodi I and so founded the 
present kingdom of Siam, The older kingdom of Sukhotai 
became a vassal kingdom in 1373, and its rulers in time
1# G. Coedess op.cit. p.342. Woods op.cit# p. 55*
2. G. Coedess op.cit. p.344. Woods op.cit. p.54.
3# Harveys History of Burma, p.110.
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became hereditary governors.'*' It formed, however, an 
almost distinct territorial unit and in later times 
the heir-apparent was usually appointed Governor of 
Pitsanulok*
By this period, there were three major .Pal States
in the area - Ayudhya, Ohiengmai, and Luang Prabang.
Luang Prabang does not seem to have been involved
seriously in the new phase that now opens - the struggle
for mastery among the fhistates ,• after the Cambodian
yoke had been thrown off.
The main struggle was between Ghiengmai, the
Northern State which had dynastic relations with, and
suzerainty over the North phi. states, and Ayudhya
which had inherited the territory and power of 
2Sukhotai. The Ayudhyans started the struggle by an
z
invasion in 1387, and this led to an unending series of 
invasions and counter-invasions right up to the time 
of the Burmese conquest of chiengmai, and the first 
Burmese invasion of Ayudhya. It is probable that the 
long drawn-out struggle so weakened the northern kingdom
1. Coedes; op.cit. p.369* Wood* op.cit. p.59«
2. Woods op.cit. p.63* favoy and i’enasserim xvhich 
had been lost by Sukhotai in 1318 had been re­
covered in 1 325•
3 . ?/oods op.cit. p.7 3*
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that Burmese conquest 'became possible, while the 
elimination of Ohiengmai as a possible ally correspond­
ingly weakened the position of Ayhdhya * fhe inhibition 
that worked against the consolidation of Ayudhyan power 
were augmented by the fact that though the D?aitvs
i
had succeeded in throwing off the Cambodian yoke from 
their colonies on the Menam area, the Cambodian, empire 
was by no means a spent force in this period, and a lot 
of energy was wasted by Ay udhya in trying to reduce 
Cambodia"- to vassalage. Ihe Cambodians, however, never 
lost one opportunity to harass Ayudhya and in like 
manner Ayudhya was always having to retaliate. fhe 
Cambodians were not strong enough to break Ayudhya but 
made large scale raids and carried off thousands of 
slaves. 'j-'hey chose naturally, the best moments for 
such invasions, for instance they chose 1570  ^the year 
after Ayudhya had been captured and made seemingly defence­
less by the Burmese king Bayinnaung. Beyond the 
relatively larger issues, there was also the need 
for slaves and both kingdoms suffered much from mutual 
slave-raiding on a colossal scale.
Ihe picture of the Siamese scene had hardly changed 
in essentials when the Burmese made their first invasion
1. Wood, op.cit. p.127-
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under king Tabinshwehti (1531-50) in 1548. The 
Burmese after the fall of Pagan in 1287 had been harried 
out of their home land of Upper ^urma by the Shans under 
their various chiefs and, losing at the same time their 
grip on Lower Burma had been gathering strength at 
Toungoo for over 200 years. By Tabinshwehti*s time 
they had regained their strength and in a series of 
campaigns from 1555 to 1559? had reconquered Lower Burma 
and established their capital at Pegu, after subduing 
the Mons. The Shans of Upper Burma were thrown back 
North of Pagan by 1546 but they were not yet completely 
crushed, and it is possible that the invasion of Ayudhya 
was motivated by the need to demonstrate the ascendancy 
of the Burmese over the strongest of the Shan or "Tai ' 
principalities. The immediate reason, however was 
Ayudhya^ raids on Tavoy, while Tabinshwehtii was raid­
ing Arakan. Tabinshwehti demanded the surrender of 
Ayudhya*s white elephants, the acceptance of this 
demand meaning the acknowledgement of Burmese suzerainty. 
Ayudhya refused and the Burmese who had already made 
preparations started the invasion. This however, did 
not succeed. But his successor Bayinnaung in 1556-59
1. Harveys History of Burma, p.158. Wood. History of
Siam, p.112.
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reduced in the course of three campaigns, the Shan States
of Mohnyin, Mogaung, Momeik, Mong Pai, Saga, Lauksauk,
Tawnghwe, Hipaw, Bhamo, Kale, Manipur. With the levies
raised from these £>han States, he took chiergmai and
1Vxengchang in 1556 With control over the Northern 'I'ai
states hayinnaung ■was now more favourably placed than
pfahinshwehti for the conquest of Ayudhya and in 1563
he asked for some white elephants which the Ayudhya king
possessed* This was refused and the Burmese armies
marched again on Ayudhya. In 1564 the King of Ayudhya
surrendered and after surrendering the elephants, and
accepting many other terms, including his own captivity,
has son was left behind as a vassal king.
In 1568 after a rebellion, Ayudhya had once more
to he attacked and through treachery was taken again by 
4the Burmese.
During the next eleven years Siam was little more 
than a province of Burma. Burmese officials resided 
at Ayudhya and at other important centres, and many
1. Woods op.cit. p.1 7 7.
2. Woods Ibid. p.118. Harveys op.cit. p.167*
3* Wood, op.cit. p.119 says that Prince Damrong, the
Siamese historian of the twentieth century cited very 
strong reasons for believing that it was not the 
king who was taken but the son.
«
4. Harveys op.cit. p.169* Woods op.cit. p.124.
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Burmese laws and institutions were forced upon the 
country. The Burmese era was introduced into Siam at 
this time, and so was the Manudhammathat (the Burmese 
Oode of Law).
In 1584, Naresuen, the famous Siamese prince threw 
off his Burmese allegiance and raised the standard of 
rebellion and by 1587 had beaten off Burmese attacks 
and had re-established the independence of Ayudhya. 
Further Burmese invasions followed in 1590, and 1592 
but both were also beaten off. In 159^ - the Cambodian 
king was defeated and a Siamese Military C-q-v-qpuop was 
put in charge. Slam, by now, was a completely 
revitalized kingdom, and began raiding into Burma.
It was Ayudhya that ruined the Burmese dynasty of 
Toungoo. 'l'he Burmese never had enough men to hold 
down Bayinnaung!s empire and the attempt to do so, in 
the face of a resurgent and defiant Ayudhya under an 
inspiring leader like Naresuen was doomed to fail. It 
was a vicious circle in which the Burmese king Nandabayin 
found himself. He needed men in large Lumbers to carry 
on his wars against Ayudhya. The continuous exactions 
of men, labour, food and money had provoked desperate 
rebellion and savage reprisals even in the reign of the 
great Bayinnaung and they grew more numerous and more 
serious as the failures against Ayudhya piled up.
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Rebellion weakened the Burmese forces against 
Ayudhya; the weakness caused failures, and failure 
caused further exactions, and still more rebellion; 
it was a dreary round, and completely exhausted the 
strength of central authority in Burma* In 1595 the 
last Burmese invasion had failed, and after that, it 
was Ayudhya which began raiding Burma. By 1599* when 
Pegu was sacked by Arakan and foungoo, all the country 
South of Martaban was tributary to Ayudhya. The 
Burmese once they had given up their Siamese expeditions, 
recovered. One of Bayinnaung*s sons, JSyaungyan 
Mint ay a who held Ava concentrated his attention on the 
reimposition of central authority from Ava, and achieved 
a measure of success. His son Anaukpetlun who succeeded 
him in 1 605, carried on the good work, and by 1610 had 
retaken Prome and loungoo. In 1613 he took Syriam from 
the Portuguese, Pelipe Be Brito and had by then 
practically re-established Burmese hegemony over Burma 
proper* Then, he almost repeated the folly of his 
ancestors. He interfered in the control of ienasserim, 
failed, and confined himself sensibly to the retention 
of 'l'avoy. His new strength further enabled him to 
re-assert Burmese sovereignity in 1615 over Ohiengmai, 
which though under a Burmese prince had had, in 1595 > 
to acknowledge the suzerainty of Ayudhya, in the lowest
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i
state of Burmese strength#
Ayudhya was not molested by the Burmese after this,
till our period; Ayudhya also, after the death of
Naresuen gradually curtailed its raids into Burma.
In the Souths Siamese influence, in our time, seems
to have extended in effective measure, as far South as
Kedah and Patani. Ihere were historical Siamese
traditions, however, that laid claim to suzerainty
over the whole Maiay Peninsular. In Rank*amheng*s time
in 1295, the Mongol court of Pekin had recommended to the
Tax' that they should abide by their promise and do no
1evil to the Malays. Phis would signify that the 
Mongols regarded both as her vassals and desired to keep 
the peace; but it also implies that 'I'ai power was 
effective, right down the Malay peninsular.
In the middle of the 14th century a Chinese author 
Wang -TA-yuan wrote that in the last few years the 
Siamese had taken to piracy, and had raided lan-man-si
p
(present site of Singapore) with over 70 war junks.
Yet again when the Portuguese captured Malacca in 
I5O9 , Albuguerque, the Portuguese viceroy sent an
jU Gt. Casdes; Les Stats Hindouisee B*Indochine hlt D*Ind- 
one sie P.382.
2. Ibid. p.383*
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Embassy to Ayudhya to explain matters, because they had 
learnt that Ayudhya had claims on Maiaccar*1
In the North and West it will thus be seen, that 
Siam was at the opening of our period, divided into a 
number of provinces or states which were more or less 
unsettled in their allegiance either to Burma or Siam^
(i.e. Ayudhya). The Siamese raided through the 
Western provinces, whenever they felt strong enough, 
into Burma, and the Burmese did the same* In the 
North, the imposition of Burmese control or suzerainty 
was more or less continuous, but in any case the idea 
emerges that Siam up to this period was never in a 
position to count seriously on these areas. To the East, 
Cambodia was a thorn, but Cambodia seems to have been 
unable to harass Siam in a serious manner; on the other
p
hand though Siam intervened successfully in Cambodian 
affairs, it seems fairly clear that Siam was unable to 
rely on Cambodian help against Burma, and that her position 
on her eastern frontier vis-a-vis relations with Burma 
was thereby weakened rather than strengthened.
To the South Nakonsritaromarat, Patani and Singora 
would really be the extreme limit of the area from which
1. Woods History of Siam p.98
2. Woods ibid. p.155* When the Siamese king was supposed 
to have intervened successfully in the succession of 
the Cambodian throne.
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the Siamese could hope for added strength.^
It will thus he seen that Siam at the opening of 
our period was not really a cohesive kingdom, and the 
system of having princes and semi-independent officials 
in charge of the provinces tended to make it easier for 
the Burmese invaders to split up the Siamese defences.
Government in Siam, however, was essentially based 
on the same idea as in Burma, of the king being the best
p
Buddhist, and therefore entitled to absolutism.
The ceremonies and ritual are very similar to those 
of Burma and was probably derived, as the Burmese was, 
from adaptation of Hindu ceremonial and custom. Bor 
example, there was a s eparate coixrt language.^ ,J-lhen 
there was the retention of the Court Brahmins for the
same purposes as in Burma.^ Beneath the king there
6were two divisions in the central administration ■.
There were five ministers in the 1st division.
m m — — t t **-*.— w i i h w «t i  i t b i t h  i i i‘ i• t t — i .t  rrr^ra-f r
1. Wood; History of Siam p.119* ’when the Pajah of 
Patani came up with a force td Ayudhya to help 
repel the Burmese in 1564. Ibid p.201 - Potts 
oner of the E. I. Company factors is reported to 
have assisted Singora, but it fell in 1 68 9*
0
1" Q*Wales 2 Siamese State Ceremonies, p.29*
3* Ibid* p. 32.
4. Ibid. p.39* G. of U.B. Part I, Vol.II, p.105*
5* Q.Wales, op.cit. p.54. M.M.O.S. Vol.IV. p.47*
6 . Wood; History of Siam, p.84.
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1) The Ministry of the Interior - which seems 
to have been the most important in this 
division.
2) The Ministry of Local Government - which was 
in charge of the affairs of the province of 
Ayudhya.
5) The Ministry of Finance.
4) Ministry of Agriculture - including land tenure
5) Ministry of the Royal Household, which was 
also responsible for the administration of 
justice.
The other division was the military administration.
A separate Prime Minister Kalahom, was set up with 
several officials under him ranking as Ministers, and 
in charge of various military departments. It is thus 
seen that there was an attempt at the differentiation of 
functions.
The provinces were placed under the control of- 
various Governors, some of whom were princes. They 
received no pay# up till the time of King Qhul alongkio.ru, 
A.D. 1868, but there was greater precision theoretically 
in the amount of land from which they were expected to 
collect enough for their living. This was the 
institution of Sakdiha' . Every prince, official and
1. Wood* Ibid., p.8 5 .
private had a certain amount of land, allotted to him.
The highest ranks held from 1000-4000 acres 5 the 
subordinate officials, like the Kuns and Luangs, held 
from 160 acres upwards; the common people had 10 acres.
The Judicial system seems to have been based on lines
* , isimilar to the Dhammathat and Yazathat operating in Burma. 
It was based on the Dhammathat which was brought into 
Siam by the Burmese conqueror Bayinnaung in his period 
of domination, and on the various edicts, case rulings, 
and procedural rulings produced by the various Siamese 
kings. The common feature of the two systems was the 
acceptance of trial by ordeal. and j, in the candle and water 
ordeals, we have identical types.
The Revenue was derived from cash payments in 
lieu of tribute or obligatory services, and from tolls, 
bazaar dues and customs. An interesting feature is that 
the Siamese kings like the Burmese kings used their 
power to become the principal import and export merchant 
of the country. foreign trade was placed under the 
control of the Praklang or Minister of the Treasury and 
finance, who with his subordinates acted on behalf of 
the King. The enormous revenue from this particular 
source made the Siamese king a very wealthy one^  and he
1. Woods Ibid. pp.127, 185, 215-
2. Woods Ibid, p.163*
3- Harveys History of Burma, p.253*
might perhaps have lightened the direct burden on his 
subjects.
The population of Siam in our period must be 
guessed rather than calculated. Some authorities think 
that Siam has hardly yet regained the population which 
she possessed before her conflicts with Burma began in
T
the 16th century. However, the census of 1929 gives 
11,506,207 while that of 1947 gives 17,105,060 which 
makes Siam’s modern population and the rate of growth 
almost the same as that of modern Burma. Considering 
that Biam has about the same area, climate, diet and 
living habits, as -Burma, it would not be probable that 
her population in the 16th century could be three times 
as large as.Burma1 s. The most reasonable thing, would 
be to assume that in our period, the two countries 
had approximately the same population.
The number of armed men that Siam could raise 
must therefore, in view of the man power resources and 
the administrative system, be about the same as in 
Burma; for example, the Siamese king Naresuen invaded 
Cambodia in 1595 with 100,000 men^ but the Cambodian 
annals give the number as 5^ ,000. Burmese estimates
1. Woods History of Siam, p. 146.
2. Woods Ibid. p.146.
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of the numbers of the Siamese Army were much higher - 
about 10 times in excess, but so was the Siamese 
estimate of the Burmese forces. The impression is 
that the balance of forces was fairly equal and this 
was the opinion of h0rd Amherst in 1824, when he wrote 
to Bix* Thomas Munroe on the various aspects of bringing 
in the Siamese into the first Anglo-Burmese War.
1. Gleig's Life of Munroe. Vol.II, pp.110-111.
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; CHAPTER VII
i \' I
The Initial >Phase of Burma’s Bastern Relations 
covering the period of the first two Konbaung kings#
^  "■ — T--T riT~1‘mn--^  '■ 1 -■■■■nil - -Bij -to mi ■ ■ I ■    — niTiiTin   Til i _ m >1 ■1II^ #I»I|I|
Alaungpaya, 1752-60, was horn in 171^ at the
; 1 village of Moksobo which contained 300 houses. He
belonged to the ruling class and for generations his
I : O
ancestors hadibeen local lords. He claimed descent
from Myaulckbei Nawrahta, Myin Wun or Commandant of
the Northern Cavalry Area, and brother to the Ava chief
Mohnyin Thado:1427-40. Non-Burmese writers, such as
the Siamese annalists and Sangermano have regarded this
as an untrue claim, but to most Burmese, even today,
the claim seems reasonable. Rural society in Upper
Burma has always been stable, and families who are
descended from great men seldom forget the fact, and
that holds good for modern Europeans too.
The reign of Alaungpaya is important in that, led
by a virile king, the Burmese reasserted their control
1. Dalrymple, Vol..I. p. 163*
2. Harvey, History of Burma, p.219*
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over Burma proper in a series of campaigns against the 
Mons of the Lower provinces. As far as relations with 
China are concerned, there seems to have been no direct 
official contact, hut Alaungpaya*s assertion of Burmese 
sovereignty over the Shan States on the Chinese border 
led to unrest in that region. Combined with the 
reluctance of the Shan Sawbwas of the border, the 
bitter quarrels stirred up on the frontier by the 
Gwes led by Gunna Bin who had been defeated by Alaungpaya 
and had fled to Meng Lien, increased the unrest, and 
probably led to Chinese intervention, and so to the 
invasions of 1767.
Siamese relations with Burma had reached a state of 
friendliness never acldelveb.before in the period 
immediately preceding ours, in view of the almost 
automatic resumption of hostilities in our period, it 
is necessary to examine the cause of that friendliness.
It is probable that control over the lovjer 
provinces of Burma was a necessary preliminary for an 
attack on Siam for strategic as well as man-power reasons. 
The Burmese kings after the havoc created by Bayinnaung 
and h'andabayin had since the time of Anaukpetlun and 
fhalun, given up plans for invasion, and had tacitly
1. Parkers Burma Helations v^ ith China, p.82.
proclaimed this by removing the seat of government from 
Pegu in ^ ower Burma to Ava in the North. The Siamese 
when they saw the gradual rejuvenation of the lVIons of 
Lower Burma, must have calculated^ that any renewed 
threat from Burma would be more likely to come from 
the Mons than from the Burmese. It was probably in 
the background of this thinking that they decided policy 
when the Burmese governors of Martaban and Tavoy were
cut off from Ava by the Mon rebellion ox 1740, and
2fled for safety into Siamese territory . The Siamese
court treated them most kindly and offered them
hospitality. The king of Burma was touched, and sent
in 1744, envoys to Ayudhya to thank the Siamese king. ■
The Siamese king in turn sent back a stately embassy
■7;
which arrived at Ava in 1746 .
The new Burmese dynasty was however ambitious; the 
friendliness disappeared and hostilities were resumed.
In a sense, the re-imposition of Burmese control over 
Lower Burma led to the strained relations, for the 
Mons fled in their thousands into i^am, and the Siamese
1. Woods History of Siam, p.234.
2. G.E.Harveys op.cit. p.214.
3. iimannan Vol.Ill, p.389*
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king offered them generous hospitality, Siam thus
he came a "base from which they could encourage and stir
up their compatriots left behind in Jburma to rebel, and
Alaungpaya probably felt that the crushing of Siam would
remove this nuisance. After the fall of Pegu Chiengmai
is reported to have sent an embassy to Alaungpaya, who
had demanded complete submission, and that before long,
after having taken a look at the blackened ruins of Pegu,
it had begun sending in tribute. The Honbaung
chronicle however does not mention the submission of
Ohiengmai in this reign, and only records that Smim 
2Htaw sent a plaintive but polite mission. In any
case, this report states that the embassy came after
the sack of Pegu, but both Wood^ and the Konbaung 
4Chronicle state that the embassy from Bhiengmai arrived
1. Harveys History of Burma, p.241.
2 . Smim Htaw was reputed to have been the son of the 
Prince of Pagan v;ho had rebelled in 1714 against 
the King of Ava, and had fled to the hills East of' 
Pegu to live among the Grwes. lie was raised to the 
throne of Pegu in 1742 by the Talaing rebels but 
had been ousted by Binnya Bala, one of his fathers- 
in-law in 1746, (see Woods ibid. p.235- Konbaungzet, 
p.241) and after a period of wandering had settled 
in Ohieng Mai with another father-in-law, the Prince 
of dhiengmai.
3. Woods History of Siam. pp.235~P36.
4. Konbaungzets p.241.
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in 175^ * Wood, however, states that Smim Htaw himself 
came with several hundred followers. Hie Burmese 
chronicle records that only nine of Smim Htawfs officers 
came and that they were housed in a junior captain’s 
camp. fhe -Burmese chronicle seems to be more reliable 
in this case, for in the next reign, Naungdawgyi sent 
out an expedition to Chiengmai with orders to conquer, 
and in the conquest the ’Lord of Elephants and Tigers*
"j
Smim Htaw was taken prisoner.
Alaungpaya had raised the Upper Burma villages 
after the Mons had taken Ava in 17522 and by late 1755 
the Mons had abandoned Ava and fled South, down the 
Irrawaddy. Alaungpaya now turned to securing the 
country at his back? the Northern Irrawaddy including 
the villages and towns, and the Shan chiefs to the North 
and North East. In the month of Tabotwe (February) he 
set out in force up the river frbm Ava# When he reached 
ICatha, he sent out a strong force under the joint 
command of his brother-in-law, Min Ye Kyaw Swa and the 
lViokso Ghone Bo-Minhla Minkhaung to impose control over
1 . Konbaungzet: p.455* He spent much time hunting 
for a white elephant but only caught plain elephants 
and tigers - Harveys History of Burma, p.241.
2. Harveys Ibid, p.216.
1the Shan States of Mohynin and Mogaung, and, two stages 
further North, the Shan Chiefs of Momeit and Bhamo 
came out to present tribute.
There is no mention of any direct contact with
p
China or even Yunnan. Harvey however, states that 
Minhla Minkhaung Kyaw with an imposing escort was sent 
up into the Shan States, where he secured the homage 
of most of them, and also recognition from the Yunnan 
Viceroy. Harvey seems to have confused him with 
another Mfn HI a Min Khaung, for before he had been 
promoted to the title of Minhla Min Khaung Kyaw, he 
also had been Min HI a Min Khaung.
The Chinese seem to have been aware of Alaungpaya’s 
rise to the throne, for in 1752^ * the Yunnan Viceroy 
reported the existence of civil war in Burma, and the 
usurpation of Alaungpaya of Moksobo. The origin of 
the Civil War was stated to be 'the conduct of the Gwe
1. Konbaungzet: p.80.
2. Harveys History of Burma, p.228.
3. Konbaungzet: p.22.
4. Parkers Burma 'Relations with China, p.82.
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lShans , who, declining to recognize Alaungpaya, had
taken refuge in the Chinese protected state of Meng~Lien,
and had "begun a "bloodthirsty quarrel with their hosts.
'i'he Sawbwa of Meng Ken or the H country of the Kon”
(Kengtung) it was said, took part against China
in the quarrel and made himself very disagreeable.
On the other hand, the Sawbwa of Muhpang (Hsenwi)
arranged with to murder the Burmese Sitke or
resident, and to join the Chinese. The Sawbwa of
Manmu (Bhamo) also offered to desert the Burmese in
favour of China.”
The account agrees substantially with that of the
Burmese chronicle. The Gwe colony of Madaya Okpo
had set up as an independent unit in the last years of
the loungoo dynasty and in 1752 they had sent twenty 
omen*- to Moksobo to administer the oath of allegiance.
A Mon detachment was already in Moksobo waiting to do 
the same so Alaungpaya asked for time saying that in 
all humbleness he coiild not decide until these two great 
parties had fought it out. On its way back he 
massacred the Mon detachment, but his kinsman the Lord
1. Harveys Ibid. p.55^ * Luces J.B.R.S. Vol.15* p.117* 
Also see Appendix.
2. Konbaungzets p.20.
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Sittha being in the hands of the Gwe, he let them 
depant in peace. The Gwe had returned, after success­
fully routing a large Talaing detachment which they
1had decoyed with 300 men, Alaungpaya felt surer this 
time, and massacred the lot, saying to the leader nthou 
treacherous dog, it is not fit that such evil as 
you should he allowed to stay alive#” He then followed 
this up, and launched a large scale attach on the
p
Gwes and after one desperate stand at Hsipaw the 
Gwes had fled into the Northern'Shan Hills#
In 1758-59 the Gwes stirred up trouble in the 
North Shan States; a strong force of 100 horse, 508 
musketeers and 5>000 spearmen was sent off by Alaungpaya 
along the hsipaw route. Another force of 30 horse,
260 muskets, and 500 spearmen was sent up along the 
Momeit route. The two columns soon cleared the area, 
and the Gwe chief Gunna Bin (the Hung Li Ten of the 
Chinese) fled into the Shan Chinese State of Maing Lyi 
(Meng Lien)
The Saw Bwa of Meng Lien abused his position and
1. Konbaungzett p.63 •
2. Konbaungzets p.73*
3# Harveys History of Burma, p#238. Konbaungzetsp.273*
4. Konbaungzet2 p.275-
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during a temporary absence of Gunna Sin took Gunn a
Sin's daughter into his harem. (Phis led to the
Saw Bwaf s murder, and the flight of Gunna Bin and his
Gwes. He was captured and sent before the Maing Si
Zaung lu (the Viceroy of Yunnan) who executed him on
*1
the orders of Ghien Lung himself. It is also 
2recorded that the hsenwi Sa\^  Bwa and 100 followers, 
the Bhamo Saw Bwa and 15 followers, and a prince of 
Momeit with 20 families took refuge in Yunnan, and 
were given protection by the Chinese authorities.
fhis seems to have been the full extent of 
Alungpaya's interest in China. A mission from a King 
Mahatsu arruved in China in 1755 with various presents^ 
but it was not till 175^' that Upper Burma was clear 
of the Mons, and it is of greater probability that 
it was the Mons who sent this mission rather than 
Alaungpaya.
Alaungpaya took Ava in 1754* January $ in the 
following March the Mons came up with their whole army.
1. Luce, J.B.H.S* Vol.15? p.118.
2. Konbaungzet; p.276.
3 . Parker; Burma - delations with China, p.83*
4. Harvey; op. cit. p.222.
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They drove his sons out of Talokmyo in Myingyan district, 
and the younger son (later King Hsinbyushin) was so 
overcome with shaine that he washed his head in purif­
ication. The Mons besieged Ava; their assaults failed 
hut they carried fire and sword through the villages 
up to Kyaukmyaung on the Irrawaddy in Shwebo district. 
Finally, Alaungpaya marched down from shwebo, his • 
younger son made a sortie from Ava, and tne Mons, 
finding the rains near, and their losses heavy, heat 
a general retreat in such haste that at Hsinbyugyun 
in Minbu district, they left behind the Golden Hti 
(umbrella-like spire) they had brought to place on the 
Shwezigun pagoda at Pagan.^
In 1754*? the I*ord of Bale (in Myingyan district)
and the lviyothugyi of Pakhange in Magwe district led a
2rising in Prome, and stood out against the attacks of
the retreating Mon army. Alaungpaya decided that the
■3Burmese of the South could not be left unass is ted^ and 
came in force down the river, raised the siege at i’rome, 
and in May 1755 took Dagon from the falaings and renamed
1. Harveys History of Burma, pp.222-223* Konbaungzet; 
p.84-116.
2* Harveys Ibid. p.229* Konbaungzet; p.111.
3* Konbaungzet; p.113*
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it Yan Kon HEnd of Strife1* (anglicised to Rangoon).
The Mons bad two great strongholds in the South,
Syriam, and Pegu, their capital. In 1755 Alaungpaya
commenced the siege of Syriam which lasted over a.
year because he had no cannon of calibre heavy enough
to smash the walls of the town, and also because there
were Frenchmen inside Syriam with two ships moored
outside on the river which smashed Alaungpaya1s flotilla
1of war boats to pieces. This siege of Syriam marks 
one more stage in the re-imposition of Burmese 
hegemony over -Burma, but the French in Syriam are of some 
importance, because their defeat, and the capture of 
their arms were of some significance in he wars vdth
p
Siam and China that followed. In July 1756 the town 
fell, and among the spoils listed by the Burmese^ ' 
were 1500 muskets, and 56 cannon; 1 0 ,0 0 0 brass 
shot, 1000 iron shot and 5000 lead shot, together with 
1 0 ,0 0 0 viss of ships anchors and chains (the reference 
to weight probably meant that they would be melted 
down for shot).
Bruno, the french chief in Syriam, had written to
1. Harveys History of Burma, p.299
2. Harvey? Ibid. p.2J0 Konbaungzet1 p.185*
3 . Konbaungzet% p.186.
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Pondicherry ■ for help and three French ships, the
Diligent, the Pleury and the Galathee, had been sent
"1with cannon and munitions. 'xbe Diligent had met with
bad weather, and did not enter Syriam, but the other
two were decoyed up to Syriam and stranded on the bar.
I'he captured loot included 35 ships* guns (24 pounders) ,
5 field guns, 1300 muskets, and a large store of 
. . 2ammunition. '-Vhe 12 officers were executed but the 
200 who formed the crewvere taken into Alaungpaya* s 
service as an elite corps of gunners. They were 
decently treated, and given wives and land, as indeed 
were most prisoners of war who survived the initial 
phase of capture. H0me of them became Captains 
in the Guards, and served in the various campaigns 
against the Manipuris, Chinese Siamese.^
It seems, however, that only a few of the Drench 
stayed long in the Burmese service, for a French agent 
Lefevre, journeyed from Pondicherry to Ava in 1766, and 
is said to have obtained the release of the survivors 
of the Frenchmen enslaved by Alaungpaya at the time of
1. Harveys Hi story of Burma, p.231. Konbaungzetsp.187
2. Harveys Ibid. p.231 .Konbaungzets p.187*
3 . Harveys op.cit. p.231 from Sonnerat*s Voyage aux 
Indes Orientals et a la h^ine - Paris.1782* Vol.II. 
p.40. Halls Europe and hernia, p.67* Symes;^  Embassy 
to Ava, pp.31-32. Sangermanos D. of B»E. in the 
notes by John Jardine. p.231* J.B.P.8 .Tombstone
of the Chevalier Mil@rd.Vol.15*P*75•
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the capture of Syriam.**- After the fall of Syriam, 
Alaungpaya in the open season of 1756-572 advanced on 
Pegu hy land and water; while another army moved 
down from ’B'oungoo* There is a good English translation 
of the story of the fall of Pegu^ written by a Mon 
monk Athwa. I'he monks were accused of helping in the 
defence, and l,he threw" 5)000 monks to the elephants, 
the elephants trampled on them, the elephants killed
them tr ihe monks who survived fled East of the
Sittang river to the towns of Sittaung, Pa-an, Shwegyin, 
Mart ah an, Lobun, Ohiengmai, Ayudhya and other Bhan 
towns. Ihe -Burmese soldiers seized all the people 
of the Mon country, men, and women, and sold them 
usome for a hundred pieces, some for 5 0, some for 2 5, 
some for 20, some for 15 pieces. We were sold in the 
market, we were sold like cattle in the market, and 
the Burmese soldiers made merry with the price. Sons 
could not find their mothers, nor mothers their sons, 
and there was weeping throughout the land.” After 
the sack of Pegu, the treatment of the Mons was not 
more oppressive than that meted out to the ordinary
1 . Halls Europe and Burma, p.72*
2. Harveys History of Burma, p.252. Konbaungzet. p.193
5 . Harveys op.cit. p.255*
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Burmese5 for in 1760 when he marched through Martaban on 
his way to Ayudhya Alaungpaya appointed a Mon officer 
Daw I'alut as Governor of Martaban. However, in the 
initial phase of total defeat, many Mons must have fled 
Hast with the monies.
Alaungpaya next turned his attention to Siam. It 
has been said that there was no immediate reason why he 
should have attacked Siam, and that the real reason was
p
his ambition and the need to work off his energy. 'the 
Konbaung Chronicle^ states that during his state visit 
to Rangoon when he had regilded the Sbwe Dagon Pagoda 
from top to bottom, Alaungpaya had received news, of 
Siamese raids on 'l'avoy, of the detention of three 
Burmese ships by the Siamese, and of the capture of a 
junk send down by him to lavoy. He had then decided to 
invade Siam. Another reason for invasion was possibly 
the rebellion of the Governor of Tavoy, who had been 
encouraged by the many Mon refugees from Hanthawaddy
K
and perhaps secretly instigated by the Siamese.
1. Konbaungzets p.JIO.
2. Harvey: History of Burma, p.241. Woods History 
of Siam, p.240.
5 . Konbaungzet, p.3 0 9*
4. Woods op.cit. p.240. Symess Embassy to Ava. p.49.
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It is probable that it was Alaungpaya* s ambition 
and his desire for loot and slaves that started him off 
on this expedition, and that the immediate causes were 
only opportune excuses*
1The Konbaung Chronicle states that when he set 
out from Kyaukmyaung on the Irrawaddy, he sent 13 
regiments, under the command of 13 Shans Sawbwas of 
Htilin, Taw, Tein Eyin, I'haunghtut, Kale, Mohnyin, 
Mogaung, Bhamo, Momeik, Hsipaw,X'awnghwe, lone, Mobye, 
and composed of 3*000 horse and 25*000 men, by the over­
land route through I’oungoo. He himself with 24 
regiments composed of 24,000 men under the command of 
Min Khaung Nawrahta had embarked in 600 war boats and 
travelled down to Rangoon* It is possible that at the 
outset he only wished to make the most ostentatious 
display while performing his work of merit, but the 
marshalling of all the Shan levies he could raise, and 
their being brought down by a separate route, instead 
of accompanying him to augment the brilliance of his 
progress downstream, suggests that he had the invasion 
of Siam in his mind before the excuses presented 
-themselves.
Siam at that time happened to be in a particularly
1 . Konbaungzet.pp*306-307•
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weak state, with no effective leadership to marshal her 
comparatively weak resoiirces. 1‘he Siamese had had no 
taste of large scale warfare since 1717*1* and there 
happened to he two brothers alternating on the throne.
One Ut'umpon not daring to rule and fearful for his
life, and the other, Ekat’at desirous, but not capable
2of ruling.
Ut’umpon had succeeded to the throne of his father, 
the peaceful and prosperous Boromokot in 1 75 8* he had 
an inclination for religious life, -possibly because he 
was nervous, for immediately after he came to the throne 
he executed three brothers whom he suspected of con­
spiring to rebel.
Skat*at his elder brother however, succeeded in 
gathering a strong following and Ut’umpon not daring 
to execute him, abdicated and retired to a monastery. 
Ekat’at in a book written only 22 years after his death  ^
is described as ’void of intelligence, unsettled in 
spirit, fearful of sin, negligent in his kingly 
duties, hesitating alike to do good or evil1. Perhaps 
the fall of Ayudhya had to be explained by the production 
of a scapegoat, but then again it might have b,een a 
proper description.
1. Woods History of Siam.p.241.
2. Woods Ibid. pp.258-240.
3. Woods Ibid. p.239*
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Early in 1760 Alungpaya completed his preparations 
and set out on his invasion of Ayudhya. i'he first 
thing he did was to send out his &ala Panthes (Christian 
Gunners) in five little ships to i’avoy hy the sea route.
He himself with 40 regiments proceeded hy boat to 
Hanthawaddy; at Hanthawaddy the hoats were abandoned, 
and his whole army took the land route through Sittaung, 
and Zingyaik to reach Martaban in nine stages from 
Rangoon. ‘-L’he army was then ferried over to Moulmein 
where a fleet of junks was collected by his orders.
After they had been requisitioned, part of the army was 
sent off in the fleet to Tavoy, Alaungpaya himself 
followed with the rest of the army, and advanced down 
the coastal pOain through Ye, and reached favoy in thirteen 
stages from Martaban. He rested a day at favoy, while 
waiting for the seaborne detachments to arrive and 
then Min Khaung Nawrahta with 300 horse and 3? 000 
musketeers was given command of the.van and sent ahead. 
Immediately after him followed Minhla Hawrahta with 
a force of the same strength. Next came the Myedu 
Prince (his second son, later Hsinbyushin) with 500 
horse and 5*000 musketeers; the main body then followed
1. Hhrveys History of Burma, p.241. Konbaungzet. p.309-
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him. Ivlergui was reached in nine stages and taken without 
any resistance being offered. He then advanced on 
lenasserim, the main Siamese port on the Bay of -Bengal, 
and took it just as easily. 1
It was at this stage that Alaungpaya seems to have
achieved the tactical advantage of surprise over the 
Siamese. He went Hast over the hills to the Gulf of 
Siam and then marched horth up the narrow coastal strip. 
Hobody in Siam seems to have realized that a serious 
invasion was possible from the South, for it involved 
marching up a narrow plain with the sea to the right 
and a high range of mountains to the left, and the 
Siamese, expecting the main enemy attack to be made by 
one of the usual routes, had sent three armies to guard 
the vulnerable points 011 the Western frontier. (The 
three routes were via Keng Tung, via the Three Pagodas 
Pass, and via Raheng-'. The Siamese, however, sent an 
army of 20,000 men, under Pfya Yomarat down the peninsula.
The Burmese Chronicle says that it was the Chao P!ya
Yazawun Thanta with 100 elephants and 1,000 horse, and 
20.?000 men. There does not seem to be any great 
discrepancy between the Burmese and the Siamese accounts
1. Konbaungzet. p.Jll. Woods History of Siam. p. 4^0.
Harveys History of Burma. p.241. Symes: Embassy
to Ava. p. 1 50.
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and possibly the Siamese knew the particular name of 
their commander better than the Burmese did*
*]
The Burmese met the Siamese force near Kuiburi.
The initial attack was delivered by the two forces under 
Min Gaung Hawrahta and Min HI a N avrahha . and the 
Burmese attack was held. ,J-'hen the Myedu Prince came 
up with his force and under his impetuoiis leadership
p
the combined Burmese force broke the Siamese#" f
1 ,0 0 0  muskets, over 100 guns, and 2 ,0 0 0 men were taken. 
After this battle, the towns of Petcha Buri and 
Ratburi fell and the Burmese van encamped within 40 
miles of the capital. Then, the main Siamese force 
of 30,000 men under the ^alahom (the Siamese Minister of 
War) came out to meet the Burmese and stationed itself 
opposite the Burmese camp with the Talaw stream in 
b e twe en. The thre e Burme s e army groups, under Min 
Khaung Hawrahta, Min Hia Nawrahta and the Myedu Prince, 
hesitated momentarily because the Burmese commanders 
realised they were facing a numerically superior force 
probably comprising the best troops of the Siamese 
king, and they wondered whether it would not be Better 
to wait till the main body under Alaungpaya had advanced
1. Woods History of Siam. p.241. Konbaungzet. p.312.
2 . Woods Ibid. p.241. Konbaungzets p.312.
to a position from which it could give effective 
support. At this moment Alaungpaya came up with a 
small bodyguard and personally ordered the battle 
formation. Minhla Nawrahta v</as to command the right 
wing, Min Khaung Nawrahta the left wing, and 1Vin Hla 
Thiri, the centre. The whole force was placed under 
the overall charge of the myedu Prince and the whole 
body was ordered to cross the stream and advance 
simultaneously.
The Siamese met the atrack mth concentrated fire
from their jingals and there were heavy casualties
among the Burmese. ‘then, while the attack was faltering
the main body of the n-urmese army came up and joined
battle. After a while the Siamese armies broke and
five Siamese divisional commanders were taken. The
Kalahom escaped and fled into the capital with the
survivors of his force. On the 11th morning of Tagu
(April) 1 760, the Burmese forces came in sight of 
1Ayudhya. It had been thirty six stages from t'avoy, and 
from the capital, eighty stages. Alaungpaya camped 
North of the city, and within effective reach of each 
other, he ringed the city with his armed camps. Then 
the commanders sent word throiigh some prominent Siamese
1. Woods History of Siam, p.241. Konbaungzets p.315*
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prisoners, to the Siamese, 11 Our Lord, the King Alaungpaya, 
having heard that the (Buddhist) faith doth not flourish 
in Biam, and desiring that it should so flourish, like 
the coming Buddhas, (Boddhisattva) has come here. Why 
has the Siamese king not met him or sent elephants and 
horses and sons and daughters in tribute, or even come 
out to at rack him. Our Lord, the King Alaungpaya 
in accordance with his desire of obtaining nuddhahood 
has set free the Ministers captured inbattle. n
The Siamese ministers on hearing these words 
replied: t!In this world of ours, only five Buddhas will
appear. Kakkutlian, Gaw Na Gone, Kassappa and Gautama 
have entered Nirvana. Only the L0rd Buddha Arimettaya 
remains. The coming Arimettaya is in the Tussita abode 
of the Nats, who be your coming Boddhisattva? In each 
world there be a maximum of only five Buddhas? there 
is no precedent for a sixth .l*
The Siamese King called a council of his courtiers 
and military chiefs and saying that the Burmese King 
had advanced and was now surrounding the capital asked 
"how can we make him retreat?"^
1. From this stage onwards, this account is fromaa purely 
Burmese point of view and is given here to illustrate 
the type of reasoning which the Burmese chroniclers 
used to explain in a plausible manner,their version 
of the development of events, for it will be obvious
■that they could not have had access to the many 
sources of the information which they recorded.
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The Leneral Abya Yaza counselled thus: 
nThe Burraese have arrived before the city, in the 
month of Tagu, and before long heavy rains mil fall, 
which will make it impossible for the Burmese troops 
even to cook, let alone manoeuvre with horse and 
elephants. The Burmese King will then have to raise 
the siege and retreat. Then we can follow up and attack 
ox' stay in our city. We should not tire our armies with 
attacks; we should stay firmly in our capital, and let 
our tributary towns stay likewise. Let the Burmese go 
quietly.:f The whole council concurred, the Siamese 
King approved, mounted additional men and guns on the 
ramparts and on the warboats, and strengthened the 
feudatory cities surrounding. To Alaungpaya too, he 
sent presents of elephants and horses, and expressing 
a hope that his comfort might not be disturbed he sent 
the three ministers, Bya fheidi, Bya Thupawati, Bya Thur- 
akama. They were taken by the Burmese pickets to lviingkh 
aung Kawcahtaiwho led them to the Myedu Prince. They 
told him that the Lord of the itising Bun, (Alaungpaya) 
had been sent these animals, fit for a king, so that 
the King of Dvayawaddy, taking refuge in Alaungpaya* s 
glory, might contrive to reign in peace. The prince 
took this message to the ning who proclaimed: !tI have
not come to destroy the peace of the King of Dvayawaddy.
In the country of Ayudhya, though a centre of the faith, 
the faith doth not flourish. I have come to encourage 
the growth of the faith. Let the three Yodayas (Siamese) 
return.l* At which the Commander in Chief obediently 
escorted them back.
Ten days after the return of the Siamese, the King 
feeling unwell, sent for his son, and the other commanders 
and proclaimed: 11 The Siamese king has not come out to
atrack, nor has he settled anything by agreement. The 
rains are coming, let us think of a plan of campaign.”
Then the Myedu Prince declared that the Siamese offer of 
submission looked treacherous for it had not been followed 
up and the Siamese king stayed in the city. In view of the 
fact that the city had many points of egress to the sea, 
which it was impossible to seal off, provisions and arms 
still poured in; therefore he would withdraw and return 
after the rains, and then would the Siamese escape 
from the Burmese clutch?
Alaungpaya agreed and appointed Min Khaung Nawrahta 
to command the rear guard. The rear guard was the pick 
of the army, 5^0 Manipur horse, and 6,000 musketeers.
Min Khaung Nawrahta spread them out, and it was two 
precious days before the Siamese realised that the main 
body had left. Then, the Siamese King sent out his 
forces in overwhelming strength with orders to take all
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of them. Min Khaung Mawrahta*s commanders watched the 
Siamese closing round saying ”We are in the heart of the 
enemy's land, and in numbers we are like the two horns 
of the cow, while the Todayas are as numerous as the 
hairs of the cow.” Then Min Khaung ^awrahta replied 
nOur Lord is not well, and has been gone just these two 
or three stages ahead of us 5 if we should retreat from 
here in haste, we should soon be in gun shot hearing 
of our Lord, and when he shoxild hear the sound of battle, 
because of us, his progress might be retarded. Therefore, 
though the whole Yodaya kingdom should come out and 
surround us, we shall not know fear; verily let us now 
go out and attack them.”
Alaungpaya went ahead by forced marches, while Min 
Khaung Hawrahta withdrew slowly, collecting Alaungpaya1 s 
stragglers on the way. Alaungpaya, however, was not 
destined to reach his capital, and at Kinywa in Bilin 
township Thaton district, he died. His death was kept 
secret and swift horsemen were sent to Shwebo, so that 
the c^own Prince might be the first to know, and secure 
the throne. The body bound in sheets was hidden in 
the curtained lituer, and thus in death Alaungpaya still 
rode with his armies, and the daily orders issued in 
his name. The Siamese account^  says that one of the
1. Woods History of Siam, pp.241-242.
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Burmese cannons had exploded while Alaungpaya was direct­
ing its loading, but if that had been true, it would have 
been difficult to keep the news of his death from his 
men, as was done* However the suddenness of the retreat, 
without any major assaults made, makes it possible that 
the very determined king had been wounded.
Looking back at Alaungpaya^ reign, we see that the 
strong hand of .a virile, new Burmese dynasty had reached 
out to the borderlands near china &t the moment when an 
aggressive and energetic Chinese Emperor was stretching 
out his hands to do the same. The stage had been set 
and the play that was to continue through the next four 
reigns of the konbaungzet Dynasty, had begun.
In Siam, a new type of Burmese invasion marked by 
greater ruthlessness had appeared, for the new generals 
and leaders were fierce and energetic men, without 
inhibitions, and this was ultimately to sway the 
allegiance of the semi-independent states of Northern 
Siam towards Ayudhya and thus accelerate the process of 
so unifying and strengthening the kingdom of Siam, that 
it helped the Siamese to reach their greatest strength, 
at the time when it was most needed, i.e. the period of 
European Expansion in the Ear East.
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Alaungpaya was succeeded by his eldest son
1Naungdawgyi 1760-1763• He ruled for only three years
hut his reign served to illustrate how sterotyped the
rule of a Burmese king was, in the dangers confronted, the
type of pious sentences uttered, and the immediate
resumption of aggression as soon as the king was firm, or
felt firm on the throne.
The danger confronted was as usual rebellion by a
prince of the blood, his younger brother, the soldierly
Myedu Prince. The plans of this prince went astray
2however, and he submitted in time for forgiveness.
The Myedu Prince had succeeded to the command of the 
main body of his father’s army when Alaungpaya had 
died. The strong rearguard under Mirikhaung Nawrahta 
had been left some distance behind. The Myedu Prince 
had seised his father*s famous personal sword, Yein-nwe- 
pa (the swaying, the tender, the keen sword) and had 
forced the oath of allegiance on the officers under his 
command at the MyanThein Dan Pagoda at Martaban. He 
had also opened communications with the ladies of the
1 . Naungdawgyi = Boyal elder brother. This title is 
some indication of the comparitive mildness of the 
king. The impression gathered from the report
of Captain Alves, the Bast India Company envoy 
who met him in 1760 seems to support this view.
2. Konbaungzet p.325-26.
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palace. He summoned Min Khaungnawrahta to hasten, hut 
Min Khaungnawrahta 'would not obey his summons. Rumours 
of all this had by now reached Naungdawgyi and he sent 
down orders for the Myedu Prince to leave the party 
escorting the body of Alaungpaya up the river, and to 
hasten home immediately by the land route.
The Myedu Prince decided to place all blame on the
general and reported that Minkhaungnawrahta had tarried
suspiciously on the retreat collecting men, arms, and
provisions and would not obey the summons to hasten
back. The king was at first not quite convinced, but
the Queen Mother interceded and this settled the
issue as far as Minkhaungnawrahta was concerned. He
heard he was suspected; already another officer
Nemyo Shwe Taung had been executed on suspicion
(Konbaungzet p.3^ 5) and saying 1!I have been accused so
that another’s crime should be unnoticed, and since
they are brothers, and our Lord and benefactor the
great Alaungpaya is no more, I shall act like a man;
for only if a man fears not for his life can he best
fulfil his destiny and in each existence he hath but
q
this one opportunity. He marched North collecting 
men and brushing aside the opposition of the Viceroy of
1. Konbaungzet p.530.
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loumgoo, Alaungpaya1 s brother, he forced his way into 
Ava and shut himself in.
The king had no cannon large enough to force an 
entry1 and ultimately, though the levies, with the 
king’s sword hovering over their heads, suffered 
terrible casualties in attempting to storm the walls, 
it was starvation, that did the work. Minkhaungnawrahta 
broke out, but was soon isolated and shot down.
In 1762 the Lord of Toungoo, I'hado Ihinkhathu, 
Alaungpaya1 s younger brother rebelled. He was the 
greatest provincial officer and had been allowed to 
reside at the capital of his viceroyal province by 
Alaungpaya, the last time any prince of the blood was to be 
bo a^llowed in this dynasty. His officers included 
San Ilia Gyi and Dammata, and Bala Mindin, the great
p
heroes of the Chinese invasions™ and his rebellion was a 
serious one. However, after some serious fighting, this 
rebellion was. also subdued and the king, in a purple 
passage typical of the continued stress on the religious 
ambitions of the Burmese kings which plays so large a 
part in the formulation of foreign policy, proclaimed:
1.G*D.Harvey: History of Burma, p.246. Konbaungzet 
P*5^ 9.
2 .Parker- Burma, Relations with China, p.92.
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11 When our royal father passed away, the Sa (Eater, 
Viceroy) of Toungoo should have devoted himself to his 
duty toward us, hut he has dared to plan that which is 
not proper, and has therefore brought great misery and 
hardship to the people. He has now deserved great 
punishment hut we aspire to attain Buddha-hood ...” 
and so the Toungoo Yaza was spared, and so were his 
Lieutenants'1'.
Thus the first two years of the reign had concen­
trated all attention on the internal affairs of the 
court, and foreign relations had been thrust aside.
Bo far as Siam was concerned the danger from Burma must 
have been regarded as trivial, for the two Siamese 
kings again began to plot, and intrigue, and the 
promising King Ut*umpon who dared not rule, was forced 
once more into retirement, and the mis at is factory one
o
came again to the throne. The Siamese, however, 
should have known better, for immediately the Toungoo 
rebellion was over, the king sent out the General 
Abaya Karmani, Minhla Thiri, Hemyo Letwe By aw Khaung, 
and Hemyo Let Ya Kyaw Din with 750 horse and 7 ?500 foot
1. Konbaungzet, p.34*9*
2. Woods History of Siam p.242.
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to take over the 57 districts of ohiengmai. The idea 
of subduing Ayudhya to vassalage must have been uppermost 
in the mind of the king, for he must have realized that 
previous Burmese successes over Ayudhya had always 
been preceded by the marshalling of all the Salween 
Shans, and by the occupation and einploitation of the 
Horthern Lao States. In any case C-hiengmai was regarded 
as d.ust a rebel province which had to be subdued1. The 
prince of Ohiengmai appealed to Ayudhya for help, but
none arrived in time, and in July 176$ the town was
?easily taken by the Burmese.
One sees the traditional pattern taking shape once 
again when the Mon general Talaban raided Martaban from 
his base the Kawgun caves in Thaton district^ and the Mon 
refugees joined with the local' inhabitants of Tavoy in a
Zl
massacre of the Burmese there and encouraged the Governor 
of the town to change his allegiance to Ayudhya . The
1 . Woods History of Siam, p.24$.
2* Woods Ibid. p.24$.
$. Harveys History of Burma, p.247* Konbaungzet, p.$$0.
4. Harveys Ibid. p.250.
5. Wood: op.cit, p.24$.
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pattern "becomes complete when it is noted that the 
Burmese grip was once more on the Trans Salween States 
like Keng Hung, for the states in that region were 
inextricably bound in a maze of relationships with 
Ghina and Burma.
Reng Hung sent tribute once every 5 years to 
Burma consisting of a gold cup, gold and silver flowers, ' 
and a few other articles from each of the 12 sub-chiefs,
& ' V ' f
while the Ohief sent the same plus 2 horses'*’. The 
right of investiture was claimed and exercised even in 
Thibaw’s reign (1878-1885) by the Burmese^. It was a 
Let Het Kaing Haingkan (i.e. it was expected to provide 
a fixed contingent in time of need) and the contingent 
for Burma was 5*000^. A Burmese Sitke (a sort of 
garrison commander in this case) was stationed in the 
State to look after Burmese interests. On the other 
hand the Chinese who called it Oheli, regarded it as 
an almost Chinese province, rather than a tributary, and 
stationed an establishment of officers and clerks to
ZLregulate and collect taxes. The passage of bodies of
1. Yules Mission to Ava. p.508.
2. Taw Sein Kho*s Selection from the hiutvaw Records.
p.21.
5. Yules op.cit. p.509*
4. T.Macleod ^ A*SBIS57'ATol.VI, Part II. pp.996-998.
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Burmese troops through this region could be quite 
sufficient to disturb the extraordinary equilibrium, and 
the tightening of border administration by U;hien Lung 
must have added to the risks of conflagration.
To the king however, all the possible repercussions 
of his aggression were as nothing. The impression one 
obtains from the clreonicles is that the expedition to 
Chiengmai was in the nature of a British Ministry of 
'food mission sent to Denmark to arrange for the 
resumption of a curtailed supply of good Banish bacon 
&nd eggs, though in the Burmese case the lever was 
force and not the offer of a guaranteed bulk market, 
and the commodity required was prestige and not eggs.
It is this matter of fact attitude to foreign aggressive­
ness which is so depressing a feature. Naungdawgyi on 
his record had exhibited the reactions of quite a mild 
prince to his full quota of trouble in his 3 years 
reign. He had forgiven a powerful and ambitious 
brother, and although it is impossible to say what he 
would have done to the great soldier Minkhaungnawrahta, 
he at least did regard his death as a loss. The Viceroy 
of Toungoo had been forgiven too, perhaps because he 
was his great father1 s own brother, but the defiant 
Lieutenants like San Hla Gyi and Balamindin would never 
have been spared or retained in high office if he had not
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been a mild man, Greatest proof seems to be in his
generous behaviour towards Talaban, the defiant Mon 
1General .
The Icing spent the short period left Id him in 
talcing his mother and queen round the countryside 
visiting the holy places and in 1763 he died quietly.
1. Konbaungzet p.25* Harveys History of Burma p.247*
has gilded the lily of this gesture by adding a 
colourful and chivalrous touch. His ^ main authority 
for this incident does not support him, for after 
all there was no need for the Icing to be circumspect 
with the captured rebel.
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CHAPTER VIII
Hsinbyushin^1765-1776 - the period of -Burmese glory 
with intensive hostilities as the main theme of 
_______   j foreign relations *
Naungdav^ /gyi1 s younger brother Hsinbyushin succeeded 
to the throne without any trouible or fuss for 
Naungdawgyi* s eldest son Maung Maung was only a baby*
His youthfulness and the shortness of Haungdawgyi1s reign 
had prevented: the growth of any opposition to the $uccess-
i
ion of Hsinbyushin and Hsinbyushin himself was an 
experienced soldier with*, a strong following and his 
accession was not contested*
1
Alaungpaya had set the stage, and giving the first 
cue had departed* Haungdawgyi had been occupied for 
the first two years with discordant moves in the 
orchestra, by rebellion, but immediately after this 
phase in the third and final year of his reign had 
started the first act by sending out troops to Chiengmai 
with orders to conquer.
Hsinbyushin’s'reign is the second act, packed full 
of action, the first major event of Hsinbyushin1s reign 
was the arrival at the capital in the month of Tabotwe
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(February) 1764 of the two generals Minhla Nawrahta and 
Abaya Karmani who had been sent to bake over Chiengmai 
in Naungdawgyi* s reign, Abaya Karmani was promoted and 
appointed Myo Wun (Governor) of Chiengmai'*'. This world 
support the view that the Burmese still regarded Chiengmai 
as part of the Burmese Empire* Minhla Nawrahta was 
also promoted becoming Maha Nawrahta and appointed Myin 
Wun or Commander of the Horse.
The capture of Chiengmai is then dismissed in 
the chronicles with a list of the booty brought before 
the king; it included the daughters of the refugee 
prince of Shwedaung, a scion of the last dynasty, the 
controversial Smim Htaw and his attendants, and 
elephants, horses, and articles "fit for kings". The 
list mentions just these, for they were royal loot, but 
Chiengmai had been for centuries from Bayinnaung* s time, 
a favourite hunting ground for slaves, and possibly 
slaves were taken in this campaign too.
Soon after the arrival of these generals however, 
news arrived from Min Ye Thiri that the Prince of
pChiengmai had rebelled. Hsinbyushin decided that he
1. Konbaungzet p.355*
2. Ibid p.555* Woods History of Siam, p.244.
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would send fresh troops and after effectively crushing
the rebellion his orders were to raise fresh strength from
the conquered province* This fresh strength was to he
employed in the subjugation of Lin Zin (Wiengchang)
and then after raising levies from LinZin the combined
forces were to advance on Ayudhya.
If the Burmese regarded the taking of Chiengmai
as a very normal business, the Siamese king also had no
doubts of the Siamese rights to 'l'avoy, and quite blithely
ignoring the fact that Alaungpaya had marched down the
'ienasserim coastal strip with the greatest of ease, the
Siamese king had formally taken from the rebel Governor
of favoy the emblems of vassalage which implied the
extension of Siamese protection to the province.
The column sent to ret alee Chiengmai was composed
of 100 war elephants, 1,000 horse, and 20,000 foot.
It was under the command of Nemyo ihihapate with ilyaw
Htin 1'hiha ihu and I'uyin Yamakyaw as his Lieutenants.
It was a formidable force, but the necessity to retake
l'avoy and the need to augment even his large Northern
invasion force with another from the South, to split
2up the Siamese•defences, occurred to the kind, and so
1. Konbaungzet, p.350.
2. Ibid. p.472.
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saying that ,f0n no occasion has Ayudhya suffered so 
severely as to have it’s king destroyed51** he ordered 
Maha.'. Nawrahta to Head JO regiments composed of 100 war 
elephants, 1,000 horse and 20,000 men, with Nemyo 
Gunner at and ‘luyin Yama Kyaw as his Lieutenants. He 
was instructed to augment his forces with levies from 
the provinces of hanthawaddy, Martahan, Mergui and 
l’avoy.
'though the Burmese king had sent sin additional 
column to invade Siam, the strength of the Burmese was 
hy no means completely expended on the Siamese adventure, 
the country was sufficiently stable for the king to lead 
personally an expedition to Manipur with the levies of 
the Shan chiefs on the west bank of the Irrawaddy plus
12,000 guards of the four palace groups, making a total 
force of 25,000* I’he official reason given was that 
the Kaja of Manipur had dared to set himself up again 
as an independent chief after the Alaungpaya invasion 
and was reported to be doing quite well. (The campaign 
was over quickly, and all the Manipur people - men, 
women and children - who could be rounded up from the 
jungles surrounding imphal were herded back as slaves.
In the meanwhile, the Chiengmai column had
1 * - Kdiifraungs ©t; p # 475 *
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reached Mone, the Burmese control point in the Shan
States and the chief’s of the Myelat (States west of
the Salween River) had teen commanded to raise 3,000
men* phe 3,000 was then formed into seven companies
under the command of the two Sawbwas of Mone and
Yawnghwe and the five Myo Safs (Shan Chiefs of the
second grade) of Lauk Sauk, Mong Pawn, Legya, Maing
Kaing and Mong Bit. They were then commanded to
1inarch m  front.
When Nemyo fhihapate arrived at hyaing Paung (Keng
Tawng) on the West bank of the Salween, urgent appeals
for reinforcement arrived from Min Ye Phiri who had been
left in command of the Burmese garrison at Chiengmai.
Nemyo fhihapate on receiving this intelligence, combined
the West Salween B^an levies with three Burmese companies
under the Burmese commanders Kyaw Khaung Kyaw fhu,
Phiri Yaza fhin Kyan and the Sitke Gyi fuyin Yama Kyaw.
This force was then sent off by the Mong Pu (Burmese
Maing Pu) Mong Hsat (Maing Phat) route, while he
himself with the rest took the Mong Iisin route down to
Chiengmai* The armies swept down the coixntry, spreading
out as they advanced while the rebels concentrated their
~~ ™  “ “  — —
1. J.PkR.Efo Luces Chinese Invasions of the 18th 
century. p.123* in which he quotes a Chinese 
Military History stating the same custom.
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lor cos up in the tom of Lampun. The approach of the 
Burmese army however, created a defeatist spirit and the 
Chiengmai rebels fled from the city, leaving the families 
of their chiefs behind, together with 200 elephants and 
a large stock of arms. Erom Lampun the Burmese marched 
to the town of Nan (Burmese Anan) and there halted for 
the rains, resting the men, and replenishing the strength 
of the army.
Nemyo Thihapate sent back a report to say that the 
cities and villages of the fifty-seven provinces of 
Ohiengmai were as unruffled as a calm piece of water 
and in a complete state of obedience; soon orders came 
out to eixploit the full resources of cbiengmai for an 
attack on Wiengchang and then with the added strength 
of Wiengchang to attack Ayudhya. In November 1764,
Nemyo Thihapate set out from Nan to carry out his masterTs 
orders.
Nemyo Thihapate and his twenty-five battalions going 
by boat reached the Mekong in nineteen stages, while the 
ten battalions under Tuyin Yama Kyaw had marched overland 
in fifteen stages.
They found the forces of Wiengchang ready to meet 
them. The troops were massed on the East bank of the
1. Konbaungzets p.J80.
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Mekong while the war "boats were massed behind* Then 
the Burmese forces uwithout fear or hesitation, aimed 
their 'boats, elephants, and horses straight at wherever 
the enemy was thickest and charged straight into their 
elephant masses, their ‘boat masses, and their cavalry 
masses; each man vying with the others to gather glory, 
they delivered a furious attack.
The Wiengchang forces withdrew into their city, 
and the Burmese camped near the Mekong. They hacked 
off the heads of all the enemy dead and piled them in 
a great pile so that the defenders of the city might 
see and he terrified. The city was situated between 
the two arms of the river, and the Burmese finding 
they could not bombard it crossed the river and erected 
hugh platforms of a height greater than the city walls 
and mounting their guns on these platforms, started 
an incessant bombardment.
After five days of this bombardment, Nemyo 
Thihapate decided that he could not waste much more time 
on the siege of Wiengchang for he still had the task 
of marching on Ayudhya ahead of him. He therefore 
declared that ’there should be an ogre at the head of 
his army” i.e. that desperate measures were in order,
1 . Konbaungset p.3 8 1 .
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and with all his subordinate commanders concurring he 
ordered an assault on the city.
They constructed moveable shelters and approached 
right up to the walls, and while some dug at the foot 
of the walls, others erected ladders and pressed on to 
come to grips with the defenders on the walls. The 
walls were captured after desperate fighting, but the 
inhabitants inside still held out, so more guns were 
mounted on the walls and a ceaseless bombardment was 
started. Then the peoples of Wiengchang 51 in such a 
state of terror, their very flesh crawled1' sent their 
General, the Amat Daro Boya (possibly Chao Phya) with 
eight monks and sent in their submission*
The King of Wiengchang and all the chiefs of the 
vassal cities swore allegiance, and three daughters of 
the king, with 1,000 attendants were sent back to be 
presented to the Burmese King. 500 viss of silver, 50 
viss of gold, 500 guns, 1,000 muskets, 100 war elephants, 
500 spears, 500 swords and other booty were sent back 
with Let Xa Udien Kyaw to the Golden Pee'ik,
Nemyo Thihapate having completed the first stage of 
his task left Wiengchang early in April and in May 
arrived at Lagun (now Nakawn Lampang) to spend the 
rains under shelter.
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The account up to this stage has been fairly 
straightforward in the Burmese Chronicle, and is not 
contradicted by the Siamese chronicles, but now comes 
the touch which is so e:xpressive of the mentality behind 
the adventures. I'he rains came while the Burmese 
army was sheltering in Lagun and the river started to 
flood. Soon the flood was serioiis and the horses 
and elephants began to be flooded out of their shelters, 
then with drawn sword Nemyo '^ hihapate invoked the Spirit 
of the River and commanded it in the Ring’s name to
i
desist, ’and then,1 says the chronicle, * the floods 
subsided’.
Mahanawyahta in the meanwhile had reached Tavoy, 
where he spent the rains of 1765 collecting men, horses, 
and elephants, from the provinces of Hanthawaddy, 
Martaban, Tavoy, Mergui and Tenasserim. 3,000 men in 6 
battalions under the &itke Linda Yaza arrived from 
Hanthawaddy. Then 3,000 men mostly Mons from Martaban 
under Binnya Sein, and from Mergui and Tenasserim,
2,000 men arrived who were placed under the command of 
the Lord of Martaban. In November the combined force 
of 200 elephants, 2,000 horses and 30 ,0 0 0 men began its
1 ♦ Konbaungzet p. 3 6 2,.
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advance on AyucLhya.
'The fact that the levies from Mergui and (Tenasserim 
reported at Tavoy makes it unlikely that this column took 
the same route as Alaungpayafs invasion of 1760* On 
the othe.r hand, the Burmese chronicles state that 
Petchaburi (Pyatbihto the Burmese) was taken before 
Batburi (Rabbi) and there is no mention of Bui as there 
was in the account of Alaungpaya’s campaign. Therefore 
Mahanawrahta1s columns must have crossed the hills 
by taking the Myitta route, as the Japanese did in the 
reverse direction in 1941, and then going dt>wn the 
Tenasserim River valley, passed down the Pram river 
valley to reach the .Siamese coastal strip somewhere near 
Prara Kao*
The Burmese struck rapidly and ruthlessly in their 
advance up the coast. The towns and villages which 
submitted at once were required to take the oath of 
allegiance and also to raise troops to fight on the 
Burmese side. The towns and villages which resisted on 
the other hand, were stormed and after a sack, the 
survivors were given to the individual soldiers who were 
the actual captors, as slaves. G-old and silver and other 
booty was reckoned the property of the captor, but arms
1. Konbaungzet p.585
and equipment had to he sent to the general’s camp.
With official sanction given to pillage, the treatment 
meted out to the Siamese must have been terrifying*
Later the Burmese generals had to issue special orders 
to remind tneir soldiers that towns and villages which 
had submitted were not to be molested which rather implies 
that they were being so molested. Even the sacked towns 
did not escape from the obligation to praise contingents 
for the invaders, though of course their value must have 
been doubtful.
The first city encountered by Maha Nawrahta in his 
march north was Petchaburi. Petchaburi was one of the 
towns which resisted, ’the Lord of Pyatbi (Petchaburi) 
not daring to face the weight of the Burmese elephants, 
horses and men (in the open) fell back into his city and 
shut himself up in defiance. Then the elephants, cavalry 
and foot, with swords, spades, pick axes and ladders 
approached the walls, and some set up ladders, and scaled 
the walls, and the royal troops showing no fear, and 
vying with each other to be the first, soon captured the 
city within an insignificant space of time5 the lords 
and all the citizens were taken as prisoners of war.
Women, men and treasure were retained by the actual 
captors, but arms were sent to the general’s camp.
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Then the chief men of the city were sworn into the
royal service, with a terrifying oath, which they would
not dare to break, and arranging for a garrison, the
royal army proceeded on its way from Pyatbi.n
It is stated that Phya Tak the Siamese general born
of a Chinese father, had been responsible for the defence
of' Petchaburi, and that the Burmese armies fx*om the
South making their way to Ayhdhyahad been stopped at
Petchaburi, and had had to retreat right back to 
2lenasserdm* The southern column however, had been 
ordered to proceed only in December 1764,^ and had spent 
the rains of 1765 in Tavoy. It had recommenced its 
advance on Ayudhya in November 1765, and so there does 
not seem to be any interval in which the column could 
have found time to advance right up to Petchaburi from 
Tenasserim or Tavoy, and after being stopped, retreat 
right back to Tenasserim. The statement possibly arises 
from the desire of the .Siamese chronicles to place Phya 
Tak in as favourable a light as possible in the history 
of the campaigns.
1. Konbaungzet. p.583*
2. Woods History of Siam, P.243-A4.
3. Konbaungzet? p.373*
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Ratburi (the Burmese Ratbi) was the next town on 
the line of march, and "the chief of Ratbi, having 
heard of the fate of the chief of Pyatfbi, and all the 
inhabitants, dared not offer resistance, and with the 
chief men of the town, came into the camp to tender 
submission. The chief of Ratburi, and the chief men 
of the town were made to take the oath of allegiance 
and were taken into the royal service, after which the 
royal army proceeded on its way."1
This was the standard procedure, and there was no 
serious resistance offered to the Burmese. Prom 
Ratburi, the main body swept up to Ban Pon which
submitted at once and then to Kanburi. Resistance was
offered but there was nothing to prevent its speedy 
capture, and the standard treatment for recalcitrants 
was dealt out. The Burmese chronicle does not mention 
the encounter with the English merchantmen near Hontaburi. 
011 the Menam, but it is possible that the Burmese sent 
a column to cut off Ayudhya from the sea by erecting 
forts on the banks of the Menam. This would have
prevented the arrival of sea-borne reinforcements from 
the tributory Malay states.
1. Konbaungzet, p.JSJ.
2. Harveys History of Burma, p.2^ 0. Wood; History
of Siam, p.245«
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From Kaiiburi the route lay through Sa Yah which 
submitted without resistance. From Sa Yah the Burmese 
marched on Sun Phyone (now San Phan) which after a 
short fight, was taken# After Sun Phyone the city of 
Sar Lin was taken without a fight. Nemyo ‘thihapate 
selected the hest elephants and horses captured from 
the towns, and villages of Western Siam, and with them 
equipped seven "battalions from the seven captured 
cities of Petchaburi, Ratburi, Ban Pon, Kanburi, Sayali, 
Sim Phyone, and Sarlin. the Siamese levies were 
placed under the command of the Lord Mingyi Karmani 
Sanda. the ability of the Burmese so to raise, and, 
what is more, make effective and valuable use of levies 
raised from freshly conquered enemy provinces is 
remarkable. It argues that the Siamese provinces had 
only the most tenuous link with the centre, or that the 
provinces had a tradition of rebellion, with no strong 
sense of national unity. The British with their use 
of Sikh a and Gurkhas and Malirattas, the Dutch with their 
soldiers from Amboyna, and the French with their 
Senegalese troops, have demonstrated in modern times 
that such troops can be very useful.
A point of major importance that strikes one is 
that notwithstanding the possibility of the Burmese 
acting in such a manner, the Siamese dissipated their
2 2 0
forces, possibly through lack of effective control.
The procession of easily taken provincial cities must 
have provided the Burmese invaders with shelter, food 
and loot, and kept the morale of the Burmese troops 
high, while correspondingly lowering that of the 
Siamese defenders. It will he shown later that the 
Siamese levies fighting on the Burmese side, fought 
well, and though it may have been the continued effect 
of a watchful Burmese eye on them in the front line, 
with a strict guard 011 their families left behind, as 
hostages, there can be little doubt that with just the 
original Burmese forces, Ayudhya would never have been 
effectively cut off for nearly two years.
During all this time the Siamese King had collected 
a force of 500 war elephants, 500 guns on carriages, and
60,000 men for the interception of the South Burmese 
column and had placed them under the command of rhe 
Minister Phya Pala. The Burmese scouts soon came into 
contact with the Siamese and reported back to 
Mahanawrahta. The morale of the Burmese was high, the 
Siamese position was attacked at once, and taken. The 
Burmese then advanced on the village of Kami, five 
marches west of Ayudhya and there dug themselves in to
t
wait the arrival of the Northern column from Chiengmai.
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The Chiengmai coliana on the confirmation of 
orders to advance from Ava, set out in the month of 
September 1765* Five battalions under the Sitke Gyi 
Tuyin Yamakyaw, five more under iekta Theikdi Kyaw, 
five more under Tuyin Thaya Kyaw and five,under Binnya 
Law making a total force of 10,000 which was sent in 
300 war boats down the Me Ping with the Sitke Gyi Tuyin 
Ysma Kyaw as commander in chief* Nine battalions 
raised from the cities of Wiengchang and commanded by 
nine princes of Wiengchang were placed under the command 
of Thiri Yaza Thinkyan and with his own battalion making 
ten, this force of 100 elephants, 300 horses and 8,000 
men were sent off ..as the vanguard*
Next, fourteen battalions raised from the cities 
of ohiengmai, and commanded by fourteen princes of 
Ohiengmai were placed under the command of Thado 
Mindin, and together with his own battalion this force 
consisting of 200 war elephants, 700 horses and 12,000 
men was sent off immediately behind the Luang Prabang 
detachment. Then Nemyo Thihapate himself with 
thirteen battalions composed of 100 elephants, 200 horse
1. The fact that the Wiengchang troops were placed 
ahead of the Ohiengmai contingent implies that
the Burmese had more trust in the Chiengmai troops*
2. The cities ■ of Mong Su, Mong Hsat which are now^part 
of Mone and Kentung was also included in the list*
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and 13 ,000 men set out as the vanguard,
The same procedtire such as we saw used by the 
Southern column in its dealings with the cities and 
villages on the way was adopted. The first city in the 
line of advance Ban Tet, (now Bantak) shut its gates 
but it was easily stormed and taken. The next town 
Raheng made its submission well in advance. Kampheng 
Phet (the Kaman Pailc of the Burmese) also tendered sub­
mission. Prom Kampheng Phet, the column made a short 
detour North East because Sawankalok had refused to sub­
mit, and encountered no difficulty in talcing it. From 
Sawankalok the column turned South again and on its 
way received the submission of Sukotai without any 
delay. The ease with which the Burmese took Sukotai 
is significant comment on the way Burmese power over­
shadowed the weakened Ayudhyan Kingdom. It had taken 
generations of struggle before the Tais wrested 
Sukotai from the Cambodians, and it was one of the 
prizes that Ayudhya had coveted and struggled for 
throughout the years. From Sukotai the march was on 
Pitsanulok* Pitsanulok the major Siamese town in the 
North, had lately been the scene of a civil war in which
the Governor of the city had triumphed. he decided to
1defy the Burmese and ignored their demands for submission.
I* Woods History of Siam, p.245* Konbaungzet, p.3S9«
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But they made short work of him, and took the town*
They spent ten days resting in the city, and then
swept south, administering the oath of allegiance to
all the people on the way. There was no large scale
resistance after Pitsanulok; hut two strong columns,
each of ten battalions strength, were sent out under
Thiri Nanda Thinkyan and Kyaw Craung Kyaw Thu to sweep
the countryside of the flanks of the line of march.
The two commanders administered the oath of allegiance
to all the provincial officials, and collecting their
families as hostages took them back to the Burmese
1base at Pitsanulok. These captured towns were 
required to provide thirteen battalions, and in view 
of the hostages taken, these were forthcoming. They 
were equipped by the Burmese with the elephants, horses, 
and weapons, captured from the Northern and Eastern 
cities of Siam.
In their victorious sweep the Burmese had captured 
such an ample amount of weapons that the Commander 
in Chief Nemyo Tkifoapatn found he could not carry all 
his booty with him, and so sent back under escort 150 
cannons of various calibres, ranging from three pounders, 
to 45 pounders to Ohiengmai. It is curious how the
1. Konbaungzet, p.389.
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Burmese generals persisted in sending back booty to 
the king. ,J~‘he fact that cannon and daughters figured 
so frequently in the choice of loot sent back would 
imply that glorifying of the king was one of the main 
factors of the invasion. It could also mean that the 
cannon used by both sides was not of any great value to 
the combatants, or that there was insufficient ammun­
ition.
The Siamese levies were now placed under the 
command of Uddein Nanda Kyaw Htin and in the traditional 
manner of using levies,ordered to march in front.
The Siamese king in the meanwhile had managed to raise 
two forces, each of 30,000 men. One group under 
Phya Kuratit marched out along the bank of the Me Ping 
river to intercept the Burmese.
The second force was placed in JOO great war
1boats and proceeded up the MePing. At a spot about 
V/z miles N.E. of the village of Pass an Pathok they 
waited for the Burmese to come up.
No sooner were they formed up than the Burmese 
attacked, and forced them to retreat. The Burmese 
followed up but the remnant of the Siamese withdrew 
into the Capital and on the 5th February 1766 the Burmese
1. War boats were of varying sizes - some carried
20 men - the larger ones 40 to 56.
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halted at the village of Pass an Pathok about % mile 
North b'ast of Ayudhya itself,
Nemyo ,J*lhihapate then ordered the construction of 
9 great stockades along both banks of the Me Ping, and 
sent back as proof of his victory the choicest loot to 
Ava*
'When Mahanawrahta heard of the arrival of Nemyo 
rhihapate1 s column, he ordered his own column to 
advance and'the Burmese Commanders joined forces almost 
beneath the walls of Ayudhya, Mahanawrahta stationed 
his column about a mile N.W. of Ayudhya just west of 
the pagoda built by Bayinnaung in the 16th century,
Phe Siamese had cleared the countryside immediately 
surrounding Ayudhya and had taken all the people and 
provisions into the city to stand a long siege# 1‘he 
walls and forts were repaired and manned, and all the 
other static defences of the city strengthened, Phe 
morale of the citizens, and even of the king, however, 
was not high, and the people followed the kingfs example 
of searchfng feverishly for all kinds of superstitious 
talismans and amulets for making themselves invisible and 
invulnerable•^
It was decided not to give the Burmese time to
1# Woods History of Biam, p,246.
consolidate their positions, and Phya Kuratit with
50,000 sallied out to attack the northern Burmese column* 
Nemyo P’hihapate took no risks with his untrained local 
levies and sent out 10,000 Burmese under 5 of his most 
experienced officers - Kyaw Graung Kyaw .Phn^  A Sitke G-yi 
Pu Yin Yama Kyaw, Bhwe Paung Si Phu, Phiri Yaza Phin 
Kyan, and Binnya Law, fhe Siamese attack was broken 
up, but 5 days later, 5 0 ,0 0 0 picked men again came out of 
the city under Phya Pak to attack the Southern Burmese 
column. phe elephants were special ones this time, 
wearing armour and carrying jingals. Phen another army 
of 50,000, under Phya phan was sent out to support the 
first group* Phis time the Burmese brought out 40,000 
men, 200 elephants and 1 ,0 0 0 horses from their stockades. 
Phe Burmese divided themselves into 2 groups, and placing 
Bayinnaung1s pagoda as their centre, spread themselves 
out to its left and right to meet the Siamese who had 
coalesced into a single group.
Phe Burmese right wing commanded by Mingyi Zeyathu 
first came unde?:’ atuack. Phe Siamese laid down a 
heavy barrage from their guns and before the smoke had 
cleared, charged with their elephants.
Phe Burmese lines at the point of contact was 
under the Lord of Ban Pon - a Siamese - and he had 70
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elephants with 500 horse in support. The Siamese gen-
eral Phya Than caiight sight of Ban Pon and exclaiming 1 It 
is thou that I seek1' charged on his elephant. Ban Pon 
stood his ground on his elephant, and the tusks of the 
elephants clashed as they strained to throw each other. 
But a Siamese musket shot hit Ban Pon and he fell, 
mortally wounded.
The Siamese then spread out their elephants and 
pressed home their attack on Ban Pon*s squadron of 
500 horse which Broke under the strain. The whole 
weight of the Siamese forces was then thrown into this 
gap in the Burmese lines and soon the 20 Battalions 
of Min Gyi Zeyathu were thrown into confusion and Began 
to retreat.
As soon as the Burmese Oommander~in-Ghief Maha 
Nawra Hta saw what was happening he came hurrying up 
with 100 elephants and 3j000 musketeers to give support. 
The sight of the Bogyoke*s action electrified the other 
wing of the Burmese line, and the 20 Battalions under 
the Sitke Gyi Nemyo Gunnerat wheeled round the 
Bayinnaung pagoda, and hurled themselves on the Siamese 
rear. The Siamese assailed from the rear, checked in 
their stride, and gave Mingyi Zeyathu*s troops time 
to re-form. The time had now arrived to catch the 
Siamese Between two attacking Burmese forces, and Mingyi
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Zeyathu ordered his column to atuack. The Burmese 
guns were massed and created panic among the Siamese 
elephants who wheeled round and broke through the 
Siamese foot and cavalry which were following close 
behind. This threw the Siamese into confusion; they 
scattered uas a bundle of bamboo would, when the binding 
rope was loosened/1
Immediately after the action, Maha Nawrahta called 
all his commanders before him, and proclaimed (IThe 
Lord of Ban Pon though a Yodaya (Siamese) has proved 
true to his allegiance to our Lord the King, even unto 
death; Mingyi Zeyathu, Nanda Bay a Kyaw Din, Thuyein 
Tan Saung, Yan Ngu Thiri Kyaw Din and Thamar Kyaw Gaugn 
(the five senior commanders of the Burmese right wing) 
on the other hand have proved lacking in zeal and care; 
let them be executed at once.T<
The Sitke Gyi Tu Yin Yan Aung Kyaw, however, 
submitted that the 5 commanders had not fallen back 
because they dared not die, but because, in view of the 
superior numbers of the Siamese it was necessary to 
fall back a little to destroy them. The Sitke of the 
left wing Ne Myo Gunnerat supported this plea, saying 
that the right wing had had a small stream in front of 
them when the Siamese attacked, and by withdrawing had
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drawn the whole Siamese force across the stream; then 
when the right had made its stand and the left wing had
attacked the Siamese re ax, the Siamese had not been able
to retreat in a hurry because of the stream, and had 
thereby suffered bloody defeat,
men Satu Karmani added his plea for leniency saying 
"the words of the two Lord commanders have been indeed 
most fitting; in the fortunes of war, it is as 
difficult to prophesy results, as it would be to tell 
of the chick in its egg; and beyond that, the royal 
commands had not yet been carried out; they were in the
heart of the enemy* s land, and it would be right to let
the five commanders prove themselves in another battle, 
■(Then spoke Mahanawrahta - "In war, lesser or greater 
numbers, smaller or greater faults, rarity or frequency, 
do not counts discipline must be maintained; but since 
the three Lord commanders desire it to be so, let the 
five commanders be given their lives this once.u
The Burmese commanders then decided that the city 
must be completely sealed off, and Mahanawrahta*s column 
took charge of the West and South of the city, while 
Nemyo -Thihapate!s column became responsible for the 
North and Last. Thirteen stockades in all were erected 
right round the city, and each was manned by five to
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seven battalions.
Ayudhya had a good natural defensive barrier in the 
network of rivers and streams that surrounded the city 
on all sides. The walls were all manned, and the 
Burmese could never, in that first year of siege,get 
near enough to the city walls. The junior commanders 
feared the approach of the rains, and wanted to with­
draw during the rainy season, but Mahanawrahta would 
have none of it, saving that the Siamese would be like 
fish escaping out of a net, and that all the months of 
siege would be wasted if they should raise the siege 
even though for a short period.
He commanded a more vigorous collection of food 
and cattle from the surrounding countryside and ordered 
the cultivation of the paddy fields« He directed the 
removal of the elephants and horses to higher ground 
under escort. A series of stockades near enough to 
each other for mutual support, wherever thex^ e was 
ground high enough, were constructed, and he proclaimed 
that he would stay ten years round tAyudhya, if it were 
necessary.
These decisions were made just in time, for five 
days after the elephants and horses had left, the 
rains poured down, and "the whole countryside became as 
one with the-.great .ocean," The Burmese forts were on
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earthen platforms faced "with ‘bricks, and they stood
out like islands in the watery waste. '-khis would
have isolated them from each other without boats, hut
the -Burmese already had some , and from the conquered
towns in the North fleets arrived and v!those which
should he gilt were gilt, and those painted crimson
were so painted." I'he island forts and the fleets
of war boats succeeded in isolating Ayudhya right
through the rains.
The Siamese heing on their home ground so to speak,
decided that their boats should he made full use of in
the circumstances, and came out again and again in force
to single out and destroy individual Burmese forts. In
1September 1766 they made a final atuempt. One hundred 
and sixty great war boats each mounting three cannons, 
and manned by a force of 6,000 men came out of the city 
under the command of Phya Petchaburi and Phya Tak. The 
Burmese were ready for them and wasted 110 time in 
coming to grips with the Siamese. They bore down on 
the advancing Siamese boats, and using grappling irons 
and boat hooks boarded, for fierce hand to hand fighting. 
The Siamese made a cobirageous stand under inspiring
1. Woods History of Siam, p.247*
leadership* Phya Petchaburi was in the thick of it 
when 20 Burmese boats hemmed his own in* His crew and 
gunners were shot down and when a Burmese officer came 
alongside to take him prisoner, he shouted ”1 have come 
to take thee and thy men? not to surrender" and jumped 
onto the Burmese boat. He was beaten down with a 
ramrod. ,J-lhe fall of Phya Petchaburi broke the 
offensive and the Siamese turned round and fled.
After this the Burmese had everything under control 
and used to decoy desperate parties of Siamese into 
bloody ambushes, so that soon the Siamese ceased to 
make any more serious attempts to break up the siege.
The Siamese of the provinces of Sukhotai, 
Pitsanulok, and Savankalok, who had survived the initial 
Burmese advance by taking to the jungles, now collected 
a sizable force of 10,000 (the Burmese chronicles 
say 20,000** and under Prince Tep Pipit cane down to
ptry and raise the siege. The Burmese detailed 3,000 
men to meet them, and, probably because the Siamese 
were a badly demoralized rabble, while the Burmese 
troops were seasoned campaigners, this force was
1. Konbaungzet, p.399*
2. Wood*. History of Siam p.247* Konbaungzet p.405.
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sufficient to drive off the at u acker s. The Burmese 
chronicles state that the Burmese force was given the 
great advantage of surprise for the Siamese forces per- 
mitted them to approach without any preparations tor 
defence thinking the Burmese were Siamese reinforcements 
from the other provinces. It is reasonable to deduce 
from this that the Siamese were completely disorganized, . 
and had no comprehensive plan of campaign, that a part 
of the Siamese population had escaped the Burmese system 
of press ganging and hostages, and also that the Burmese 
soldiers could not have’-had any distinguishing uniform, 
though this last might have been due to deliberate policy 
for the occasion.
After the monsoon floods had subsided, the Burmese 
captured one after the other the Siamese forts serving 
as an outer defence line, and were then able to erect 
large ear them mounds overlooking the city walls, 
against which they directed a ceaseless bombardment.
The walls, however, stood firm and the Siamese stubbornly 
refused to surrender, The Burmese commanders decided 
to scare the Siamese into surrender by a bluff. A vast 
number of huts was built round each stockade and in 
the night, large bodies of troops were secretly sent 
some miles behind. During the day they would come
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marching up, flags flying, bands .playing, and salvoes
being fired from the stockades to welcome them* At
night men were detailed to keep lamps burning in the
empty huts. This strategem did not bring about
surrender, but seems to have successfully deceived the
Siamese, and therefore lowered their fighting spirit.^
Siamese morale was now very low; dissension was
rampant, and some of the best commanders, like Phya Talc,
deserted and fled from the capital* The Siamese king
now decided to ask for terras, and sent four Siamese,
o
garbed in penitential white with this message. ilThe 
Righteous king, Lord of Dvayawaddy, and of the white,
1. Woods History of Siam P.248. Mr. Harvey has 
considerable contempt for Burmese ideas of 
strategy, but they seem to have been quite sound 
in the light of present day acceptances; for 
example Maha Bamdhla wrote incriminating letuers 
to a Magh employed in the British service in the 
1824 war, and arranged for them to fall into 
British hands* Some months ago a well known 
British correspondent wrote about the great comfort 
he had in incriminating by false friendliness a 
cafe proprietor in Vienna, presumably in Russian 
pay, who annoyed him by eavesdropping. Again Gen­
eral Wingate is recorded to have successfully 
bluffed the Italian-Luke of Aosta as to the real 
strength of the British in Abyssinia. Surely a 
basic need is to mislead the enemy about one's 
military strength.
2. Kohbaungzet p.408.
red and spotted elephants, delegates his wise ministers 
0 great Lords of Ava, possessed of wisdom, energy and 
courage, who having placed on their heads, the commands 
of the great and righteous king of Ava, Lord of many 
umbrella bearing kings, of the sapphire, gold, sil.ver, 
and amber mines, of the white, red and spotted elephants 
have marched to this regions the great countries of 
Xodaya and Ava have from the time of our ancestors 
been at peace and as one, like unto a piece of gold.
But this peace, with the forwarding of great elephants, 
horses, and other tribute with the regular passage of 
envoys has' been broken by the rebellion of the 
Talaing (Mon) race, and therefore the tributary presents 
have not reached the Golden Feet. The customary pre­
sents shall be presented as of old.”
The Burmese treated the offer with contempt, saying 
”in this war between the two countries, the Xodaya king 
and his ministers are as inconsequent and trivial as a 
YJwe': (Burmese weight = 1 gramme) is to a viss in a very 
true balance1 and that they would in any case take the 
city. Five days after this Mahanawrahta died but 
orders arrived from Ava that Hemyo Thihapate should 
be in sole charge, and that the Todsya affair must be 
finished off soon, for the king himself was going to
2 3 6
lead his armies into China. Nemyo Thihapate now 
decided to tunnel, and to hide the tunneling operations, 
constructed three forts near the city walls. Five 
tunnels were dug. Two, after getting beneath the 
wall, followed the line of the wall for a distance of 
800 feet, timber supports of suitable girth being 
placed along the tunnel to support the walls. The 
other three proceeded past the earth embankment behind 
the walls, and then tilted upwards till a thickness of 
only 2 feet was left between the tunnel and the surface. 
On the 28th of March 1767 the wooden supports in the 
tunnels dug along the walls were fixed, and from the 
other three, the Burmese streamed into the city. Sim­
ultaneously a great assault was made from all sides 
under cover of a terrific barrage, and the Burmese 
fought their way into the city. The Burmese chronicle 
states "thus in the year 1123 (1763 A.D.) had marched 
from the Golden Feet at Ava, 28 battalions of 20,000 
men under Nemyo Thihapate and 30 battalions of 20,000 
men Linder Mahanawrahta by Zinme and by Tavoy, and because 
it could not withstand the glory of the king, in the 
year 1129 (1767 A.D.) at four in the after-noon of the 
16th day of the Waxing Tagu fell Ayudhya with its king 
and people."
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1khe chronicle gives a list of the "booty which , 
questions of chauvinism apart, indicates that the wealth 
of Ayudhya must have been one of the major reasons for 
the Burmese attack, 'the chronicle states nthen were 
captured, the ex-king, the brothers., sisters, wives and 
concubines of the Siamese king, the ministers and 
officials, merchants and magistrates, learned men, 
musicians, dancers, wood carvers, carpenters, masons, 
blacksmiths, goldsmiths, silversmiths, painters, tanners, 
stone polishers, . ebsfcers, magicians and herbalists, 
astrologers and soothsayers, vets, brocade weavers, spinn­
er s, dyers and all the books and manuals, lumps of gold 
and lumps of silver, precious stones, copper and brass, 
elephants, muskets, great and curious cannon, shot of 
Chinese manufacture, shot of Linzin and Zinme manufacture, 
and many other articles of great value.:J
Ayudhya was by the command of the king destroyed 
utterly. i'he buildings were burnt down, the walls 
razed to the ground, and the moat filled up. fhe 
destruction of Ayudhya might have been a gesture, but it 
could also be an indication of what the Burmese king 
conceived to be the best method of holding down a 
conquered region; the Konbaung kings had not progressed 
mentally from the koungoo kings who had the same idea.
But the Siamese chronicles say "the king of Hanthawaddy
1. Konbaungzet' p&18.
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(Bayinnaung) waged war like a monarch, and the king of 
Ava like a robber.”
They did not realize that strong garrisons at 
strategic points were needed in the initial stages 
after conquest; and that with the certainty of swift 
action, a policy which was not more harsh and oppressive 
than that of its native rulers had to be combined, to 
lessen the strain on Burmese resources. In actual fact 
the Burmese conquest imposed a parisitic burden, which 
by doubling the exactions from the people would make the 
overthrow of Burmese rule increasingly desirable, and 
in any case, even had they realised the need for this 
policy Burma had not the resources for full time and 
effective garrisoning. Punitive expeditions sent out 
to avenge the massacre of inadequate garrisons would tend 
rather to inflame the conquered and unify them in 
resistance. The threat of certain and overwhelming 
forces which enabled lone British officials to rule did 
not exist, for the Burmese were about equally matched 
in strength with the Siamese. f’he Siamese knew this, 
and if anything, they could convince themselves that 
they were stronger.
The conditions for successful invasion called for 
determined and effective Burmese leadership set aginst 
a hesitant Siamese defence; the coercion and effective
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utilization of Siamese tributary provinces set against 
the fragmentation of Siamese strength, and the ability 
to keep the field through the monsoon floods which last 
would call for tranquillity-in the Burmese homeland.
All these conditions were by great good fortune operative 
just long enough for the capture of Ayudhya.
Immediately after the fall of Ayudhya, the Shan, 
Ghiengmai, Wiengchang, and Siamese levies were released 
from their duties and small Burmese detachments were left 
in charge of Siamese garrison troops, and with this 
optimistic gesture the Burmese armies hurried back to 
Burma.'1'
fhe destruction of the Siamese ruling dynasty 
accentuated the fragmentation of the country, which broke 
up into various petty spheres of influence. 1'hus, 
only if sufficient Burmese strength were stationed in 
the country could a lengthy and durable overlordship 
have been maintained. But since Burmese strength 
was lacking, the destruction of the ruling dynasty and 
the fragmentation of the country provided men of ability 
and energy the opportunity to rise to leadership.
A leader having risen to power, the debilitdting. ihfiluence 
of the Burmese invasion on the power of the semi-independent
1. Woods History of Siam p.248. Konbaungzet p.422.
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provinces would enable him eventually to unify and so
strengthen the country. Burmese withdrawal, the
essential preliminary to the revival of Siamese strength
was however, brought about by an external factor -
Chinese invasion - and before we deal with this Siamese
revival we must turn to Burmese relations with China.
The Burmese chronicles first reference to the Chinese
invasion is given casually, when Hsinbyushin appointing
ITemyo I'hihapate to the sole command of the Burmese armies.
in Siam urged speed for he himself was to lead his troops
into China. This casual way of introducing the subject
is in keeping with the tone of Burmese ideas as to how
and why the invasions had started. The two reasons which
they gave, the death of a Chinese in a brawl near Keng
Tung and a minor trade dispute over the question of the
bridging of the Taping Piver are not mentioned at all by 
1the Chinese. ^he Burmese chronicle however seems to
2have been vaguely aware of the true cause, for they add. 
that the disputes provided the Viceroy of Yunnan with an 
excuse to accept the bribes and blandishment of the three 
refugee sawbwas of Hsenwi, Bharuo and Keng Tung 2
1. Luces J.B.B.S. Vol. 15, Part II, p.116.
2. Konbaungzet pp427-2®*
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for he could on the strength of these disputes urge on 
the Emperor to war against Burma. The Emperor of Ghina 
it is stated, ordered the annexation of Keng lung.
Now, this reference by the Burmese to the three 
refugee sawbwas from three frontier states brings us 
onto solid ground; for it is known that all three were 
rebels and fugitives from Burmese authority. The 
Sawbwa of Hsenwi referred to without any explainatory 
note by the Konbaungzet chronicle was the full brother 
of Sao Meng li, the Hsenwi sawbwa who in 1758 &ad been 
■didve-n out of Hsenwi by Alaungpaya1 s troops for assisting 
the Shwedaung Prince, a scion of the preceding Burmese 
dynasty.'1' The Burmese had appointed as Sawbwa a 
half brother of sao Meng Ti, but the people of Hsenwi had 
murdered him, and set up, Sao Hkam Leng (the Nga Aung Tun 
of the Burmese) . On Burmese troops being sent up to 
Hsenwi, Sao Hkam Leng had fled into Ghina and thrown 
himself on Chinese protection. Hsenwi, under the Chinese
The Hsenwi Chronicle (Gr.U.B. Part I, Vol.II. p249) 
says that during Sao Meng li* s period, the Burmese 
had made many demands for money and men. The 
sawbwa had dreamt that if the liti (spire) of a 
pagoda he had built inclined towards Burma, then 
Hsenwi would always remain under the Burmese; if 
it remained upright it would be independent, and if 
it leant towards China, then it would be a Chinese 
vassal. When he woke the next morning he found 
the lltl leant towards Burma, and thinking that he
would soon be killed by the Burmese, he gathered his 
treasures and fled into China.
Konbaungz et, p «276.
1.
H ’“LL
2.
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terra Muhpang had been for centuries regarded as a 
Suaii-wei-ship (Comforter^s province), and now when the 
Chinese were once more powerful on the frontier they were 
glad to utilize this opportunity for fragmentation.
As regards Bhamo, the sawbwa had come in with his
psubmission to Alaungpaya early in his reign but at
some time later, he had presumably rebelled for the
Burmese re corded^ that he had fled into Cbina. The
Chinese also had a tradition of suzerainty over Bhamo,
which to them was known as Man Moh, under a Suan fu-sz
(a vassal ruler) and the same Manchu attitude as in
hsenwi seems to have been adopted.
The Keng lung Sawbwa referred to was the rightful
heir who had been ousted by the Burmese nominee and
4had fled into China. Keng Tung, the largest trans
Salween Shan state owing allegiance to Burma was of
course another border state, and though it had never 
had relations with China, as intimate as those of the 
other two, it was the immediate neighbour of Keng Hung
1. See Chapter VI on the historical background of 
Sino-Burmese relations.
2. Konbaungzet p.80.
3* Ibid* p.276.
4. Luces J.B.R.S. Vol. 15. Part 11, p.118.
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axi * inner dependency1 of Uhina. The Chinese knew
Keng Tung as Meng Ken (the Kon country) and the Yung- 
1Chang annals claimed that Keng Tung "came in in 1406, hut 
joined Burma in 1522" and remained independent of China. 
"Its chief" the Chinese annalist continues, "is called 
P1 a Ohao. (Sao Pha of the Shans today the Ohao Pa of the 
Siamese) and lives in a many tiered ‘building. He has 
several hundred wives, who in the late afternoon go out 
on elephant back to bathe in the river* When this is 
over, they form in a circle to do obeisance to the chief, 
who removes the gold bracelet from his arm, and the 
one who get it does night duty. There are many tigers 
in the country, and the husbandmen build straw huts on 
the trees to watch their crop* Theii* clothes are pulled 
over their heads and they make maturesses of goose 
feathers. Chao Hun, the Prefect of Yunnan, on one 
occasion went into this country on a barbarian-conciliatory 
errand, but the chief was so discourteous that no man 
has ever been since."
The real reason for the invasion can be traced to the 
Chinese policy of keeping the frontier region quiet, a 
policy which by Chien Lung’s time they were strong enough
1. E*H. Parker’s translated extracts in G.U.B. Part II, 
Vol.I. p.397.
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to put into effect, and secondly to the need to iieed 
the complaints of the Chinese protected border states 
about exactions by the officer of the expansionist 
Konbaung kings.
It will be remembered that in Alaungpaya*s reign, 
the Gwe chief Gunna Bin had been driven across the 
border into Meng-Lien and that after bitter quarrels 
Gunna Bin had been killed, and his wife taken into 
the harem of the iVi eng-Lien Sawbwa. ■ The Chinese 
historians remark that Nang Chan the wife of Gunna Bin, 
loved neither the Chinese nor the Burmese, nor even her 
captor the Sawbwa of Ivieng Lien. They made an under­
statement, for she hated all three, and brooding on her 
wrongs, planned revenge.2 . In 1762, herself leading 
a band of avengers, she murdered Meng Lien and burnt 
his city to the ground. Then while on the run, she 
instigated the Sawbwa of Keng 'lung, a Burmese nominee, 
(the rightful Sawbwa having fled into China) to make 
an attack on Keng Hung. The Keng Tung Sawbwa accepted 
the suggestion and attacked Keng Hung.
The Chinese border states in Southern Yunnan were
17 ™*See* Chapter TTT7 ’ — — — — —
'2. Luce - J.B.H.S. Vol.15 Part II, p.116.
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soon in an uproar, and the Chinese presumably ill-prepared 
for hostilities in this area after the long years during 
which the declining Toungoo dynasty had had no say in 
frontier affairs, were at a disadvantage, and three 
Chinese generals were severally defeated. ihen 
while the Yunnan authorities were presumably re­
organizing their forces for retaliatory v measures,
pTeinkya Min Khaung was despatched in 1765 by Hsinbyushim 
to demand tribute from the minor Sawbwas in the Salween 
area North ox ICeng 'l'ung who were under Chinese protection.
The states in the border country had long paid 
tribute to both China and Burma''1 but in the decline of 
Burmese influence in the last years of the ,J-‘oungoo 
dynasty, they must have escaped the payment of tribute 
to Burma, and when they were ashed to resume payment 
they proved recalcitrant. Perhaps it was the arrogance
of the officers of the new and fierce Burmese dynasty; 
perhaps they relied on effective Chinese protection; 
but they seem to have refused, for Keng Hung murdered 
the Burmese Residents, Let Ya Kyaw G-aung, and Letwe
1. Luces J.B.R.S. Vol.15, Part II, p.118.
2. Konb aungz et, p.388.
3* Macleods J.A.S.B* 1837? Vol.VI, p.996.
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Kyaw G-aung^ " and threw themselves on Chinese protection,
The Yunnan forces having 'by now re-organised,
advanced on Keng Tung and it is at this point that the
Chinese account of the invasion and that of the Burmese
meet, though the Chinese hardly mention the siege of 
2  11Keng Tung, The --urmese chronicle continues, 
after giving its explanation of the invasions, to say 
that the viceroy of Yunnan posted a notice on the banks 
of the Talaw river saying "Deliver a man to us in the 
room of our man who was killed, or we will attack you,u  ^
The Chinese were supposed to have advanced on Keng Tung 
with 50,000 foot and 10,000 horse under Yin la Lo Ye,
The Keng Tung Sawbwa now deserted the Burmese, and went 
over to the Chinese, and the Burmese resident Sit-Ke 
Shwe Taung Tet was left to conduct the defence as best 
he could.
Word had, however reached Ava, and Hsinbyushin on 
the 28th December 1765 sent 20,000 foot, 2,000 horse and 
200 elephants under the ^et We Win Daw Hmu Nerayo Bitlm 
(Let We Win Daw Hmu - meaning the officer in command 
of the left hand or Northern section of the palace city;
1. Konbaungz et p . 428.
2 . Luces J.B.R.S. Vol.15, Part II, p.118.
3 « Konbaungzet p,3 28.
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in effect one of the principal military officers commanding
the Guards).
Remyo Si Thu arranged for a sortie to be made
by the Reng Tung defense at the moment of his atrack.
The Chinese cavalry broke under the charge of the
Burmese elephantry, and first the Chinese retired to
the bank of the Talaw river, where the5r erected some
mud works; then under continued Burmese pressure they
retreated to the Melchong where the Chinese general fell.
The Burmese were back in Ava by April. It was at this
time that the Viceroy of Yunnan is stated to have f,lost
his witsn and smarting under the Bmperor's censure,
1committed suicide nout of sheer fright** ♦
Up to .this stage what seems to have happened, from 
the point of view of the Chinese was a large scale dis­
turbance of the peace in.the frontier areas caused 
largely by the invasion of Burmese-Shan hordes. The 
Chinese thought that the Burmese were at the bottom of 
all the disturbance, and such suspicions in the time of 
an energetic and strong emperor* like Chien Lung could 
well be sufficient, at the very least, to provoke 
active retaliatory measures.
1. Luces J.B.R.S* Vol.15, Part II, p. 119- E.H.Parkers 
Burma, Relations with China, pb-84.
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From the Burmese point of view, the whole business 
was pure Chinese aggression. ‘fhe new Burmese dynasty 
was oust getting into its stride hut it already had 
fierce opinions of its own worth and any retaliatory 
measures would and did automatically bring violent 
Burmese reaction.
it is reasonable to conclude that the historical 
accident of the Gwes fleeing into Chinese protected 
territory, and after unfair treatment setting the whole 
border region on fire is an incidental, rather than 
a fundamental cause of the war. The Gwes of course 
acted as a historical catalyst, but the reaction from 
the meeting of two national ambitions in the explosive 
area of highly unorthodox frontier politics could not • 
have been long delayed.
It was the reintroduction of Burmese power in 
those regions by the energetic and ambitious Konbaung 
dynasty that made possible the extent of the fire 
lighted by the Gwes. Without the prospect of Burmese 
intervention to bade one of the disputing parties in the 
area the whole incident could have been limited to minor 
operations. For, whatever the real reasons that ca&sed 
Keng lung to attack Keng Hung, the fact remains that the 
Sawbwa of Keng lung had now become a Burmese nominee.
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In any Chinese attempt to Impose law and order on the 
frontier, the Chinese were liable on every occasion to 
find that their policy was regarded as aggression by 
a rejuvenated Burma. The situation could not have 
developed otherwise. The traditional Burmese conception 
of successful kingship called for an expansionist policy. 
Whenever the Burmese had enough strength, as they did 
have in our period, they would at the very least attempt 
to enlarge their sphere of influence into a semblance of 
that under their greatest kings. This expansionist policy 
was invariably accompanied by avaricioxts extortions from 
the Sawbwas of the frontier region, and naturally the 
incumbent Sawbwas of the border region turned to the 
Chinese whom they considered to be punctual and just 
In all their transactions, insisting 011 regular payment 
of their taxes, and writing long letters about a few 
:pice- , but never taking any sum however small which 
they were not entitled to. Thus the Sawbwas not amen­
able to Burmese demands were generally chased out by 
the Burmese, and replaced by Burmese nominees. These 
local quarrels were aggravated, and the backing of the 
antagonists on the one side by Burma, and on the other
1 . Macleod: J.A.S*B# 1837, p.998.
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by China was hound to lead to friction.
The -Burmese in their recital of the causes of the
invasions assumed that the Emperor had been persuaded
to sanction the invasion. In view of the lack of
contacts between the Chinese and Burmese courts this was
a natural and I'easonable assumption. '-they were wrong
in assigning the Emperor1 s decision to the period of
the first disturbance at Keng Tung but they were right
later, for a Viceroy of Yunnan did succeed in persuading
the Emperor bhien Long to sanction the conquest of
Burma. The Viceroy of Yunnan eoncierned in the decision
was however, not the one who was in charge at the time
of the Keng Tung fighting. That official, as stated
before, had committed suicide, and the Emperor Chien
1hung had sent another to take his place. His name 
was Yang ■ Ying< Chu described as a man of large 
ambitions and meagre abilities.,s Yang Ying Chu was 
at first successful, but Chinese operations seem to 
have been limited to the restoration of order in the 
border region. He reported to Peldrr that he had taken 
Keng Hung and Keng Tung and this claim seems to have
1. E*H. Parkers Burma, Eelations with China, p.84.
2. Luces J.B.K.S. Vol. 15 Part II, p.119*
3. Luces Ibid. p.119*
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been a true one, for the Chinese are reported to have 
advanced from Keng Hung and taken Keng lung after 
defeating the combined forces of the Keng Tung Sawbwa
“I
and the Burmese garrison troops.
The Viceroy* s ambition seems to have been fired by 
these successes, and he now conceived the idea of con­
quering Burma. The Sheng wu chi, the Chinese Military 
2Records states that i!his generals falling in with his 
humour, told him there were daily applications from 
states wishing to become tributary. Emissaries were 
despatched to Mongmit, Hsenwi, Mohnyim, old Bhamo,
Zinme (Chiengmai) and other states to induce their 
chiefs to swear fealty or to invite their relations 
or sub-sawbvjas to do this for them....
All this was reported to the limperor without examination 
by the Viceroy, but in effect these states v^ ere still 
half inclined towards Burma, and were beyond the range 
of our effective control. 11
Chien Lung had of course to make the final decision, 
but he probably regarded the conquest as an easy matuer, 
for although he told the Viceroy to be careful, he 
sanctioned the proposed operations, and in the notes which
1 . Translations from the Keng Tung State Annals. G.U.B. 
Part II, Vol. I. pp.406-407.
2 . Luce:' J.B.R.S* Vol.1 5, Part II, p.lig.
5 . Ibid. p.120.
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Chiang Lung recorded on liis file, it is seen that he 
intended to annex Burma, and set his nominee on the 
throne.
The Burmese king meanwhile had foreseen the 
prohability of Chinese aggression and immediately after 
the return of the troops from Keng Tung had despatched 
Bala Mindin (the rebel lieutenant of the Toungoo Viceroy)
o
with a strong force to garrison Kaungton, South of 
Bhamo, a strategic spot on one of the two main routes 
from China to Burma.
The Burmese were however, still under the strain 
of the Siamese campaigns, and the hulk of the Burmese 
forces in Siam being still outside the walls of 
Ayudhya, the Northern Lao Spates had rebelled, and 
Hsinbyushin in October 1766 despatched 2,000 horse, and
2 0 ,0 0 0  foot under fein Kya Min G-aung and MahaThihaThura 
to settle affairs in that region.^ The deduction is 
either that the Burmese had no fear of ultimate Chinese 
success or that knowing from painful historical 
experience that the Chinese were their strongest enemy, 
they still persisted in blindly pursuing their kingfs
1. G.E. Harvey: His tor y of -burma, p • 555 •
2. A riverine town on the Irrawaddy 8 miles South of
Bhamo. It is a Burmanised Shan name - derivation from
Kwang Tung - 11 the Sambhuis® field.”
3 . Konb aungz et p.430.
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policy of senseless aggrandizement.
The strengthening of the Kaungton defences
had not been made too soon, for the Chinese swooped
1
on Bhamo and captured it in October 1766. The Burmese 
were not in strength at Bhamo, a disaffected town, and 
their intelligence was faulty, for ftsinbyushin only 
knew of the Chinese invasion after the capture of the 
town, and in the circumstances, the strength of the 
original small force of Chine set hat took the town, they 
placed at a ridiculously disproportionate figure.
'The capture of Bhamo, where the Chinese had erected 
a fort near the river, now stirred the Burmese king 
from his concentration on his Siamese campaigns and he 
proclaimed that 7tthis matter had arisen because in the 
time of our royal ancestors, they (the- Chinese) had 
always had easy passage into the country whenever they 
invaded, but this time every Chinese that has come into
p
my kingdom, shall everyone of them be killed.Tt In 
January 1767, the Wungyi Maha Sithu was sent off to 
march up the West bank of the Irrawaddy, and after 
collecting what levies he could from Mogaung and 
Mohnyin, to proceed by the £>anda route to attack the
1. Luce! J.B.R.S. Vol.15. Part II, p.120.
2 . Konbaungzet p.431.
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Chinese. Another force commanded by the Letwe vuin 
Hmu (the Oommander of the Guards of the left) NeMyoSithu 
and composed of 1 5 ,0 0 0 men was sent up the river in 300 
boats carrying guns and jingals.
The Chinese capture of Bhamo gave them a good 
base right in comparatively open country and an easy 
route down to Ava. But there was the Burmese fort 
under Bala Min Bin at Kaungton blocking the way, and 
it was the failure to take Kaungton more than anything 
else that decided the outcome of this first invasion.
The Burmese under Bala Min Bin conducted a 
magnificent defence and well might the Chinese Emperor 
Chien Lung write that the Burmese 11. • ♦ know their strength 
in stockade fighting.ST uInside and round the
foot of the fort” seys the Konbaungzet“he threw 
up earth five cubits deep, seven cubits thick. On 
the top of the fort also he prepared shelters, warrior- 
runs and flares. At the bastions and angles he 
placed his cannon holding two viss or three, and drew 
up ready in array men to pick up and hold the fuses. 
Outside the fort also he planted elephant-snags, horse- 
snags, breast works, thorns, spikes, 1 sharks’, pits,
1. G.E.Harvey*, Plistory of Burma, p.356.
2 . Konbaungzet P.432-433 ~ the translation is the 
excellent one by Luce in the J.B.R.S. Vol.15* Part
II, pp.120-21.
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trendies ? cross-' bar reel fences and deer horns. A log 
25'-to* 50 cubits long and Wjz or 5 fists thick, was 
fastened to two short posts by a catch5 this long log 
was so placed that it could be pulled up bye; rope-mechanism, 
and then sprung back by releasing a pin inside the fort* 
In the barbicans on top he stationed abundance of guns, 
cannon, braves and formidables. fliere, within the 
fort, he stood resoliite, with molten lead and liquid 
resin ready The Ohinamen left a force at Bhamo 
market-fort to guard it and came marching, densely 
surrounding Kaungton. They brought along with them 
town-scaling ladders, dalis, spades, axes, hooks and 
ropes, and drew near the fort. But they could not 
get right up to it; for what with the thickset 
* sharks’ snags, pits and trenches, and the royal tropps 
in the barbicans discharging guns and cannon, the Chinese 
were wounded and slain and their generals and captains 
suffered severe punishment. Therefore without stop 
or pause, like running water, making breastworks of 
pile on pile of their dead corpses, they closed right 
in on the foot of the fort. Then the wheel-ropes 
of the mechanical catapults and levers were let fly 
time after time, each time killing a hundred or two.
Yet the Chinamen closed in; those appointed to dig xip 
the fort posts, dug; those to plant the ladders and climb
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them, climbed; those to hook the fort-posts and pull 
them, pulled* 1'he royal troops undaunted hurled down
levered logs and molten lead and resin, li'rom the 
barbleans above also, armed with dah, spear, gun, stick, 
faggot and bar, deftly and desperately they thrust, 
hewed, shot,.slashed, beat and rammed* Therefore the 
Chinamen could not penetrate the fort, but perished 
pile on pile; and they said {lThis fort is held by 
gods and not by men. 11
Nemyosithu arrived on the scene and stopping just
North of Sliwegu he asked for volunteers to take supplies
and the king*s gracious presents to BalaMinDin and his
men. The Chinese who show here a lamentable lack of
vision in coming down to Bhamo from where the Irrawaddy
offered an easy passage down to Ava, had only three 
1sampans and the volunteers brushing these aside, pushed 
their way into Kaungton. Here they found BalaMinDin 
in magnificent spirits; the first three jionbaung kings 
were skilful in their choice and handling of good men, 
and Naungdawgyi1 s leniecny towards the rebel BalaMinDin, 
and Hsinbyushin1 s confidence in him was paying off 
magnificently. He spurned the offer of reinforcements 
and the officer sent by Nemyosithu witnessing just at
1. Konbaungzet p.AJA.
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that moment the skilful way in which the defence repelled 
yet another Chinese night atuack, agreed to recommend 
BalaMinDin* s plan for the capture of Bhamo fort which was 
to be followed by an atuack on the rear of the Chinese 
besiegers while he made a sortie* Nemyosithu hearing 
of Kaungton* s strength decided 011 the strength of 
information about Bhamo fort, which was reported to be 
manned by sick Chinese and a rabble of Shans, to adopt 
BalaMinDin1s p1an *
Bhamo fort was stormed and the cavalry group which 
the Kaungton Besiegers sent to the rescue was intercepted 
by a large Burmese group which Hemyosithu had posted 
at the Lem-Ban-Cya stream in anticipation of such a 
move. After Bhamo had fallen, men were sent to fix 
a date for the double assault, and on the chosen date, 
the Chinese were attacked* '-L'he Chinese admit that they 
"fell into a complete trap and were most bloodily 
defeated#1’ i'he Chinese Officer-dn-Charge, Chao Hung 
Pang set fire to his stores and retreated.
Mahasithu’s army, reinforced by the Mogaung levies, 
turned on Eastwards, and then crossing the Irrawaddy 
near Waing Maw approached another Chinese group stationed
1 . Luce, J.B.R.S. Vol.15, Part II, p.1 2 1 .
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in the Yawyin hills North of Sima. The Chinese left 
a part of their force in their camp and their main body 
advanced to meet the Burmese. ’^he Burmese had however, 
sent off their two wings on a flanking movement to the 
rear, and the Chinese in the camp, secure in the knowledge 
ox their main body being between them and the Burmese were 
caught by surprise and fled. MahasithuTs troops then 
made a frontal assault, while the two Burmese wings 
closed in on the Chinese rear.
The outmanoeuvred Chinese were defeated, and 
retreated with the Burmese following, right up to 
Sanda (Tsanta on modern maps) where they prepared to 
make a stand. Maha Si Tku'was now permitted to return 
because of illness, and Nemyosithu was given the chief 
command. The Chinese at the other Chinese forts along 
the frontier were now outflanked by the advance of the 
Burmese beyond Sanda, which had fallen to Nemyosithu, 
"because”, says the Chronicle, 11 the Shans of the area 
had refused to send in supplies to the Chinese declaring 
they were subjects of the King of Ava," This statement, 
as far as the attitude of the Shans is concerned, may 
not be true, but it is an indication of the Burmese 
pretensions and the complicated political atmosphere 
of the area.
In any case, the two Northern army groups of the
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Burmese were now reinforced by the arrival on the 
scene of MahaThihaThura* s army which had been diverted 
from its Siamese adventure, and had proceeded up the 
Salween, driving back the Chinese from that area of Hsenwii 
The Chinese frontier forts were now taken from the re­
treating Chinese, and the eight Shan-Chinese states of 
Hotha, Latlia, Mona, Sanda, Mengmao, Sikhwin, Kaingma, 
and Maungwan were occupied by the Burmese * ‘ilhe Burmese 
then proceeded to ravage the whole countryside, raiding 
right up to Yung-chang and Tengyueh* The Viceroy of
Yunnan vtf ell ill through excitement” . The Emperor 
despatched his Court Physician to see if he was shamming, 
and a confidential officer to report on the whole 
situation."*'
It is by now clear that the Chinese and Burmese 
systems of conducting foreign relations had fallen 
into all the pitfalls which their inadequacies could 
bring abotit. The Burmese system of conducting their 
foreign relations in the most remote manner, only by 
the imposition of control over border states without 
much attention to any possible repercussions is now 
proved to have been based on a hostile state of mind, 
and hostilities were a logical outcome*
The Chinese in the vastness of theix* empire, had 
delegated a large measure of responsibility to their
1. Luce, J.B.R.S. Vol.15 Part II, p.121.
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frontier viceroys, and the only guide to policy, the 
necessity to maintain Chinese prestige at all costs.
The question of prestige was always a onesided affair, 
as far as the Chinese were concerned. It was this question 
of prestige which brought about the Emperor*s acceptance 
of the Yunnan Viceroy’s ambitious reports on the 
situation. If there had been more official diplomatic 
relations, the Chinese Invasions might never have begun.
As it is the Viceroy got into deeper and deeper water 
in his need to cover up his failures and thereby aggravated 
the situation.
Yang Ying Chu now began sending in the most frightful 
lies; ten thousand Burmese, he claimed, had been
killed at Meng Mao; Nemyosithu himself had visited the
Chinese camp with apologies and offersc.of submission; the 
people of Bhamo had adopted the Manchu pigtail. At the
same time he added, it would be better to come to terms
1with Burma, restore Bhamo, and offer trade facilities.
Chien Lung saw through this report at once. He 
knew the fighting could not be taking place on Chinese 
soil at Meng-mao and Sanda, when the Burmese were reported 
to be beaten everywhere. He summoned Yang Yin Chu to
1. Luce; J.B.R.S. Vol 15* Part II, p.122
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Pekin where he was irgraciously permitted to commit 
suicide” * Ming-Jui (the Burmese Myin Khun Ye) one 
of the finest Manchu generals - conqueror of Turkestan, 
hearing the title of “Purely rejoicing, recklessly 
gallant, Pirst class Puke” was appointed viceroy and 
commander-in-chief.
Preparations were made for a hig invasion of Burma 
in the open season of 1767? the land tax of the 
districts traversed by the armies was to be raised;
6 ,0 0 0  Manchus and 20,000 Chinese troops were despatched; 
the ex-Sawbwa of Ilsenwi, Nga Aung Tun came along presum­
ably to raise the Shans of the area on the side of the 
Chinese•
Ming Jui decided to strike right at the heart of 
Burma - Ava the capital - and at the end of October 1767 > 
the Chinese array started off from Yung Chang. One 
division under Ertenge was to march on Bhamo, take 
Kaungton and descend on Mong Hit, and then join Ming 
Jui at Ava, while Ming Jui himself was to take the 
Lashio route, down to Ava. In 36 days Ming Jui reached 
the frontier at Wanting, his advance base. Eight days 
later he reached Hsenwi. The Burmese Resident fled
o
with what troops he could collect without a fight.
1. Luces J.B.R.S. Vol.15, Part II, p!22 says there 
were only 3 >000 Manchus in the total force; the 
Konbaungzet gives 700,000 foot and 10,000 horse.
2 . Konbaungzet p.440.
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Nga Aung Tun was installed at Hsenwi, and the Chinese 
leaving a garrison of 5)000 under Ta Hsinga to guard the 
advanced base from which supplies were to "be conveyed to 
the striking column of 12,000 led "by Ming Jui.
The Burmese sent off 5 ,0 0 0 horse and 30 ,0 0 0 foot 
under Maha Si Thu to meet the Chinese advance; then 200 
elephants, 2 ,0 0 0 horse and 2 0 ,0 0 0 men under MahaThihaThura 
were sent through Shwe Za Yan, up the Myitnge to inter­
cept the Chinese communication with Hsenwi and after 
cutting off their supplies, to attack the Chinese from 
from the rear* A third Burmese force of 10,000 men 
under NemyoSiThu was sent off to intercept Ertenge1 s 
column*
MahaSiThu first came into contact with the Chinese
East of Hsipaw at the village of Bangyi; but the seven
Burmese battalions which took part in the fighting were
driven off. Then at Gokteik (west of Hsipaw I, fbe main
battle was fought. The Burmese cavalry charged, but were
surrounded, and three whole cavalry regiments were taken
prisoner. The Burmese elephantry wf&s next routed and
the Burmese stockades erected to strengthen their barriers
were taken. The Burmese were most bloodily defeated
1and the Konbaungzet admits that "the whole army sank, the
1 . Eonbaungzet p.442.
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troops fled topsy turvy, helter skelter**. MahaSiThu 
collected the remnants of his troops, and sought the 
shelter of thick kaing grass and sent off messengers 
to report at Ava.
Hsinbyushin rose arrogantly and magnificently to 
the situation. Two of his predecessors Narathihapate 
of the Pagan dynasty and Pye of the Toungoo had failed 
to act the part demanded of them. Hsinbyushin1 s 
decision is in keeping with the martial tradition of his 
adventurous youth; the position of the king was so 
important that had he faltered at that moment, the 
Burmese army would have disintegrated, and Burma today 
might have been a Chinese province. But he stood 
firm, his armies rallied and the inherent difficulties 
that still faced Ming Jui, combined with the lack of 
co-operation from the other Chinese column saved the 
country. Kingship as practiced in Burma had its 
defects, but then, a resolute man on the throne, at a 
time of crisis meant all the difference between failure 
and success.
He ignored the arrival of the message sent by 
MahalhihaThura; the next day when he sat in court, and 
was advised to make drastic preparations for a siege, 
he refused with scorn saying that the Chinese had never 
really succeeded in their invasion in the time of his
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ancestors; "All the Chinese who enter my kingdom are
doomed. Let not a house or tank or monastery "be touched.
Let all the subjects in my kingdom work and eat as
usual. When the Chinese come to shwekyetyet (just
outside Ava on the Irrawaddy) I shall cross the Myitnge
with my four brothers, and like mine ancestors, Pyusawhti
(the legendary founder of Pagan) myself shall smite them
though they come thick as leaves or grass, and cast them
all into the Irrawaddy. As the oracle saith "(There
shall be a dusty cart track from Shwekyetyet to Shwe-
Taung-u, for I will cross treading on Chinese carcases. 11
(Then his brothers answered* "lake thine ease, 0 king,
in thy golden palace. We four will go and slay all the
Chinese; not one shall escape, 11 and the king said:
"Though all my kingdom be women, there are we five
brothers who are men and who in Jambudvipa can withstand 
1 .
us." •
The Burmese plan of campaign was however beginning 
to pay dividends. MahaThihaThura with his deputy 
Teinkya Min Khaung now cut the Chinese line of commun­
ication and intercepted all the supply columns which 
Ming Jui as he advanced further and further from his 
base needed so urgently. The Burmese as usual employed
1. Konbaungset p.44-5.
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their stockading tactics and when the Chinese hurried up 
forces to push through supplies, they found the Burmese 
entrenched in hurriedly erected hut strong stockades 
on the route. The Chinese wasted their strength against 
these stockades and then the Burmese attacked and scatter­
ed them. The Burmese followed up and drove the Chinese 
right hack - beyond Hsipaw, beyond Lashio, right back to 
the Chinese forward base at Hsenwi.
It was at this moment that MahaThihaThura showed 
his mettle. The other Burmese commanders desired to 
turn back to help in the defence of Ava, but MahaThiha- 
Thura decided otherwise* He pointed out that their 
Lord Hsinbyushin was not the person to panic and fail, 
for 11 had he not been the leader in the defence of Ava 
in 1754* when at the age of 1 7, he had repelled the hordes 
of Talaings (Mons)." Ho - he had confidence in the 
strength of the capital mr.er such a king;, "besides it 
is one of the fundamentals of warfare that the supply 
base and the lines of communication are the root and 
heart of a campaign. Therefore if the supply base which 
is the root and heart is surrounded, dug up and destroyed, 
then the spearhead which is as the branches and sprigs, 
will, of its ovm accord wither, and shrivel and become 
tfit for burning (i.e. destruction)."
In the circumstances MahaThihafhura*was quite right.
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The country through 'which Ming Jui was going, was 
desolate and lacked supplies (even today), and in any 
case the Burmese had desolated the countryside as they 
did in the Irrawaddy delta when the -British landed in 
1824* To reinforce his decision at this juncture, 
NemyoSiThu who found that the North Chinese column was 
teing well held 'by Bala Mindin at Kaungton came down from 
Mongmit (the Burmese Momeik, the ruby mine state) to 
join MahaThihaThura.
At Hsenwi, the Chinese as an indication of their 
bad military judgement had split up their strength.
They had posted the bulk of their Shan auxiliaries and 
some Chinese troops in Hsenwi town itself, and at a 
distance which ultimately proved too far for co-operation, 
they erected a stockade in which the Chinese general 
Ta-Hsinga himself, and the bulk of the Chinese troops 
were placed. MahaThihaThura before any assault on the 
Chinese positions at Hsenwi sent off 5*000 musketeers 
to occupy the Chinese outpost at Kunlong (the main 
Salween ferry) and thereby to ensure that the Chinese 
at Hsenwi would be cut off from reinforcement and 
supplies. The town of Hsenwi being regarded as the 
weaker position was stormed first, and taken. Then the 
water supply of the Chinese fort was first cut off, and 
after allow/ing for a time interval In which the Chinese
1. Luce, J.B.R.s. Vol.15. Part II p.125.
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cut off from food and water, might "be weakened physically, 
an assault was made with all the strength the Burmese 
could muster* The fort was taken and Ta-Hsing-a in 
despair committed suicide "by cutting his own throat.
The Burmese column was now free to ’burn on Ming Juifs 
rear. MahaThihaThura, leaving a strong garx'ison at 
Hsenwi under the ex-Burmese resident gathered his troops.
Meanwhile Ming Jui, almost within sight of Ava, found 
himself cut off both from his Hsenwi base and from 
Ertengefs support. His men were now starving, and he 
decided to retreat. It is difficult to understand why 
Ming Jui did not advance right into the Burmese plain, 
where with the bulk of the Burmese forces absent, he 
might have taken the capital and obtained food for his 
troops. The talcing of the capital might have demoralized 
the Burmese and prevented any further organised defence. 
The conclusion must be that Ming Jui’s casualties were far 
heavier than was ever admitted by Chinese historians.
The Chinese claimed that Ming Juifs column only lost 
from 10 to 20% of its effectives.*1' 'xhe bulk of the 
losses were suffered on the long retreat from Singaung 
(3 6 miles from Ava); when he made his decision, he must
1. Luce, J.B.R.S. Vol. 15 Part II, p.127*
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on the Chinese figures of his original!- strength still 
have had at least 11,000 effectives. It is however 
possible that the Burmese concentration on his lines of 
communication was, in combination with his losses, the 
deciding factor.
It must be remembered that the Chinese had taken 
care in their preparations. There had been nothing to 
stop them from bringing in all the supplies they would 
need to their base at Hsenwi. Hsenwi was at the very 
least neutral, and not hostile, and they had the active 
support of the Sawbwa, and perhaps the bulk of the Shans, 
for Hga Aung fun was not the Burmese nominee. Hsenwi, 
however, is in about the same geographical position 
on the East, to the Chinese, as Imphal in the West was to 
the 14th Army in 1944-45* In 1944-45 'the 14th Army with 
a larger force in relation to the Japanese against the 
proportion of Chinese to Burmese in 1767? could not over­
come the problem of keeping clear the lines of communic­
ation even with the help of Bailey bridges, caterpillar • 
tractors, and mepacrine. 'l'he 14th Army ultimately had 
to rely on large scale air supply. It is obvious that 
so long as the Burmese leaders kept their heads, and their 
armies did not disintegrate, the Chinese could not succeed. 
The Chinese Empire at its peak under Chien Lung could not 
have provided the necessary strength to hold down Burma,
269
in face of the continued Burmese will to resistance, 
and that to my mind is the whole crux of the matter, 'the 
Chinese in the circumstances had bitten off more than 
they could chew.
Ming Jui withdrew fighting. rfhe troops of MahaSiThu 
took the offensive once a,gain at news of Hsinbyushin1 s 
anger at their failure. Ming J'ui did not retrace his 
footsteps, knowing that there must be Burmese armies in 
his rear for his supplies had been effectively cut off.
He struck North for MongLung, South of long Mit, perhaps 
in the hope of finding food, perhaps in the hope of 
linking up with Brtenge1s column. from Mong Bung, Ming 
Jui turned North-West and marched North West to Meng Yu. 
MahaSiThu*s troops in the meanwhile had taken a short 
cut through the hills and by-passed Ming Jui, and by the 
time Ming Jui reached Meng Yu he found that he was in a 
trap. MahaThihaThura had marched North via Lashio, and 
had reinforced MahaSiThu1s column. The Burmese in great 
strength hemmed in the Chinese and cut it off completely 
from any succour. A Chinese scout sent from Yunnan 
found that he cou.ld not enter Ming Juifs camp, so tight 
was the Burmese ring round Ming Jui.^
1. Luces J.B.R.S. Vol.15- Bart II, p.126.
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The Chinese could not last much longer now, and
'before reinforcements could reach him from Yunnan, he
decided that it was the end. The standard of Man chu
duty was high, and an officer who could not preserve the
Emperor’s honour was expected to commit suicide. Ming
Jui did not know that Chien Lung had ordered his 
pretreat- and he determined to make a last suicidal stand 
with a chosen hand, while he ordered the rest of his 
troops to cut their way out one night as hest they could. 
The Chinese made a desperate attempt, and most of them 
escaped to Wanting the Chinese 'base 70 miles away. Ming 
Jui with his Manchu lieutenants Chalafenga and Kwan Yin 
Pao died at their posts, Ming Jui committing suicide and 
sending his pigtail to the Emperor as a last token of 
affection.
The Burmese did not know of his death; they only 
knev^  that the Chinese had left Burmese soil. tvThe two 
Wungyis finding the Chinese had retired, and that the 
king’s service was completed, retired with all their 
prisoners, arms etc. to Ava, where they arx*ived on the 
17th March 17681^ The reference to the ’king’s service’
1. IQ• II.Parkers Burma, Relations with China, p.8 6.
2. Luce a op.cit. p.127*
Burneys J.A.S.B. 1837 > p.133.
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is significant, for it illustrates once more the Burmese 
attitude towards foreign affairs - it was the hinges bus­
iness .
•
Hie full fury of the Chinese Emperor now fell upon
Ertenge, who after being relieved of his independent
command, had once again become commander-in-chief at the
1death of Erkinge. He was blamed for failing to support 
Ming Jui, but this was rather unfair, for with the in­
adequate numbers under him, he cotild not have taken 
Kaungton, and with Eaungton threatening him he could 
enjoy no freedom of manoeuvre- The defeat of Ming Jui 
brought about his withdrawal. He was sent in chains to 
Pekin, where he and his family were given the most fright­
ful punishment, the Emperor being amazed at his own 
2moderation.
The Chinese had not however, given up the idea of .
conquest. llhey probably considered Ming Juifs failure an
avoidable one, and preparations were once more made to 
renew the struggle-
Towards the end of 1769^ - the Burmese learnt that once
1. Erkinge had been sent to take command at Eaungton
because the Bmperor.disapproved of Ertenge being
given independent command.
2 . Luce: J.B-R-S- Vol.15, Part II, p.127- 
3 - E-Ii.Parkers op.cit. p-8 6-
272
more the Chinese had invaded Burma. The Chinese had 
assembled no less than 60,000 fresh troops on the border 
and their best general Fa Heng, a Manchu Duke and the
o
’Chief reliance of the Government1 was placed in command- 
The original Chinese plan of operations was for Fu
Heng to cross the Irrawaddy at Waing Maw with a mixed
force of Manchus and Chinese, and thei to sweep through 
the region on the West of the Irrawaddy to take Shweio 
and so down to Ava.^ Another force under General Ilet'u 
was to advance down the East bank of the Irrawaddy to 
assist Fu Heng, and a third column was sent to march by 
Manwyne on Bhamo.
The Burmese despatched HemyoThihathu (the Amyauk 
Wun = commander of the artillery) with 12,000 men to 
Mogaung. MahaThihaThura himself with the main body of
52,000 men proceeded in a fleet of boats up the river to 
Bhamo, while the Mongmit Sawbwa and Kyaw Din Yasa with the
1. Li ..Ung Bin: op.cit. p*450.
2. The Burmese generally used the words Kun Ye as
part of the names of the Chinese generals. Most 
of the senior Chinese commanders were Dukes which
in Chinase was Kung-ye. The Manchus used the first 
syllable of their names as their family names and 
therefore the Burmese version of Ming Jui, Myin 
Kun Ye \-i/ould be a perfectly correct version meaning 
Duke My in or Ming. Fu Heng was known as the Th(U- 
kunye.
5* E.H.Parkers op.cit. p.88.
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cavalry and elephants rare sent up along the East hank.
The Chinese plan seems to have mis-carried at once.
Eu Heng spent two futile months promenading in the Mogaung 
area? a malarious place, without getting anything effective 
done. By the time the Mogaung column of the Burmese 
arrived at Mogaung, the Chinese had turned East again 
towards the Irrawaddy. North of Shwegu,Eu Heng was joined 
by Ilet’u who had crossed the Irrawaddy. The Chinese 
on this occasion seem to have realized the value of boats 
for fighting on the Irrawaddy and had brought a large 
contingent of carpenters to construct a fleet of boats with 
the plentiful timber to be had from the area. With the 
arrival of the- third. Chinese column from Man Waing, a 
combined naval and military assault was made, and Bhamo 
was once again taken. But Bhamo 011 this occasion as on 
the first and second invasions was not the -Burmese strong 
point. The Chinese after talcing Bhamo, constructed a 
tremendous stockade 1 as big as a city1'*- at Shwe nyaung 
bin (the place of the Golden Bo tree) 12 miles East of 
Eaungton. Then 1 the Chinese spent weeks dashing them­
selves against the obstinate stockade of Eaungton, though
p
their artillery was fairly powerful.1*'
1. Konbaungzet p.461.
2. E.H.Parker, op.cit. p.87*
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The Burmese generals as usual, first sent off
strong columns to waylay the Chinese supply columns and th®
closed in on all sides. Kaungton was first relieved by
the river force, the Chinese fleet of junks and sampans
being scattered and then a violent assault was delivered
on them at Shwenyaungbin. Shwenyaungbin was taken and
the Chinese armies fled to join the besieging force on
the landward side of Kaungton.
The Chinese were now in a desperate situation,
hemmed in on all sides, starving, they were like ’fenced 
1in cattle’. It is at this point that the Chinese and
Burmese accounts contradict each other. The Chinese 
2account states that shortly after the Emperor had ordered 
withdrawal, the Burmese king sent proposals for peace, 
saying that he would apologize for past offences, release 
all prisoners, restore all occupied territory, and send 
tribute. The Burmese account^ states that on the third 
December 1769* the Kwei Swe Bo (probably Akwei, the 
general who led the peace party in the Chinese camp)
1. Konbaungzet P.468.
2. E.H.Parker*. Burma, Relations with Chines., P...80.
Li Ung Bin: Outline of Chinese History, P.450.
5. Konbaungzet pp.464-476.
4. E.H.Parker: op.cit. P.8 8 .
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had advanced to the Burmese lines with a letter which 
stated that if the Burmese would send presents as was done 
in the 16th year of the Emperor's reign (1751 when Maha 
Damma Ya&a. Dipati asked for Chinese help), then presents 
would he returned. The war had arisen at the instigation 
of the Sawbwas of Bhamo, Hsenwi, ICeng Tung and Mogaung; 
they would be handed over, if the Burmese promised to 
reinstate the four. finally, if the Burmese would re- - 
lease all the Chinese prisoners, then they would submit 
to the Emperor that the two countries continue on the 
same terms as before.
How it must be remembered that on the admission of 
their own military records that the Chinese were all 
gathered in a tight mass round Eaungton. The Burmese 
had cut them off completely from the landward side, and 
were closing in. I'hey could not escape across the river, 
because Eaungton barred their way, and in any case they 
had lost control of the river. The next step that the 
Burmese would take, would be to launch a double assault 
that would have sandwiched the Chinese. The Emperor 
had already sent orders to withdraw and to inform the 
Burmese that nout of sheer compassion the Emperor had 
decided not to annihilate them as they deserved.If
1. E.H.Parkers Burma, Relations with China, p.8 8 .
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the Chinese could get out of the mess they had got them­
selves into, there would be no rebuke from the Iftnperor, 
but it might be as well from the Chinese point of view 
if they cofild realize most of their war aims too.
The Burmese chronicle shows that the Burmese com­
pletely missed the point of the Chinese conception of 
traditional relations, even when references were made to 
the presents in 1751* To the Burmese it was inconceiv­
able that the Chinese would regard the assumption of 
friendly relations as an acknowledgement of vassalage,
They therefore fell into the diplomatic trap and agreed 
to parley, The Burmese wei*e most punctilious in their 
negotiations aboxxt their position as a sovereign state, 
and resisted at first, that the negotiations be carried 
on in neutral country, i.e. on the border; but there 
were practical difficulties to this, and this was dropped.
Mahalh ihaThura now summoned his thirty senior officers 
to debate on the course of action to be taken. They all 
recommended that no terms be given. MahaThihaThura then 
pointed out that though they were right in thinking that 
the Chinese army now surrounded could be easily destroyed, 
that would not be the end, and would generate the most 
bitter feelings. He would recommend the granting of 
terms, and if the king disapproved, he would take the 
whole responsibility upon himself. MahaThihaThura1 s
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decision must here he noted to prove that Burmese senior 
officers who had the actual experience with foreign 
powers did acquire reasonable ideas, but it will be seen 
that Hsinbyushin as a typical Burmese king, was ready 
to' sacrifice reason, if it should affect his prestige or 
vanity.
The Chinese next sent a long letter addressed to 
the king of Burma proposing that the Burmese should with­
draw first, before the Chinese retired, but the Burmese 
replied that they dared not submit such a letter. The 
Chinese then climbed down and said a mistake had been 
made, but it would be more suitable if the Chinese were 
to be allowed to negotiate from a more favourable position.
Finally, on the 13th December 1769, fourteen Burmese, 
headed by the Wundauk (Minister of the second grade)
Nemyo Maha Thuya, Commander of the Ko Thin horse, and 
without the three senior Burmese commanders met thirteen 
Chinese headed by Akwei and Hakwohing (’the Kyimih 
Tituha1 of the Burmese, from Chinese titu = general and 
Kin ming - by Imperial Command) . The Burmese demanded 
that the rebel sawbwas be handed over immediately. The 
Chinese replied that they were not in the Chinese camp, 
but promised on oath to deliver them six months hence at 
Hsenwi. Then the following treaty^ was written by the
1. Konbaungzet, p.480.
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Chinese on white paper with ink, and a copy delivered 
by the Chinese to the Burmese.
’’Wednesday, ljth December 1769, in the temporary 
building to the south-east of the town of Kaung-ton.
His Excellency the general of the lord who rules over 
many umbrella-wearing chiefs in the great western 
kingdom, the sun-descended king of Ava, and lord of the 
golden palace, having appointed the Wundauk, N.einyo Malia 
Thuya, Commander of the Ko Thin Horse, the Yodaya Wun 
(Officer in charge of Siamese Affairs) Nemyo Thiri Zeya 
Th inky an lord of Magwe, the Yun so Kaung Han Wun (officer 
in charge of the bao colonies) Nemyo Nawrahta, the Nga 
So Wun (officer in charge of 5 Sos>or service groups)
Nemyo Sithu Kyaw Htin, lord of ' Meiktila, the Tayok 
Wun (officer in charge of Chinese Affairs) Nemyo Sithu 
Thinkhaya, Shwe Taung Ye Gaung Nawrahta lord of Hlaing det 
the h-athe Wun (officer in charge of Manipuri Affairs)
Ne Myo Thiha Thu, the Myenan Thenat‘Wun (officer-in- 
charge of the Household musketeers) Kyaw Swa Shwe Taung 
Nawrahta lord of Myede, the Idnzin Thenat Wun (officer 
in charge of the ^±nz±n musketeers) Nawrahta Kyaw Din,
Kyaw Thiii Nawrahta lord of the four Kothin towns, General 
Yangnu Thiri Nawrahta Lord of Salin, the Commander of the 
Pye Sin Horse Minye fhihathu, the Commander of the 
Kyauk Sauk Horse Minye Minhla Kyaw Htin. Pyanchi Thiri
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Nawrahta, and the generals of the lord of the golden palace 
of China who rules over many umbrella wearing chiefs in 
the great Eastern Kingdom, having appointed Akwei, Kyi 
Min Pi Tu Ha, Sin .Ta Ye, Myin Ta Ye Kyi, Hai la. Ye, Ya
la Ye, Myin la Ye %e, Yi la Ye, Yo la Ye, Ya la Ye,Li la
Ye, Kwei la Ye then assembled in the large building, 
erected in a proper manner with seven roofs?to the 
south-east of the town of Kaungton, on the 13th December 
1 7 6 9 9 to negotiate peace and friendship between the two 
great countries, and that the gold and silver road should 
be established agreeably to former custom. 'i'he troops
a
of the sun-descended king and lord of the golden palace 
of Ava, and those of the lord of the golden palace of
Ohina, were drawn up in front of each other when this
negotiation took places and after its conclusion, each 
party made presents to the other, agreeably to former 
custom and retired. All men, the subjects of the sun- 
descended king and lord of the golden palace of Ava, who 
may be in any part of the dominions of the Lord of the 
golden palace of China, shall be treated accoi^ ding to 
former custom. Peace and friendship being established 
between the two great countries, they shall become one, 
like two pieces of gold united into one; and suitably 
to the establishment of the gold and silver road, as well 
as agreeably to former custom, the princes and officers
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i
of each country shall move their respective sovereigns 
to transmit and exchange affectionate letters on gold, 
once every ten years. 11
During the negotiations Akwei seems to have really 
set himself out to please, presumably because he was 
getting away with an astonishing piece of chicanery, 
and asked to see the defenders of Eaungton, and the 
Burmese proudly pointed out Bala Min. Pin and San HI a 
Gyi pointing out that even they were only junior officers. 
Akwei next asked to see the officer who had intercepted 
the supply columns on the Meng lien route, and here is a 
very convincing touch, for Min Xe Thihafhu, Commander 
of Pye Sin horse stepped forward, rolled up the sleeves 
of his jacket, and tucked the lower part of his garment 
up his crutch to show the admiring Chinese his strength. 
(There was a famous precedent for this kind of exhibition, 
for in 1755 Alaungpaya himself had behaved in such a
1manner for the East India Company’s envoy Captain Baker.
Presents were then exchanged between the officers 
and the Chinese sent some for Hsiiibyu shin and. on the 15th 
December, the Chinese army withdrew followed at the 
distance of a jingal shot by a Bxirmese column under 
NemyoSiThu, and TeihKya Min Gaung.
1. Baker’s Report. Dalrymple. p.149*
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When Hsinbyushin heard of the Chinese withdrawal, he
was furious. Mahafhihlhura and his commanders hearing
of his anger dared not return, and as if to provide
another illustration of the Burmese attitude towatds
foreign relations, they moved off in the direction of 
1
Manipur to gather a fresh crop of slaves and loot 
to appease the king. The irresponsibility of foreign 
relations hinged on the king’s mood, in the past, at 
that moment, and in the future.
Hsinbyushin unable to lay hands on his generals vented 
his fury on their wives. MahaThihaThura’s wife was a 
sister of his chief queen, but even that was of 110 con­
sequence; they were lined up at the palace gate with 
the Chinese presents on their heads, and kept there for r; 
three days. when MahaThihaThura returned, the king’s
anger had not abated, and he and the ministers who 
counselled forgiveness were exiled.
Several months passed and since no tribute came or 
prisoners returned as he had been led to expect, Chien 
Lung ordered the Yunnan Viceroy to remind Burma of her 
duty. The bunaese were willing to send presents because 
they thought that there was to be an exchange of presents
1. Pemberton; Report on the Eastern Frontier of British 
India, p.43*
2. Konbaungzet p.495* S.H.Parkers Burma, Relations 
with China, p.8 9.
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between two great nations, but they were not going to 
surrender their prisoners without first obtaining the 
fugitive sawbwas, and the Emperor instead of receiving 
tribute received a letter through the Yunnan Viceroy 
demanding the Sawbwas.
It is recorded that it was from this -Burmese demand 
that the Emperor and the Viceroy first learnt of the 
surrender of Sawbwas and from this clue we deduct that 
the Ohinese generals, as Yang-Ying-Ohu had done before, 
had been out to bamboozle the Emperor with tall stories 
of Burmese submission. ' The military situation from the 
Burmese point of view did not call for submission, the 
fierce pride of the -Burmese king did not call for sub­
mission, and finally Hsinbyushin* s subsequent behaviour 
after the Ohinese withdrawal, and till his death, does 
not seem to be that of a submissive monarch. Hsinbyushin 
had disgraced- and disowned the generals who had let 
the Chinese get away. He never surrendered a single 
Ohinese prisoner, and continued to occupy Chinese 
territory, and proof of the last is in the official 
Momein (Yunnan) Annals which tell us with a sigh, that 
’the Han Lung; Kwan and the Tein Ivla Kwan two of the 
frontier gates established in A.D.159^ (after Bayinnaung’s
1 . E.H.Parkers Burma, delations with China, p.89
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invasion) as a protection against the Burmese » fell 
into, and have since remained in,Burmese hands
The Burmese were genuinely angry at the failure of 
the Chinese to deliver the Sawbwas, and the Emperor 
continued during Hsinbyushin*s reign, and that of his 
son Singu to write in the Yunnan Viceroy’s name 
arrogant and abusive fulminations demanding tribute, but 
the Burmese ignored the Chinese demands and held on 
tight to their prisoners and their frontier conquests.
Chien tung was almost impotent but managed to 
retaliate by strictly forbidding all trading at Bhamo, 
or by the sea route. It is on this hostile note that 
relations were conducted up to Bodawpaya’s time, and it 
would now be relevant to turn back to Siam to examine the 
effect of the Chinese invasions, on Burmese relations with 
that country.
Ihe Burmese king after the fall of Ayudhya, had 
ordered back the bulk of his conquering armies and only 
SEiall Burmese detachments were left round Ayudhya. It 
was an optimistic gest/ure and probably counted on the 
submissiveness of the Siamese after the reverses they
1. E.H.Parker, Burma, Relations with China, p.82.
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had suffered. They failed to reckon that if they them­
selves could resist Ohinese pretensions and aggression, 
so could the Siamese their own.
Thus the situation in Siam in the middle of 1767> 
had one dominating factor. The old central Siamese 
authority, which had heen unable to exercise control 
for two year’s had now vanished and the bitterly resented ; 
new Burmese authority was not based on the firm foundation 
of a show of force, nor even by the threat of immediate 
reinvasion. The way was open for the provinces to split,
/
but it was also open for the rise of new and virile power 
which by its virility might harness the forces of national’ 
ism to unite the country in the process of throwing and 
keeping the Burmese out.
Actually both possibilities became fact. Phya Tak, 
the half Chinese governor of Sin who is known in history 
as Phya Tak Sin had escaped from Ayudhya before its 
fall, and had fled South-East into the district of 
Rayoung on the East coast of the Gulf of Siam. By the 
time Ayudhya fell, he was in full control of Rayoung 
and Chon Buri districts. In June 1767 he had collected 
enough strength to take over Chantabun (the Eastern-most 
Siamese province on the sea). By October his forces had
1. Wood: History of Siam, p.252.
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grown to 5 ?0 0 0, and he took first lanaburi (western part
of Bangok) and then destroyed the main Burmese garrison
1near Ayudhya. Phya I'ak Bin now determined to become 
king and after a period of psychological preparation, he 
married some of the princesses of the old dynasty, and 
crowned himself king at Bangkok, At this stage Siam was
p
divided into five spheres of influence.
1) Central Siam, under king lak Sins area today 
occupied by the provinces of Bangkok, Hatburi, 
Nakon Jaisi, Prachin, Chantabun and part of 
Nakon Sawan.
2) The Peninsular provinces up to Jump or n: the 
Governor of Nakon Sritammarat had proclaimed 
his independence at the fall of Ayudhya tinder 
the title of king Musika.
5) The Eastern provinces including Korats a 
prince of the old dynasty had set himself 
up as king at Pimai.
4) The province of Pitsanulok and part of Nakon
Sawan under the governor who was known as King 
Huang.
1. Konbaung zet p.498 .
2. Woods History of Siam p.254.
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5) The extreme North of Pitsanulok where a 
priest had set himself up as the ruler.
Phya Tak Sin first turned to Korat and in the open 
season of 1768, he killed the king of Pimai and annexed 
that province. Then as his strength grew, he fell once 
more a victim of the futile conception of foreign relat- ■ 
ions of whichIndo-Chinese -history provides too many 
examples. Instead of consolidating the country, he 
used his strength to interfere in Cambodian affairs, but 
had only limited success there. Then he turned to Nakon 
Sritammarat; he defeated king Musika but judged him 
a usefiil man, and reappointed him as Governor of the 
province. Early in 1770, he defeated the priest ruler 
of the North and occupied Pitsanulok.
The three years of grace allowed by the Chinese 
invasions had been made use of. When the Burmese could 
spare a thought for Siam, it had been reunited under a 
strong audacious king. The Burmese had been driven out 
of the old kingdom of Ayudhya but they regarded it as a 
temporary setback vdiich would be dealt with in time, for 
they still retained a garrison at Chiengmai, and the key 
to success in Ayudhya was the retention of bases in 
Chiangmal and the utilization of its power and resources. 
The retention of the Lao states however, was dependent 
on a certaih measure of tolerance towards the native
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rulers,and this was no longer available from the new 
type of Burmese Residents sent out.
In March 1773, Hsinbyushin received news that there 
was unrest in Maing Lon Kha Bin (Luang Prabang) and 
that J-fhya Talc* s forces were raiding the frontier 
districts of Wiengchang. He therefore sent 500 horse and
7,000 foot under Nemyo Thihapate (the same general of the 
earlier Siamese campaigns) with orders to settle affairs 
there, and then, with the help of the local levies, to 
march on Phya Tak Bin at Bangkok. " At the same time 
the Governor of Pagan, Mingyi Karmanf Banda was sent 
as Governor of Martaban in place of Min Ye Min Hla 
Uzana who had died, with instructions to raise levies 
from the Mons of Martaban, Tavoy, and Mergui and to 
march in support of Nemyo Thihapate.
Nemyo fliihapate 011 arrival at Chiengmai found a 
bitter quarrel going, on between the Brirraese Governor., 
Thado Min Din and the influential chiefs Phya Chaban 
(Phya Sap an of the Burmese) Kawila, lord of Lagun. The 
account of the quaimel given in the Konbaungzet^ supports
1. Woods History of Siam p.262. Kon^aungset p.4-98.
2. Dr. D.Richardson1s translation of the Native history
of Labong J.A.S.B. 1837 P-55-
3 . Kohb aungz et p .500
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1
the account given in the history of Ohiengmai which 
states that Ifthe Burmese rulers in every part of Lannata, 
(kingdom of Chiengmai) oppressed and illtreated the people 
in many ways and the people suffered very grievously.
Some fled and dwelt in the forests and jungles, and some 
formed themselves into robber bands and fought together.T‘
A report on the state of affairs was sent back to Ava, 
and Hsinbyushin ordered that Thado Mindin confine himself 
to his duties and let the Ohiengmai nobles rule in peace. 
The Burmese king evidently was content if Chiengmai con­
tinued as a vassal state, fox* that was the extent of 
Burmese ambitions, but the machinery broke down because 
the men employed to maintain this relationship were 
inept and oppressive, and there was no effective means 
to correct in time the results flowing from such inept 
handling.
Thado Min Bin issued an arrogant order to the 
Ohiengmai nobles to attend in person to hear Hsinbyushin*s 
orders. The Ohiengmai nobles refused to submit to this 
arrogance and cut up the armed men sent to bring them by 
force. Hiding their families in a place of refuge, 
they hurried into Nemyo Thihapate1 s camp for protection. 
Nemyo Thihapate in the meanwhile had settled affairs in
1. Woods History of Siam p.260.
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Wieng Chaung and had returnedto Ohiengmai to collect more 
troops for the projected march against Phya I'ak Sin.
He received the ^hiengmai nobles, and gave them the command 
of the van. Thado Min Din at this point approached 
Nemyo Thihapate and pointing out that the Ohiengmai 
nobles were disaffected persons not likely to be loyal 
asked that they should be given into his custody. Nemyo 
Thihapate refused saying that he found no fault with 
the Ohiengmai nobles since it was only a personal quarrel.
Thado Min pin was not to be denied. He sent back 
an urgent message to Ava giving his interpretation of 
the affair and. Hsinbyushin desiring to cleaip up the matter 
sent out orders for the Ohiengmai nobles to come to 
court. Armed with this order Thado Min Din demanded 
the Ohiengmai nobles from Nemyo Thihs.pate again, but 
deciding that the king probably only wanted to ensure 
the tranquillity in Ohiengmai so that the invasion of 
Siam should not be affected, and un any cases he had full 
powers as a field officer on active operations, Nemyo 
Thihapate refused to hand them over, for they were persons 
of great influence in Ohiengmai, and their surrender might 
turn the people against the Burmese. Thado Min Din now 
sent armed men to intercept the Chiengmai nobles, but 
his men were cut up and had to retreat. Thado Min Din 
however was reckless by now; he rounded up the families
2 9 0
of the Ohiengmai nobles, and sent them under escort to 
Ava. News of'this development reached the Ohiengmai 
nobles. They deserted their posts, hurried in pursuit, 
rescued their families, and fled into Phya Talc Sin’s camp.
The disafxection of the leaders of the Ohiengmai 
people was a godsend to Phya Tak Sin. He realized that 
this was the best opportunity to unite Chiengmai with his 
territories, and he hurried to make use of it with all 
his strength; by January 1775 the Burmese were driven 
out of Ohiengmai, and had retreated to Chiang Sen 
(Bankasa). Through their own fault, the Burmese had 
inextricably thrown away the bases essential to the 
success of any future aggression in Siam, while at the 
same time they had helped to increase its strength, by 
creating the conditions necessary for the effective 
fusion of Ohiengmai and Bangkok.
In the South too, the avaricious folly of the 
Burmese officials was the main cause of failure. Mingyi 
Karmani Sanda, the newly appointed Governor of Martaban 
collected troops as ordered, and then ordered the Mon 
levies under Binnya Sein to lead the advance. Three 
marches away from Martaban the Mons received news that 
their families were being tortured by Mingyi Karmani
1. Konbaungzet p.5 0 3 .
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Sanda for money. Saying ”v;e have marched in the van so 
that our families may live in peace, and now they are
t>eing tortured; our enemy is not before us, it is 
1behind” , they hurried back travelling day and night, 
killed all the bxjrxaese they caught, and drove the rest 
into Rangoon, which they besieged. fhe My&haung Bo 
(lyan Aung, North of Kenzada) raised the Burmese of the 
delta towns, and came to the rescue. The Mens taking 
their families with them, fled into Siam where the 
Siamese, regarding them as useful enemies of the Burmese, 
treated them well, even to the extent of stocking supplies
p
on the escape routes.
Hsinbyushin however, did not abandon his ideas of 
conquest, and persisted in once more sending a major 
expedition by the Southern route. MahaThihaThura who 
had been recalled from exile was placed in charge of 
2 ,5 0 0 horse and 3 5 ,000 men and sent off once more via 
the three Pagodas route.
Hsinbyushin was now near the end of his life; the 
generals knew of his illness and in the intrigues that 
went on between the generals who were backing different 
nominees for the vacancy, the efficient conduct of
1. Konbaungzet p.504.
2. Hallidays Journal of the Siam Society Vol X, Part 3? 
PP . 3-5. Konbaungzet jjyg qS ; . 3 .
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foreign relations, even as the Burmese conceived it to 
“be, suffered.
MahalhihaThura was a “brother-in-law of Hsinbyushin 
and was also f athei*-in- 1 aw of Singu, Hsinbyushin1 s 
son (who was to succeed his father in disregard of 
Alaungpaya1 s desire that his sons should rule one after 
the other); Minye Zeya Kyaw, one of the senior commanders 
was the brother-in-law of the Amyin Prince (the fourth 
son of Alaungpaya). MahaThihaThura received intelligence 
that the Siamese were waiting in force in a narrow valley 
through which his route lay. It must be remembered that 
he was a soldier of considerable esqperience and proved 
judgement; the action he now took must therefore lead 
one to suspect strongly an ulterior motive. He commanded 
Minye Zeya Kyaw to lead 5,000 men to disperse the Siamese 
force that blocked the way.
Minye Zeya Kyaw protested saying that it was folly 
to invite inauspicious defeat at the very beginning of 
the campaign, by sending such an inadequate force.
MahaThiha'lhur a persisted and when Minye Zeya Kyaw still 
refused, he sent back a report to Ava on Minye Zeya Kyaw1 s 
insubordination. Minye Zeya Kyaw heard of this report, 
and knowing that his life was now in jeopardy, he determin­
ed to play for high stakes. lie knew that Hsinbyushin was 
not well, and determined to throw the weight of his own
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regiments on the side of his brother-in-law in the coming 
fight for the succession. He gathered his regiments and 
retired to Martaban.
MahaThihaThura now had to persist in his original 
orders, for he must never let it be suspected that there 
was anything deeper in the causes of Minye Zeya Kyawfs 
insubordination. He ordered the Sat Pya Gone Bo (the 
Colonel of the Soapy Hillock village) to advance with
3,000 men. ©he Sat Pya Gone Bo had no option but to 
advance as ordered. The Siamese surrounded his troops,
and in April 1775> one thousand three hundred and twenty
1eight starving men that were the survivors of the force 
surrendered. By this time, it was too late to achieve 
any worthwhile results before the rains, and the Burmese 
returned to Martaban.
Hsinbyushin, however, even in his illness had no 
thought of giving up his Siamese adventure. The orders 
for invasion were not withdrawn, and in October 1775 
MahaThihaThura having abandoned the previous invasion 
route chose the far more suitable one via kawkareilt- 
Myawaddy and Melamao. The causes of the failure of his 
earlier campaign become even more obvious when the rapid 
progress he now made is seen. With the same number of
1. Wood: History of Siam, p.265*
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of troops9 he rapidly occupied Raheng, Sukotai and 
Pitsanulok, A Siamese army under Chao Phya Chakri 
(the founder of the present Siamese dynasty,) v^ as smashed 
at Pitsanulok, and Phya fak Sin himself was defeated in 
his attempt to relieve Pitsanulok.
It is clear from these successes that Siamese strength 
had not reached the stage when they could prevent a det­
ermined and well lead Burmese army from creating havoc 
in Siam. The Chinese invasion must he regarded as an 
absolute god-sent gift, for if the Burmese had been able 
to muster the same strength as MahaThihaThura*s single 
army, at the beginning of his rise, Phya Tak Sin would 
never have had a chance.
The vagaries inherent in the direction of foreign 
policy, due to the absolute power of the Burmese kings, 
however, now came to the rescue of Siam. In June, just 
when MahaThihaThura. had deployed his army in three 
columns to swoop through the .Siamese plain on Bangkok, 
Hsinbyushin died. His son Singu succeeded to the throne, 
and orders were at once sent out to recall the Burmese 
troops from Siam.
1. Woods History of Siam, id.266. Konbaungzet p.524.
CHAPTER IX
Singu 1776-82. An Interim Period.
We now enter upon an Interim Period in which the 
scale of hostilities is reduced, and foreign relations 
are more or less suspended.
Singu, the eldest son of Hsinbyushin was born in 
1754 &nd throughout his life there had been fighting on 
a large scale which must have made him sick of it all. 
Another reason for the recall of the troops in Siam 
could have been that, he succeeded to the throne 
largely because his fathers reign had been long enough 
for him to build up a respectable following, though 
by the express wish of Alaungpaya another of Alaungpaya*s 
sons was to have succeeded Hsinbyushin; * therefore the 
presence of MahaThihaThura, his father-in-law, and the 
chief Burmese commander in Siam? who must have been one 
of his principal adherents, was necessary in the capital 
to buttress his position in the first months of his 
reign. Nemyo Thihhpate, the -Burmese commander, who was 
the other specialist on Siamese campaigns and at the
time of Hsinbyushin1s death was still at Chieng Sen, was
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probably another supporter for he also was recalled with
his troops, and made a Hint taw Wungyi, with the title
of Nemyo Thenapate.
Singu, whose tutor was the Poet Nga Pyaw, spent his
time wandering round the countryside visiting various
pagodas, repairing those of his predecessors and building 
2new ones* He possessed, however, in some measure, the 
same attitude as his immediate predecessor towards the 
traditional boundaries of Burma. Chiengmai to him was 
part of the Burmese kingdom, and as far as suzerainty 
over Chiengmai was concerned, the Burmese had a far 
better claim than Phya Tak Sin. In January 1777? he 
sent off 15,000 men under the Amy auk Wun (Commander of 
the artillery) Nemyo Thiha Thu, \,wll.o,. succeeded in 
driving Phya .Chaban (the Chiengmai noble of Nemyo 
Thihapate1s time) out of Chiengmai.
Regarding relations with China, the Burmese still 
retained their Chinese prisoners, and the Burmese 
chronicles do not bother to mention any renewal of
1. Konbaungzet p.525* Harvey in his History of Burma,
p.262 implies that Mahathihathura was deprived of 
his office almodtimmediately after his recall from
Siam. In the chronicles, the main source for this
period MahaThihaThura was stripped of his dignities
only in June It77 (Konbaungzet p.526), one year 
after his return.
2 . Konbaungzet p*542.
297
activity, hostile or friendly. ,J-’he Chinese accounts^ 
state that lettex^ s drafted personally by Chien Lung were 
sent to Chwei-Koihya (Singu) but they never effected
anything. The Burmese wars had cost Chien Lung on his
o
own admission4" 2 0 ,0 0 0 men, the flower of his generals, and 
the equivalent of several millions sterling, and the 
prospect of another invasion being therefore distasteful, 
the continued hostility of the Burmese monarch abolished 
all contacts during the period of Singu*s reign.
Singu did not reign long, he took to drink'7 and in 
his drunkeness, wantonly alienated the loyalties of an 
influential section of his ministers. He adopted the 
custom of wandering round the countryside and returning 
to the palace at odd hours of the night. A conspiracy was 
hatched. Maung Maung, the eldest son of Naungdawgyi 
tricked his way into the palace one night, and with the 
help of his village braves from Paungga, captured the 
palace city and proclaimed himself king. Singu planned 
large scale measures to retake his palace, but the 
ministers and officers deserted him in droves.
Maung Maung, an inexperienced youth, was at once
found out to be a weaiding and the excesses of his
uncouth villagers soon alienated the court. Bodawpaya
1. E.H.Parkers Burma, Relations with China, p.90*
2. S.H.Parkers Ibid. p.82.
J. Konbaungzet p.534-*
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Alaungpaya1 s fifth son, obtained the support of the 
ministers and generals, and on the seventh day of his 
reign, Maung Maung was seized and executed* Soon after, 
Singu who had been captured, was also executed, and in 
February 1782 Bodawpaya ascended the throne.
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CHAPTER X
Bodawpaya 1782-1819- The last period in 
which Burma was to conduct her foreign 
relations 5 free from effective .European 
pressure* ___ ________ __
Bodawpaya, the fifth son of Alaungpaya was 38 years 
old when he came, at long last to the throne* He had 
grown up in an atmosphere of arrogance, heady success 
and power, and up to his Brother Hsinbyushin1 s death 
had lived in all the trappings of influence and pros­
perity.. Then, all his carefully Bred arrogance, and 
the lust for power which he considered would rightfully 
Be his one day had had to undergo the most painful 
humiliation. throughout the reign of Singu he had 
Been progressively stripped of almost everything he 
valued, and only the most circumspect Behaviour had 
Brought him safely through. If enforced humility 
increased his pent up ambition, his years of trial 
taught him to Be careful with anything or anyone that 
could affect the retention of his power.
His pent up desire for glory sent him off on a 
conquest of Arakan and, much later, Assam and the 
resumption of the interminable campaigns in Siam, and
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in him this desire for glory reached such a pitch of 
intensity, that he carried the traditional Burmese con­
ception of the monarch as the "best Buddhist, much further 
than any of the other Konbaung kingss he was to proceed 
to the ridiculous extent of proclaiming himself as 
Arimettaya the Buddha himself. ‘the years of humiliation, 
however, showed their effect in the way he resumed 
friendly relations with Ohina without much fuss, though 
only after he had been led to believe that it was the
-i ]Chinese who had made the first overtures. ‘
Bodawpaya had ascended the throne by forcible
meansf. and his first task was to make himself secure
during the inevitable period of rebellion that followed
immediately after the accession of a new king. 'Three
rebellions had to be dealt with in quick succession. His
brother the Sitha Prince and MahaThihaThura, the great
2Burmese general, were the first to rebel in March 1782* 
'Then, Nga Myat Bpi£„ one of Maung Maung* s followers rebelled 
and nearly succeeded in killing Bodawpaya5 but he too 
was disposed of. finally, in February 1783? bhe Mons
1. Sangermanos 3D of B.lU. p.58. Bodawpaya had however, 
after the conquest of Arakan in 1785 talked of annex­
ing China and India but perhaps the failure in Siam 
made him change his mind.
2. Konbaungzet p.544.
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of the Delta rebelled once again and took Rangoon, but 
they did not last long and tha-ti rebellion was crushed 
with great ferocity.
The rebellious phase now being passed, Bodaw in 
December 1783 set out to concentrate on the more 
efficient esploLtat'inn of his people, and carried out a 
census with great care.'1' He was now free as no other 
Burmese king had ever been to. increase the happiness and 
prosperity of the people, and by conserving his strength, 
to keep the country’s independence secure. The country 
had been united since Alaungpaya’s time, and in the five 
years preceding Bodawpaya’s period, there had been no 
great wars. The common people had achieved a large 
measure of prosperity, and when Father .Sangermano first 
arrived in 17&3? he found on the way up to Ava, a thriving 
and prosperous country. But now, an obscure local 
quarrel in Arakan diverted his attention from Bodawpaya’s 
own country, and success, once more inflamed the ever 
present ambition of the Konbaung dynasty.
In 1665, "khe Arakanese kingdom which had taken part 
in the sack of Pegu - 1599, suffered a mortal blow.
pShay is t a Khan the Moghul 'Viceroy of Bengal had forced
1 . Bee Chapter on Population.
2 . Jadunath Sarkars The Conquest of Chatgaon. J.A#S,b. 
1907.  •
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the Portuguese allies of Arakan to desert, and in 1666
Chittagong was irretrivably lost to Arakan. Bhe extension
of Moghul power under Auranzeb made it certain that the
centuries old piratical instincts of the Arakanese
would find no efrective and profitable outlet. Boon
there was widespread anarchy in the kingdoms by the time
of Bodawpaya1 s secession Arakan was in complete confusion.
A certain faction of the warring Arakanese nobles came
to Amarapura (the new capital a few miles from Ava) for
help, and in November 1784 the Burmese crown Prince with
33?000 men started from the capital on the Arakanese 
1adventure. Arakan was taken with little trouble, some 
of the villages coming out with hands playing to welcome
p
the Burmese. Bodawpaya now felt that he was' equal to the 
task of -surpassing any achievement of his predecessors 
and almost automatically, lacking in imaginative under­
standing of the true interests of his country as againsr 
self glorification, his thoughts turned to Siam.
In 1785 he issued orders for a grand at rack on 
Siam, saying that he himself, lord of many etcetras would 
lead his royal troops. Preparations took a considerable
1. G.E.Harvey, History of Burma p.267* Konbaungzet
2. Konb aungz e t p.582.
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time for an enormous army was ordered to be raised, but 
finally Mingyi Min &aung Kyaw was sent off ahead in June
1785j to arrange for supplies at Martaban, which were to
/
be stocked on the Atahan river route (the Burmese 
Htaryaik roxite) , after which he was to lead a column of
10.000 men to Tavoy, from whence he was to start his 
activities. Then, the seven Salween Sawbwas with
1
30.000 men were placed under the command of the Wungyi 
Thado Maha Thiri Uzana and ordered to march via Ohiengmai, 
Next the Bhamo frHsipaw and Mogaung Sawbwas with 23?000 
men under the command of two Burmese princes were sent 
ahead of the main body to Martaban. '^ he main body some
50.000 strong accompanied the king down to Martaban. It 
set out in November 1 7 8 5, and marching by way of Toungoo 
and Shwegyin reached Martaban in December. High festival 
was held at every stage in anticipation of victory.
At Martaban, it was found that the supplies collected 
by Mingyi Min Khaung Kyaw were insufficient, for there 
^ere hordes of camp followers brought by the king; so- 
that unfortunate officer was brought back bound into 
the royal presence and executed at once. The other 
officers were now thrown into a panic, and when the king 
asked again about supplies they lied and told him they 
had enough. The king was thirsting for glory now, and
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when the troops were slow in the crossing- over to 
Moulmein, he uttered violent threats which caused such 
a confusion of haste that it seemed probable that a large 
amount of what supplies had already been collected must 
have been left behind#
A courageous junior officer, the Eater of Khaw 
Thanti novj suggested that an intensive search for food 
should be made in the provinces of Martaban and Pegu 
by the main body, while strong columns would cache 
supplies along the route and guard the lines of comm­
unication. After all this had been done, the main body 
unencumbered by the transport of supplies could march 
twice as quickly- he calculated that the Siamese9 
hearing of the king’s intention to march by the Htaryaik 
route, would be forced to keep their main strength on 
guard on this route. (This would enable the other three 
columns which had been sent via Tavoy, Ohiengmai, and 
Mergui, to advance without meeting any considerable 
resistance, and would thus serve his Majesty1 s ends 
very effectively. The king, however, refused to 
consider this suggestion, saying he would march on the 
morrow, and just to emphasize the point threw his spear 
at the crouching group of officers.
There was now no escape from the king’s folly. The
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army "began its advance. It could not march in strength 
"because there was not enough food on the way, and the 
consequent division of the main "body into detachments led 
straight into defeat. The advance columns reached as
1far as Kanburi, were surrounded, overwhelmed and captured.
The king himself had advanced but three stages from
2Moulmein where he received news of this. Saying "In 
war, even Sakya (the king of the nats) has on occasions 
to retreat; we shall let the Yodaya be this once, but 
can they ever escape again! 11 he fled back shamelessly.
The Salween levies had by now fought their way down 
to Pitsanulok, and the Tavoy column, after driving the 
Siamese forces out of Nakon Sritammarat, had reached 
Raheng, when orders came recalling them. These two 
columns had advanced rapidly because the main Siamese 
armies were waiting for Bodawpaya, but as the king!s 
flight had now set these free, the Burmese had to retreat 
leaving many prisoners in Siamese hands.
The Mergux column had been sent off with the most 
sensible aim of the campaign, which was meant to redtice 
the strength of the Siamese by indirect means. Its 
orders were to capture: Junkceylon (Ujong Selang) . The
1 . Konb aurigz et p. 605 *
2. Ibid. p.607.
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mountains on the last of the Siamese peninsular provinces 
effectively cut off the Siamese from direct access to 
the Bay of Bengal and it was only at Junkceylon island 
that there was a practicable outlet to the western seas* 
Junkceylon was conterminous with the territory of the 
Sultan of Ee.dah and commanded Siamese access to the West* 
Its occupation hy the Burmese forces would affect con­
siderably the flow of arms and ammunition from India, 
and also reduce Siamese trade with India* Thus while 
the Mergui column marched down the Tenasserim coast, 
a fleet of eleven ships set out from Rangoon in support. 
Early in 1786, the Burmese troops landed, on Junkceylon. 
They were not, however, suffered to remain long on the 
island. The governor Phya Chalang having recently died, 
his widow and her sister took the field at the head of
o
their troops and drove the Burmese off
Bodawpaya himself was largely responsible for the 
failure of this personal attempt at the reconquest of 
Siam, but the new king of Siam was the founder of a new 
dynasty (the present Qhakri ) and had been the right 
hand man of Phya Tak. He was an energetic leader, able
1* Syrness Embassy to Ava, p.111.
2. Gerinit Historical retrospect of Junkceylon island. 
Journal of the Siamese Society, p.60.
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to rally and effectively deploy the Siamese resources, 
and this combined with the implacable hostility of Ohiengmai. 
towards the t5m*mese meant that b-urma was never again to 
be in a position to repeat Hsinbyushin*s success.
Bodawpaya, however was not the sort of man to be 
sensible about matters affecting his prestige. He hims&f 
never took the field again for he concentrated his 
personal efforts on the erection and construction of 
vainglorious works of merit which called for the large- 
scale conscription of unpaid labour and resulted in 
depopulation and intense misery. He continued, however, 
to send expeditions. ,J-’hey were never again on the grand 
scale, and even the figures of the troops sent were 
officially exaggerated, for men like Oox who personally 
saw the troops being marshalled at the capital, noted 
that it was getting more and more difficult to reconcile 
official figures with actuality.
1 . For example, the Mingun pagoda, which was intended
to be the largest pagoda in the world, the construction 
of which after seven years was still not completed, 
though men vjorked ^ an -^ night, and the nat 
spirits were supposed to be helping (see Iiiram Coxs 
Journal of a Residence in the Burmhan Umpire, p.108) 
till finally someone took advantage of the king’s 
superstition, and spread a story to the effect that 
the completion of the pagoda meant his ruin; that 
stopped him.
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The ^iamese were more sensible, and confined them­
selves to frontier raids, and the instigation of border 
governors and vassal states to rebel. The two countries 
were really too we ale for one effectively to subdue the 
other, and the Burmese struggle with degenerated
into a series of raids and counter raids. In 1781 the 
Burmese, who still held Chiangsen and Chiengrai, sent an 
army to drive the Ohiengmai noble Kawila out of the area; 
but with the assistance of a Siamese force under the 
Maha Uparat (the heir-apparent of Siam), they were driven 
out. In the same year Siamese troops raided Tavoy, but 
they In turn were driven out.
In 1791? however, the Siamese policy of encouraging 
Burmese subjects to rebel bore fruit, and hostilities on 
a larger scale broke out once again. Nga Myat Pyu, the 
Governor of Tavoy was disappointed in not being promoted 
to the Governorship of Martaban on . the death of the 
incumbent, and invited the Siamese into the town. The 
Burmese king acting with traditional ferocity burnt 
Nga Myat Pyu1 s family alive; a strong force was sent 
out under the command of the crown prince, and at the 
first halting stage, Nga Myat Pyu1 s father, the Mekhaya Bo
1. Wood; History of Siam p.274-* Konbaungzet p.624.
was also burnt alive before the troops. Tavoy was ultim­
ately retaken. The whole incident serves to illustrate 
the futility of the struggle.
b'nce again in 1797 Bodawpaya sent an expedition to 
retake Chiengmai. He scraped together with much difficulty 
50*000 men'** and sent them off to march on Ohiengmai. 
Desertion was chronic by novj, and it is doubtful whether 
a third of them fought; the Burmese were again defeated 
and driven off. Burmese power in this region had ebbed 
away almost completely, and In 1802, the Burmese forces 
which had held on tenaciously to the desolated area round 
Ohiangseh and Chiengrai, were finally driven out.
The visible decline of Burmese power in the area, 
combined with their heavy exactions and extortions, proved 
too much for the long suffering Shans of Reng Tung, and 
once again the Siamese policy of specious promises bore 
fruit. The Keng Tung people^ now became pawns in the 
game of unending hostilities between Siam and Burma. They 
rose in rebellion under their princes and migrated en 
masse across the frontier to Chiengmai, where as had been 
promised, land was marked out for their settlements. But
 _____j --11 j T-. ~1 " ~r. ~n ‘ v_lrfmnr uxm_- ii_ Ji  S_____ n 1....... i n m_i_ ■ ~l '—------------- lili !■ Iii i 1 »iiiMiiiMi MW 111 nimi  i^ >~rn—m i wn "I' 1 — '
1. Hiram Coxs Journal of a Residence in the Eurmahan 
Empire p.118.
2. Crawfords Embassy to the Court of Ava,
Vol.II. p.59.
3. G.U.B. Vol.II. Part I, p.407. Macleod: J.A.S.B.
1837, P-991*
tliey found no peace there, and Macleod, who visited them 
in 1 8 3 6, found them hitter, frustrated people? the 
Siamese had used them as the Burmese had previously used 
the people of Chiengmai, to repair the ravage of enemy 
slave raids hy counter raids.
Bodawpaya1s policy of resuming hostile relations 
with ^iam in 1785 had, in the South, resulted in 
repercussions which led Burma to take a political interest 
in a region she had previously not bothered about. The 
invasion of 1785 "by the Burmese column starting off from 
Tavoy had necessitated the despatch of large bodies of 
Siamese troops into Hakon Sritammarat. The rapid collapse 
of the Burmese invasions left the troops free to undertake 
the task of enforcing Siamese suzerainty in parts of the 
Malay Peninsula, a region where since the fall of Ayudhya, 
Siamese influence had been practically nil.^
The Malay 'state of Kadah, being the nearest to 
Nakon Sritammarat, came first under Siamese pressure. It 
was forced to accede to heavy demands for men and supplies, 
and had to acknowledge Siamese suzerainty by the sending 
in of the traditional gold and silver trees of submission 
(the Bung a Mas). The Sultan looked round for help and
1. Woods History of Siam! p.275*
2. L.A#Millss British Malaya 1824-675 p*24.
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ceded the island of Penang in 1736, and in 1800 ceded 
province Wellesly on the mainland, to the East India 
Company hoping for British help. British help however, 
was not forthcoming in our period, and the Sultan had 
to look round for some other source of succour. It is 
in this connection that the Burmese record of an embassy 
from Yodaya (Siam) must he examined.
In Eebruary 1807, some Siamese subjects are reported 
to have arrived at Mingun with presents and letters.
I'he Konbaung chronicle then closes this incident and it 
is not mentioned in our period again. It is impossible 
to imagine that it was from Bangkok that the mission came 
for the Siamese never changed their hostile attitude 
towards Burma; it must have been from Kedah, for soon 
the Siamese were accusing Kedah of intriguing with Burma. 
Apparently the East India Company knew the fact§ and in .an 
excessively punctilious maimer informed the Siamese Governor
p
of Eakon Sritammarat to that effect.
The'* incident presented Bodawpaya with a welcome 
opportunity to harass the Siamese.
In I8O9 he sent ships to raid the Siamese coastal
1. Konbaungzet p.731*
2. L.A.Mills - British Malaya 1824-67* p.130.
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villages South of the Isthmus of Kra, and to invade Jurkcqyta 
The Burmese were driven out, hut he sent yet another, and 
in the years 1809-11 there were altogether four of these 
unsuccessful expeditions which later on brought fearful 
retribution on Kedah from Siam. I'he Burmese had no heart 
in these wars now; when they were recruited they would 
be tied hand and foot together, and such material was 
pitifully inadequate for the achievement of the conquests 
the king so passionately desired.
Friendly relations were never resumed between Siam 
and Burma. The Siamese were too prudent to carry out 
large scale invasions, but they did anything they could, 
from slave raids, propaganda inciting rebellion, and 
support?even though’ it might not be effective,of anyone 
who was the enemy of the Burmese, from the fugitive Mons 
to the East India Oompany. in 1814 they sent princes 
of the blood to escort the Mon fugitives into Siam (Maha 
MongKut later the king, in the famous book !Anna and
p
the king of Siam1 was one of them) ; in 1823 they planned 
to send an army under a Mon chief to help the British
1. Crawfords Embassy to the Court of Ava Vol.II, p. 159*
2. Halliday; Journal of the Siamese Society, Immigration
of the Mons into Siam, 1913*
1in the first Anglo-Burmese War; in 1836, Macleod 
found that even Shan subjects of Ava were not allowed to 
set foot in Siamese territory; in 1854- they carried out 
a great invasion of -^ engfung which was not successful, and 
in 1943 they joined the Japanese, and obtained Keng lung and 
Mong Pan from them as their payment.
Every aspect of Burma1 s relations with Siam in our 
period, is depressing. In the days of the loungoo 
dynasty, it was the everlasting unfriendliness of Burma*s 
relations with Siam that contributed so largely to that 
dynasty*s temporary collapse in 1 59 9* 3n h^e Konbaung 
dynasty, it was the same thing all over again. Canning, 
the. British Agent at Rangoon in 1809, found the misery of
p
the country beyond Ascription* Beserters unable to 
return to their villages roamed about in murderous gangs; 
the administration of the country almost collapsed, and 
all this was largely due to the boundless pretentions of 
the Burmese kings which had poisoned, the country’s rel­
ations with Siam. Burma might have collapsed, and much 
earlier if Mahafhihalhura had not exhibited rare indep­
endence in his negotiations with the Chinese in 1769, but 
fortunately for Burma he had,, and this opportunity for
1. Halliday - op.cit.
2. HallBur op e '" and - Burm& - p. 9 8 •
Chinese face saving, and the later intrigues of the 
Yunnan authorities combined to take advantage of the 
king’s vanity, and so channeled Burmese relations with 
China into a saner, more beneficial atmosphere#
The beneficent nature of Burma's relations with 
China in Bodawpaya’s reign was a later product, and came 
into effect only after 1788# fhe reign had opened with 
Sino-Burmese relations frozen on a note of hostility, and 
it did not start off' very well, evidence on the particular 
manner and style in which relations were resumed is to 
some extent contradictory. Colonel Burney1 the Burmese 
Resident at Ava, in 1836, states that he was given to 
understand that Bodawpaya had in 1781, deputed a small 
party for the purpose of opening a communication with 
China. G.E.Harvey , perhaps relying on his knowledge 
that Bodawpaya came to the throne in 1782, places 1782 
at the head of a string of dates of Burmese embassies to
China. E.H. Parker in treating of Burma’s relations with
Chrna^ during the period completely omits any mention of
either a I78I or 1782 mission. Li Ung Bin, the Chinese
1. J.A.S.B. 1837, p.405.
2. History of Burma, p.279-
3* E.H.Parker - Burma, Relations with China, p.91*
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historian, ■writes*1' "Misfortunes now fell upon Burmah.
Weakened by civil strife, she found herself completely
at the mercy of her neighbour and historic enemy, the
Siamese* Inasmuch as yiam had sent missions c£ tribute
to h^ina, Bhodo Phra, the new king of Burmah, thought that
the cheapest way for him to get out of the trouble would be
to follow her example * In 1788, he too sent an embassy
to h^ina; to pay tribiite, and to ask for pardon." The
Burmese chronicle for the period, the Ivonbaungzet, does
not mention any diplomatic mission in 1782. The Konbaungzet
2does, however, record a Burmese embassy in the year 1788.
The Let Ywe Gyi Emu (officer of the ^reat Company of 
picked men) Hemyo Shwe Taung, Thiha Kyaw Gaung and 
Welu Thaya were the mission officials sent. These 
envoys returned in January 1789 and in their report mention 
is made of the Burmese demand for the persons of the 
fugitive sawbwas and the six men, Hga Uh (probably Nga Oh) 
Nga Lhe G-ho, Ega Tsit To, Hga Tsit Li (possibly Chinese int-
— 7
erpreters) Nga Po Bin, and Nga Po Yi;^ who had been seized 
and sent to Tartary.
1. Li Ung Bin: Outlines of Chinese History p.452.
2. Konbaungzet, 'p^ SlF*
3. Burneys J.A.S.B. 1837, p.420.
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Thuss there does seem to have heen an embassy pre­
ceding the one of 17889 but it is obvious from the fact 
that the six men had been seized and kept imprisoned that 
the mission was not a tribute mission.
Now9 the Burmese do admit having sent an embassy
to Pekin in 1788, (it is said to have borne a letter
from the king addressed to the Emperor an"reply
to one from him which had been delivered by a Chinese
Embassy in 1787)* "The Chinese annals which are very
minute in all other details? do not give the text of the
1king’s letter;" this is surprising when one bears in 
mind that the Burmese monarch’s letter was very plainly 
an acknowledgement of one from the Chinese Emperor. It 
seems strange that such an important letter bearing a 
message of humble submission, a thing fox' which the 
Chinese had fought three very costly wars, and for which 
they had waited nearly 20 years, should not have been 
recorded in its entirety, just to prove to all that the 
king of Burma had indeed sent in his submission to the 
Son of Heaven.
The explanation would appear to be that the Chinese 
Shans of Kaingma and the Bhamo Sawbwa were acting in
1. E.H#Parker? Burma, Relations with China, p*91*
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collusion with the Chinese officials of Yunnan and 
Pekin to bamboozle "both Bodawpaya and Chien Lung. I'here 
are certain aspects in the behaviour of the Yunnan offic­
ials which would tend to support this view. In the first 
place, it is not without significance that the Burmese 
envoys, who were sent in 1 7 8 8, were kept waiting five 
months in Yunnan,^ before sanction was given by Pekin to 
let them proceed. Now this would be strange if it were 
really a Chinese embassy genuinely from Peking itself, 
for it must be remembered that the Chinese ambassador 
had brought what was supposed to be the Chinese TDmperor’s 
own letter, and would have returned straight from 
Jhna^ apimavto Pekin taking as a matter of course the 
Burmese with them without a delay that stretched into 
five months; after all, the Chinese had an excellent 
courier service which took only ten days to cover the
p
distance from Yunnan to Pekin. If however, the Chinese 
embassy of 17S7 had not been sent by the Lmperor, then 
the delay would be a natural one in the circumstances, 
for it woxxld be from an irritating and impertinent 
Burma, which had at last crawled in to submit, and which
1. Burneys J.A.S.B. 1837? p.414.
2. See Chapter six.
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therefore must be treated with a certain amount of dis­
pleasure at the beginning, and in any case the completion 
of proper arrangements would have taken a considerable 
time.
To reinforce one!s suspicion of the bona-fides ■ of 
the first Chinese embassy, the Ohinese ambassador did not 
accompany the -Burmese to Pekin, They were detained in 
Yunnan on various pretexts during which time presumably 
report of the arrival of a tribute-bearing -Burmese 
mission was sent to Pekin and Imperial orders awaited.
The Burmese envoys were sent off to Pekin with an escort 
from Yunnan, including an interpreter presumably chosen 
by Yunnan, . Once before the emperor, there would be no 
difficulty about the Burmese envoys behaving in a 
satisfactorily humble manner. The Ohinese demanded 
as a matter of course, the kow-tow from all non-Chinese 
nations, but they got it easily enough from Burmese 
envoys who were also junior officials. Bor example in 
1744- the king of ^urma sent an embassy to Ayudhya and 
on that occasion the Burmese envoys were willing to 
kow tow not only to the king of Ayudhya but to the
1senior ministers and generals of the Siamese king.
Actually the Burmese envoys not only kowtowed, but acceptec
1. Wood!s History of Siam, p.234* G.B.Harveys History
of Burma, p.214.
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the orders of the Chinese ministers to wait in the 
early mornings at stray corners, and then to offer, as 
instructed, the most fulsome flattery to Chien Lung*
A comparison of the dates on which Chinese embassies 
arrived at Amarapura with the dates on which the Chinese 
annals record any kind of communication from China to 
Amarapura might help to clear up this matter* The Burmese
I
account states that in 1787 a mission led by the brother 
of the lord of Kaing Ma arrived to arrange for the re­
sumption of friendly relations* In 179C another mission 
arrived at Amarapura with three Chinese princesses for
O 7
Bodawpaya*s harem. In 1795 another Chinese embassy^
arrived to ask Bodawpaya to recognize Chien Lung’s grandson
as the heir to the Chinese throne and to regard him as his
own brother or son.
.From the Chinese annals we may infer that a mission
from Burma arrived some years before 1 7 8 8, and since they
were seized and hurried away to Tartary, they could not
have been tribute bearers, because the first Burmese
embassy which was acceptable to Chien Lung arrived in 
41 7 8 8, and. was given an imperial letter and some presents.
1. Konbaungzet p.613- 
2* Ibid* p.6p8*
3* Ibid, p.6 7 2.
4. E.H.Parker, Burma, Relations with China, p.91*
3 2 0
This date tallies with that of the Burmese account. In 
1 7 9 0, the king of Burma was given a seal of investiture.
In 17915 the Eraperor sent some presents in acknowledgement 
of certain Chinese prisoners taken from the Blamese and 
restored to h^ina. In 1793, a Manchu seal for the 
Sawbwa of Manmu (Bhamo) was granted to the Bawbwa who 
explained that he made the application with the consent 
of the king of Burma. The Emperor replied in granting 
the seal5 that the king of Burma need entertain no 
suspicions as Manmu and Muh Pang (North Hsenwi) would of 
course continue to he subject to Burma, and that, the grant­
ing of seals to those two sawbwas was but an additional 
honour to Burma and to them. It is recorded in 17955 
that the Burmese sent a mission to congratulate the 
Emperor Chien Lung on the 60th anniversary of his reign, 
and also brought tribute. in 1796 the Emperor Kiaking 
censured the Viceroy of Yunnan for refusing a Burmese 
tribute mission on the grounds that it YJas not yet due, 
adding that 011 an occasion such as this, it was unnecess­
ary to adhere too strictly to the letter. The Emperor 
however sent some complimentary presents in acknowledge­
ment of his civility.'**
To add to the impression obtained from the dates, it
1. E.H.Parkers Burma, Relations with China pp.92-94.
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would be relevant to say from the Burmese records in 
Bodawpaya1 s reign (1782-1819) Burma sent, sometime before 
the 1788 embassy, a mission of some kind which definitely 
did not bear tribute; 'While in 1788 an embassy was sent 
in return to the one the Ohinese sent. In October 1792 > 
Bodawpaya sent an embassy with some vaTuable presents*
The Sawbwa of Bhamo was the chief envoy. In 1795 polite 
acknowledgement of the Emperor’s letter asking recognition 
for his grandson was sent. In 1798, an embassy was sent 
under a Sayedawgyi which was turned back at the frontier.
It is shown from this comparison of dates that both 
the coxn?ts of Ava (Amarapura) and Pekin were being 
fooled by some person or persons unknown.
The Emperor of China it is seen never sent any of 
the missions which arrived at Amarapura, and the Burmese 
mission of 1790 asking for investiture, and in 1795 'to 
congratulate the Emperor on the 60th anniversary of his 
reign were sent without the knowledge or at any rate, 
official sanction of the Burmese monarch.
The Burmese account of the 1787 Chinese embassy 
gives further proof of the bogus status of the embassy. In 
the Konbaungzet'1' it is given n0n Tuesday the Jrd. April 1787 
Mintayagyi (Great Lord of Righteousness - Bodawpaya)
1. Konbaungzet pp.613-22•
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received a report from the Sawbv^ a and officers of Hsenwi 
that a Chinese embassy consisting of tipwards of 3GO men 
with Etsoye as the chief envoy had arrived at Hsenwi with j 
a letter on gold and costly presents from the Emperor 
of China, for the purpose of establishing peace and 
friendship between the two great countries* Mintayagyi 
ordered the Chinese embassy to be conveyed to the capital. 11  ^
After the Chinese mission had been brought down to Amarapura 
and a translation of the letter made, a formal procession 
was made through the decorated streets of Amarapura 
with the letter and the chief envoy on elephants, and the 
junior envoys on horseback. At the She Ton (the j
Criminal Court) they dismounted and after the Ein-she-min 
(the heir apparent) had passed into the palace, the envoys | 
"stopping and kowtowing along the whole road in the usual > 
manner*1 followed. Now, this reference to the "kowtowing11 
in the "usual manner*1 is significant, for Imperial Chinese 
would never consent to kowtow to the palace of a vassal 
prince. The Burmese reference to the "usual manner11 meant 
that they regarded the Chinese as having come from a 
nation at most an equal, but certainly not Burma* s 
superior.
After Bodawpaya had made his ceremonial entry and the 
preliminary blessings from the ponnas had been pronounced,
i\
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and the dispatch of offering at the pagoda had been com­
pleted, the letter purporting to he from the Chinese 
Emperor (Udibwa) was read out. It ran as follows;
nThe elder brother, Udibwa (Emperor of .China) who 
rules over the great kingdoms to the eastward, and a 
multitude of umbrella-wearing chiefs, addresses affection­
ately his younger brother, the lord of the white, red and 
mottled elephants, who rules over the great kingdoms to 
the westward and a multitude of umbrella-wearing chiefs, 
lord of the amber mines, the sun-descended king and master 
of the golden palace. I'he ancestors of the two brothers 
have inherited and ruled in succession in this 2iabudipa 
island, lying to the southward of Myen 1110 mount, from the 
first creation of the world; and the two brothers are 
enjoying in the eastern and western great kingdoms, pros­
perity equal to that of the Thagya Nat, with very great 
glory, power and authority. Ihrom the time even of our 
ancestors there has been no enmity. The younger brother, 
the sun-descended king, is an independent sovereign, 
receiving the homage of great kingdoms, and of an hundred 
umbrella-wearing chiefs. The elder brother also- is an 
independent sovereign, receiving the homage of great 
kingdoms, and of an hundred umbrella-wearing chiefs. If the. 
two brothers enter into a permanent agreement and friendship,
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conformably to the union which has oexisted"; between them 
uninterruptedly in former states of existence, it will be 
like a nail driven in (as firm) to their posterity. 1’he 
elder brother, vhio possesses the great kingdoms, and the 
golden umbrella and palace to the eastward, as well as his 
queen, sons., daughters, nobles, officers, and the inhabit- 
ants of his country, are in the enjoyment of health, peace 
and happiness5 and he desires to learn that his younger 
brother, who possesses the great kingdoms and the golden 
umbrella and palace to the westward, the master of the 
golden palace, as well as his queen, eldest son the 
heir-apparent, his othei* sons and daughters, nobles, 
officers, and all the inhabitants of his country, are also 
in the enjoyment of health, peace and happiness.
l?or one reason, because freidnship has existed from 
former states of being? and for another, because the 
elder loves the younger brother, he sends with a royal 
letuer on gold, a piece of gold, and desires that two 
pieces of gold may become like this one piece. It is 
now seventeen years since the gold and silver road, and 
gold and silver bridge have not been opened or traversed, 
between the elder brother and younger brother, persuant . 
to the arrangement made in 1769, that ambassadors of rank 
should pass betv.een the two great countries, in order that
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a sincere freindship and esteem might arise. When friend­
ship has been established between the two great countries, 
each must receive favours from the other. xhe elder 
brother has in front of his palace and worships eight 
images of Byamha which it has been the custom to worship 
from the creation of the world; but loving the younger 
brother, and desiring that he., should worship in the same 
manner, the elder brother presents these images to the 
younger. If the younger brother worships them, his glory 
and power will be as resplendent as the rising sun. The 
son of the lord of Kaing Ma'V who wears a red umbrella 
and is always near the person of the elder brother, is sent 
to the younger brother with a royal letter on gold, and 
with the following presentss-
'Eight images of Byamah, cast in gold.
Bight carpets.
Ten pieces of gold cloth.
Ten horses.
Let the younger brother, master of the golden palace, delay 
not after the arrival of this ambassador in his presence, 
to appoint ambassadors on his part, and send them with a 
royal letter on gold. When the son of the lord of Kaing 
Mai returns to the elder brother, it will be the same as if 
the royal countenance of the younger brother, the master'of 
the golden palace, has been seen.1
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^ow the tone of this is not that, of a haughty Manchu
Emperor, ‘but of an equal, desiring to resume friendly
relations. Bodawpaya had no claims to suzerainty over-
China, and after the failure of his Siamese campaign of
1786 must have realized that he could not hope to conquer
China; the prudence his years of obscurity under Singu
had developed made him seize this opportunity to have a
* ,
friendly neighbour in a powerful China, which would leave 
him free for adventures elsewhere.
■^e deputed three Burmese envoys to accompany the 
Chinese mission to Pekin, and sent a letter, which did 
not beg for forgiveness or acknowledge the suzerainty of 
the Ohinese. The letter is as follows:'*’
nThe protector , of religion, the sun-descended king 
of righteousness, bearing the name and title of Thiri 
pawara wizaya nanta yatha tiri baw ah a ditiya dipadi pandita 
maha dhama raja diraja, owner of the white, red and 
mottled elephants, and proprietor of mines of gold, silver, 
rubies, and amber, who rules over the great kingdoms and 
all the umbrella-wearing chiefs of the westward, 
affectionately addresses the royal friend, the lord of the 
golden palace, who rules over the great kingdoms and all 
the umbrella-wearing chiefs to the eastward. Ho hav-.. / lin­
ing existed between the two great eastern and western '
1. Konbaungzet p.622*.
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kingdoms from the first creation of the world, and hoth 
being independent sovereigns who have possessed a golden 
umbrella and palace from generation to generation, and 
the homage of a multitude of umbrella-wearing chiefs, 
the royal friend deputed the son of the lord of Kaing Ma­
rch o arrived at the great and golden city of Amarapura on ' 
the 26th May 1787* The royal letter and the presents 
consisting of eight images of the A’batthara Byamha, ten 
carpets, ten pieces of gold cloth, and ten horses, having 
been arranged in front of the throne and hall of audience, 
his Majesty.^,; attended by the heir-apparent, his royal broth­
ers and sons, and all his officers, came forth and sat 
on the throne,, and caused the royal letter to be read 
out. His Majesty was exceedingly pleased to hear, that if 
a friendship like the union which has always existed in 
former states of existence between the kings of the two 
countries, and an agreement as fixed and permanent as a 
nail driven in, be entered into, it would be to posterity 
from generation to generation like two pieces of gold . 
convethjed into one (as inseparable); and also, that the 
royal friend, the lord of the golden palace himself and 
his queen, royal children, and relatives and all his officer 
are in.the enjoyment of health. The royal friend, lord of 
the golden palace, who rules over a hundred umbrella-wearing
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chiefs to the westward, is also in the enjoyment of 
health as well as his queen, heir-apparent, royal children, 
and relatives, and all his officers. Friendship which
a
had always existed in former states of existence, is now 
become a royal friendship. When the two great countries 
have established friendship, each must receive favours from 
the other. ' The eight images of ATbattharaByamha' which 
were sent with a desire that they might be worshipped by the 
royal friend, have been placed in a proper and suitable 
manner in front of the palace, tinder pyramidical buildings 
covered with gold and silver. Desire is also felt that 
approbation be given to the merit of constantly upholding 
and protecting the religion of the deity (Gautama), who 
is full of glory and power, who can give relief to the 
kings of men, Nats and Byamhas, who has no equal in the 
three worlds, and who' has been worshipped from generation 
to generation by the sun-descended independent kings, that 
have ruled over the great kingdoms to the westward.
Nemyo Shwedaung, a noble man who is in the immediate 
service of the royal friend, and Thiha KyawGaung and 
Weluthara have been appointed ambassadors to accompany 
the son of the' lord of Kaing Ma,.. and are deputed with a 
royal letter on gold and with royal presents, consisting 
of four elephants, one hundred viss weight of elephant1s 
teeth, an ivory helmet surmounted by a ruby, and another
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encircled with rubies and surmounted by a sapphire, two 
ruby rings, one sapphire ring, one viss weight of Mobye 
stone, one piece of yellow broad cloth, one piece of green 
broad cloth, ten pieces of chintz, two pieces of handker­
chiefs, ten carpets, one hundred books of gold leaf, one 
hundred books of silver leaf, ten viss weight of white 
perfume, four large lacquered-ware boxes, and fifty small 
lacquered-ware boxes. Let the ambassadors return, quickly 
and without delay, and when they return it will be as if the 
royal friend had been met, and conversed with.'*
If the purpose of this embassy had been to promote 
the resumption of friendly relations between China and 
Burma, then that was achieved. The Burmese king, in 
politeness could not but send some prisoners along with 
the embassy, and this combined with the extreme humility 
of the Burmese envoys presumably convinced the Chinese 
Emperor that Burma had indeed repented and reformed, and so 
all the surviving Burmese prisoners were ordered to be 
released and presumably the trade embargo lifted as well.
The next Chinese embassy to Amarapura is even more 
unlikely to be what it purported to be. This one arrived
o
at Bhamo in I79O and brought three Chinese girls who were
1. E.H,Parker; Burma, Relations with China, p.91*
2 . Konbaungzet p.6J8 .
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said to be daughters of the Emperor Chien Lung, Bodawpaya
of course was eager to accept them atftheir face value, for
the Chinese girls above all else would impress his subjects:
gifts of daughters being a.recognized Burmese sign of
submission, and the Burmese seem to have been suitably
impressed &ro5beft'Nemo S;ura (Nemyo Thuya) the Governor of
1Rarnree wrote to the British Governor General in 1818 
he referred to the Udibwa (Chinese. Emperor) "presenting 
three of his esteemed daughters as offering to the golden 
soles of the royal feet” of Bodawpaya* The significance 
of the second embassy would be to support the view that 
Bodawpaya did not regard himself as a vassal, and that 
the embassy was a fraud, for Chien Lung would never have 
dreamed of sending one, let alone three daughters to a 
Southern barbarian* like Bodawpaya*
Now, the Chinese account states, that Bodawpaya 
applied for investiture, after, with the Emperor*s per­
mission, the Viceroy of Yunnan promised rich rewards if 
he would send an embassy to congratulate the emperor on his 
80th birthday, and that a seal had been granted to ham 
conferring the title of king. There is no record of such
1. G.E.Harvey, History of Burma, p.291*
2* E.H.Parkers Burma, Relations with C^ina, p.93*
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a seal being received at Amarapura, .but it could be part of 
the presents which were brought with the princesses. It was 
reported to be a large gold seal, weighing ten pounds. It 
was supposed to give Bodawpaya the same power and authority 
that the Emperor himself possessed over every part of the 
Chinese Empire. Chien Lung would of course be in fits 
before he would dream of doing any such thing, but the 
seal would be regarded on the occasion of daughters being 
presented as a very suitable and natural gesture, by 
Bodawpaya.
t
With regard to the application by the Sawbwa of Bhamo, 
the sanction of the Burmese king is extremely unlikely.
In the first place it would be quite unnecessary from the 
point of view of Amarapura, even if he had been a vassal 
king and secondly Bodawpaya had demonstrated in the case 
of Nga My at Byu, the rebel governor of Tavoy, what his 
attitude would be in such a case.
Bhamo, it will be remembered, is a frontier state 
right on the borders of Yunnan. It was the first state to 
be attacked by the Chinese in all their invasions, and 
was exceedingly vulnerable to Chinese pressure from Yunnan. 
The embargo on trade affected considerably its prosperity, 
for Bhamo town was the main exchange centre for Burmese 
and Chinese goods. The transit trade was a large factor
1. Burney, J.A.S.B. 1837, P*^3^
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in the Bhamo Sawbwa*s revenue. He could easily have 
succumbed in view of all this, to threats or pressure from 
Xunnan, to force him to "become a tool of the Ohinese who 
desired to trick the Burmese into an admission of vassalage, 
enjoy the "benefits of restimed trade, and gain the favour 
of Qhien Lung "by the sending in of Burmese missions 
of tribute.
The suspicion that Bhamo was an agent "becomes a cer­
tainty, when we find that the Sawbvja of Bhamo, a man of 
unprepossessing appearance and behaviour,^ was seized and 
imprisoned by Bodawpaya.
In 1795) & Chinese mission which Symes met, arrived at
Amarapura to ask Bodawpaya to recognize Ohien Lung*s grand­
pa
son as the Chinese heir apparent. Even Symes who is not
noted for penetration on this embassy was convinced that
3the Ohinese embassy could not have come from Pekin. Symes. 
was right, for the Burmese themselves grew suspicious.
In March 1790, the Sawbwa of Bhamo on suspicion of 
having imposed on the king in the affair of the Chinese
1. Hiram Goxs Journal of a Residence in the Burmhman 
Empire, p.102.
2. Konbaungzet p.462.
3. Symest Embassy to Ava. p.299*
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1-ambassadors w/as anrested and imprisoned.
2In April 17969 a Sayedawgyi was sent to China to 
enquire, hut was refused permission to proceed to Pekin; 
an insurrection it was said prevented his travelling.
This must have 'been the refused tribute mission about which 
Kiaking the new Chinese Emperor censured the Yunnan Vice­
roy.
After 1796 Bodawpaya sent no more embassies. His 
pride was hurt, but he had to keep up appearances, and 
also, he could not afford hostilities. Whatever it was 
that brought about the resumption of friendly relations 
between China and Burma, Bodawrpaya was prudent enough to
keep relations friendly,, and trade was resumed. Annual
caravans of 400 oxen or 2,000 ponies brought down silks, 
raw silks, velvet, tea, gold leaf, hams, copper, steel, 
mercury, large quantities of needle and thread, and paper. 
The Burmese now had a market for their surplus cotton, 
and the Ohinese merchants soon formed a large colony in 
Amarapxxra which bought up the cotton, salt, birds feathers 
and lac. f'he .Chinese were now able to open up the various 
mines, a task for which there was no incentive before, 
and which the Burmese did not undertake.
1. Hiram Ooxs op.cit. p. 14*2.
2. Hiram Coxs op.cit. p.34-0.
3. In 1824 silk import was worth about 71?000 ticals of 
silver.
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In 179S5 the Chinese traders at Amarapura, with the
assistance of the Burmese Government opened up a new 1*0Lite
to the jade mines, via Monywa and up the Chindwin, and
the jade trade developed rapidly, The Burmese profited
from this, and they established a collect ornate at Mogaung
1to protect the trade and collect royalties.
The picture of Bodawpaya1 s relations with China is a 
refreshing contrast to his Siamese relations. Circumspection 
and moderation resulted in nothing but good. The Chinese,
the most energetic and capable merchants, were able to 
settle in Burma, and the natural friendliness of the 
Burmese was ultimately to absorb this valuable community 
for the benefit of Burma. In the 20th century, the 
greatest merchant princes of Burma were Chinese - Chan Ma 
Phee and Xdxn Ching Tsong. They were Burmanised Chinese, 
and had Burmese wives. Their children were brought up 
as Burmese^  as were almost all other Chinese in Burxaa since 
Bodawpaya* s time, and by the third generation, the descend­
ants were completely Burmese* There is in England today, 
a grandson of Chan Ma Phee, who regards himself as a 
Burmese, and speaks only Burmese. My own grandfather was 
a pure Chinese and yet I would not even begin to dream of 
regarding myself as anything but a Burman.
1. Warry. G.U.B. Part I, Vol.II, p.280
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It is on this note that this account of Burma’s 
relations with her Eastern neighbours must end, for the 
West was already looming menacingly on the horizon of all 
three* All three were to challenge by making an attempt eat 
conducting their relations with the West in the traditional 
pattern* In Burma we have the Burmese raiding the frontier 
of British East India; in Ohina we have the snubbing of 
Lord Macartney and Lord Elgin’s embassies, and the attempt 
to exploit the West through the co~hong system of trading; 
and in Siam, the Siamese clashed with Britain over control 
of the Malay states. Iheir challenge was to have disastrous 
repercussions, and in time the European entry took such 
a large place in Chinese, Burmese, and Siamese affairs 
that the traditional relations of these countries, one 
with the other, lapsed and slid unnoticed into,the farthest 
background.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Burmese sour ce s *
1. Hmannan Yazawin ( 5 volumes Mandalay I9O8) .
The compilers were the palace officials of
Bagyidaw’s reign and they started the work on the
order of the king in 1829* They did their Best, hut 
1as Mr. Luce says..y they proceeded on the king’s orders 
to eke out what scanty materials they had in the shape 
of inscriptions which- they could not read properly, 
.with fiction, ©tories Borrowed from the Jatakas,
t
miracles, portents which incidentally the chroniclers 
of 1829 still Believed in when they wrote.
•The -Burmese seem to have gone wrong mostly in 
detail, and that in varying degrees of error; for from 
Chinese accounts of the Pyu who preceded the Pagan, 
there -is a large similarity Between the life of the 
pre-pagan Pyu king, and say that of Bayinnaung. I 
have not, however relied on the Hmannan except to give 
the colour provided for a Background to my period, and 
even then I have relied on checks from the Chinese 
and from modern readings of the inscriptions. The
1. Journal of the Burma Research Society Vol.32, Part IX,
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main cause of unreliability seems to have been the 
lack of provisions by private individuals for the 
achievement of continuity# The Burmese v^ ere a liter­
ate race, probably more so in the days of the -Burmese 
kings than at present, but the frequent sack of 
capitals and the rise of new dynasties on the ashes 
of the old, when all the eggs of literary evidences 
were .confined in the palace, certainly contributed to 
the errors of the Hmannan#
It is stated that the Hmannan chroniclers wrote 
their annals to the year 1821^  and in 1867 Mindon 
ordered the Kanni A twin Vvun Mingy i Maha Min Knaung 
Thinkaya, the Nanma Daw Pay a Wun (minister of the 
Nanmadaw Queen), the -^ oyal Librarian Maha Thiri 
Zeyathu, the Atwin Wun of the Heir-Apparent Maha 
Minhla Thinkaya, the Sayegyi Minhla Zeyathu, and 
the Saye Daw Hemyo Sithu Xaza to resume the narrative 
from where the compilers of the Hmannan left off*
2. The konbaungzet, (published by the Pinrayaing Kin Le* 
Mandalay 1905)*
The Kohbaungzdt therefore in the chapters that 
deal with the period previous to 1821, the konbaung is
1. Konbaungzet p#905*
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largely the work of the 1829 compilers. The style 
and tone however is difficult to distinguish; the 
only distinguishing mark of the later chapters, i.e. 
the chapters dealing with the Mindon and Thihaw 
periods, is the elaborate treatment given to com- 
paritively unimportant affairs, which reads hadly 
after the fiery gusto of the earlier chapters.
After the 1869 compilers took up the task of 
compiling the Mahayazawin (the Great Chronicle of the 
kings) and carried the narrative to 1854 after which 
though it were collected material was not sifted and 
arranged to go into the Mahayazawin. It is from 
this point that U Tin the compiler of this Mandalay 
edition of the konbaungzet Mahayazawin takes up the 
task.
U Tin was the son of the Myinlimu Mintha (the
Prince commander of the horse) and served in the
Burmese court, under Thibaw. Ke showed Mr. G.H.Luce,
1the manuscripts in his possession for part of the 
period 1854 to 1886. The manuscripts were supposed 
to be practically identical with those which the 
Monywe'Sayadaw possessed which argues that U Tin*s 
sources were official records or diaries. U Tet Htoot
G.H. Luce, J.B.R.S. Vol.15. Part II.
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who has "been living in Bloomsbury through the last 
fifteen years has shown me parts of the Monywe Sayadaw1 s 
palm leaf manuscripts, and I have found this to be 
true. U let Htoot incidentally is a relative of the 
Monywe Sayadaw and himself comes from the Upper burma 
village of Marywe, near Monywa.
The main argument against the Konbaungset
Mahayazawin is made by Crawford"1" who gives his
telescoped version of the Burmese account of the
Anglo-Burmese war of 1824-26. 1‘he Konbaungzet actually
2gives eighty pages to the war and though the humxl- 
iation of defeat is toned down by the flowery palace 
language, the picture of defeat is clear enough. I 
hold no special brief for the Konbaungzet, but it 
should be remembered that the Japanese Emperor Hirohito 
in his eve of surrender broadcast used almost the same 
phrases that CrawfBrd holds up to such derision. The 
point is that though no one was ejected to believe in 
the flowery explanation of defeat, it was not quite 
proper to set such total defeat in plain words.
Mr. Gr.E.Harvey^  questions the accuracy of the
1. Crawf&rds , Embassy to. the Court of Ava Vol.I, p.p04.
2. pp.944-1064.
3. G. £, f-Urve-u’ p355.H.£st}vy of fW-m.**.,
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Konbaungzet for even Alaungpaya* s period, on the 
accusation that on page 141 of the Mandalay edition, 
Lester* s Embassy to-2^ en3£S&y is placed in 1755 whereas 
it was really in 1757* Now, on this occasion, at any 
rate the accusation is unfounded*, the Konbaungzet on 
page 141 only refers to some arms and presents which 
it is said Alaungpaya obtained from some English ships 
It is only the Burmese Chronicle’s way of recording 
the fact that in May 1755 “ the date in question - 
Alaungpaya, finding three small ships in Rangoon 
harbour after he had caputred the town,, sent men to. 
seize their cannon, small arms and ammunition; Mr, 
Harley himself gives the account of this arbitrary 
action on page 224 of his book* Generally, the dates 
given of the main events apart from the Negrais 
massacre of 1759* are confirmed by non-Burmese 
sources*
'there is a convincing ring about some of 
Alaungpaya* s, Hsinbyushin1 s and Minkhaung Nawrahta* s 
reported words, and some of the defeats in battle 
are quite plainly admitted. the Konbaungzet has many 
limitations of style and matter, but on the whole, it 
is a valuable source book.
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Myamma Min OkchoHPon Sadan - with Appendix to King 
Bodawphaya’s Yazathat Hkaw "Ame indaw langyi1 compiled 
by U Tin ™ in five volumes, Rangoon 1931* (A 
treatise on the Administration of the Burmese Kings) .
U Tin was appointed by Sir Reginald Graddock 
in 1925 to catalogue the enormous amount of Sit tans 
(sworn statements giving particulars of administration) 
and palm leaf manuscripts, some of them 200 years old, 
which the Rangoon Secretariat then possessed# He 
spent some years on the task and ultimately from his 
selection of all relevant data, including modern 
■editions of the !Inscriptions1 U Tin produced this 
work. U Tin did not know the English language but 
his method of comparison, collation and sifting has 
a competent air about it all# He bases his work 
on various royal edicts on palm leaf and stone. His 
only fault is that he tends to accept sometimes the 
authority of fairly modern works to support aspects 
of his work.
Selections from the Records of the Hluttaw by Taw 
Sein Kho, Rangoon 1889#
The selections are largely of ThibawTs period, 
but is useful because it offers proof that in 
Thibaw's time, the system of Administration in Burma
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was still "based on the same conception of govexxnance, 
as in the earlier Konbaxmg period, and also because 
it indicated that nominal control was still exercised 
over the Shan States as far East as Keng Hungo 
Inscriptions - six volumes published. Rangoon.
The first volume dealing with the inscriptions 
of Pagan, Pinya and Ava published in 1892.
Letwe Thondara* s Theninga Byuha Sit Thamainge (A 
treatise on the Art of war) published Rangoon 194J.
It is a modern edition based on palm leaf manu­
scripts. Letwethondara was the great poet who 
served the Konbaung kings, and it offers a picture 
of the theoretical basis of the Burmese military 
system.
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APmmix a.
The Burmese Era,
The introduction of the Burmese Era is traditionally 
assigned to Popa Sawrahan who ruled in Pagan^ 15 - 40* It 
started in March 638. The months are Burrnan consisting 
alternately of 29 and 3^  days and an intercalatory month 
is added every third year, to make up for the difference 
viith the solar year.
In 1440 Mohyyin Thado (1427-40) made an alteration 
in the calender, and at present, the Burmese New Year 
starts on the 12th of April, Beginning when the sun 
finishes its course through the caliptic*
34-8
APB^NDIX B.
.*s original 68 followers.
MIN HLA SITHU (son of the sister of Alaungpaya*s
Chief C-iueen) •
NGA NYON later MIN' HLA KYAW THU, later
MIN YE MIN KYAW - the.Ava General 
(husband, of his sister-in-law).
NGA KAUNG later MIN KYAW PYANCHI MINHM
MIN KHAUNG, later MINHLA MIN KBAUNG 
KYAW, later MAHA TffiDNAPATI, and 
finally AGGA MAHA THENAPATI, 
Commander of the Muslteteers.
NGA OH later MIN YE KYAW SWA.
NGA NE later MIN YE SI THU (Alaungpaya*s
nephew).
NGA HTUN later THIRI SHWE TAUNG, later
MINHLA SHWE TAUNG, later MINHEA MIN 
KHAUNG, and finally the famous 
MIN KHAUNG NAWRABTA.
KHTN BA later YE SET KYAW KHAUNG.
KYAW HMAT later YE SET TAGUN.
PAN HTWE later BALA KYAW KHAUNG, later MIN
YE KYAW HTUT.
PEIN KYAW later MIN'HLA KYAW KHAUNG.
NGA AUNG later THIRI KYAW HTIN.
L U N  THA later MIN YE KYAW HTIN.
NGA MYA later NANDA KYAW, later MIN KYAW
THEIKDI, later BALA ZEYA KYAW HTIN, 
later ABAY.A KARKANI THUYA, later 
THUYA KYAW HTIN, later KARMAN1 
THINKYAN, later NEMYO THII1A THINK- 
HATHU.
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14-) NGA HTAW AUNG later EINDA BIHNYA.
15) NGA HTUN YA later MINHLA KYAW SWA
16) NGA ET later SETYA PYANCI-II.
17) THA MYAT later THIRI PYAN'CHI, later MIN KYAW
PYANCHI.
18) NGA AUNG NGB later YE HTIN PYANGHI.
19) SAN KHE later IN YIN TUYIN.
20) SAN HMAT later YAN NAINO THIRI, later LET WE
KYAN TIIAING, later BANDU THENA KYAW 
HTIN, later liHNGYI PYISSAW TA, 
finally YAZA OTTAMA THINKYAN.
22) PAW HTIN later NGYi/B TAUNG PAW, later
TAUNG KYAW SWA, later SHWE TAUNG 
KYAW SWA KYAW, and finally THIRI 
ZEYA THINKYAN.
23) NGA PAN NYO later NARATHEINKHA KYAW, later
KYAW HTIN SHWE TAUNG, later THIRI 
NANDAMEJ.T KYAW HTIN, later KYAW 
HTIN TARABYA, later MAHA TAKABYA.
24-) SIOTE YI later BALA ZEYA KYAW, later MINKYAW
SITHU, later NE MYO NAWRAHTA, later , 
MINGYI KHAUNG KYAW, later MAHA TII1RI 
ZEYA THUYA, later OTTAMO ZEYA THUYA, 
later THADO MAHA THETTAWSHE.
25) THA TUN AUNG later TUYIN BALA.
26) NGA THA later MINHLA YAZA, later MIN KYAW
HTIN, later MAHA THIKATHU, later 
MAHA THIRI THIKATHU, finally 
MAHA THIHA THURA (the great general . 
of the Chinese Invasions).
27) NGA THWIN later MIN NGE KYAW, MIN YE NANDA
THU, later THABO THIHA KYAW (the 
son of Alaungpaya1 s sister-in-iavj) .
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28) PHYO THA
29) KYAW HTIN
30) SHWE Yl
31) MYAT THU
32) KYAW ZAN
33) NGA HTYffi
34) SHIN NGON
35) MYAT THA
36), SHWE KHE
37) MYAT HTUN
38) CHIT PHYO
39) NGA HNATJNG
40) NGA THA TIN
later UDEIN YE NA1NG, later LET YA 
KYAW TIIAING, later LETYA KYAW SWA, 
later M1NGYI MAHA WITHA.
later YAN AUNG THENA.
later NASA PYANCHI KYAW, later 
SHWE TAUNG ZEYA KYAW, later SHWE 
TAUNG SITIIU.
later 1ETWE SHWE TAUNG, MIN KYAW 
TA SAUNG.
later NANDA KYAW HTIN, later MIN 
KYAW UDEIN, later M1NGYI KYAW HTIN, 
later MIN GYI MIN KYAW KHAUNG, later 
MAHA THIRl ZEYA KYAW THU, later 
MAHA YAZA THINKYAN,later MAHA THIRI 
ZEYA THINKAYA.
later NANDA THIHA, later NANDA 
THIHA KYAW HTIN.
later MIN KYAW HTIN, later MIN YE 
KYAW, later MIN Y8 KYAW HTIN 
(grandson of Alaungpaya’s uncle).
later ZEYA KYAW HTIN, later NEMYO . 
THINKAYA.
later SIT GAUNG THIRI, later SIT 
GAUNG THIRI KYAW, later MINGY1 
KYAW,' later OTTAMA'THIRI THINKAYA.
later MIN KYAW BINNYA, later MIN 
KYAW AGA, later MIN KYAW NAWRAHTA, 
later MAHA NANDA THINKYAN.
later BALA YAZA, later MINGYI YAZA, 
later OTTAMA YAZA.
later LETYA KYAW HTIN, later 
MINHLA NAYJRAHTA, later MINGYI MIN 
KHAUNG, finally MAHA SITHU (the 
general of the Chinese invasions)
later NANDA KYAW.
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41) SAN YA
42) NGA THAW
43) THA U
44) NGA BWE
45) NGA NYO THU
46)' SU TAUNG
47) LUN KYAW
48) NGA LWIN
49) NGA AUNG
50) SWE NX
.51) NGA PAN
52) SHWE HTIN
53) CHIN TI
54) NYO MIN
later LETYA PYANCHI, later MINDIN 
PYANCIII, later MINGYI KARMANI SANDA.
later NEMYO NANDA MBIT, later 
MINGYI NANDA YIT.
later GA NA BALA, later SHWE TAUNG . 
THINKHAWE. :
later YAN KHWIN KYAW, later TUYIN 
THIHA KYAW, later THIRI YAZA MIN 
KYAW, later NEMYO ZEYA THINKYAN 
later NEMYO KYAW HTIN THIN KHAYA-
later MINDIN NAWRAHTA.
later TULUT KYAW, later MINNGB 
BALA, later THET SHE KYAW HTIN, 
later THlRI THIHATHU, later 
NEMYO THIHA KYAW HTIN.
later MINNGE KYAW SWA.
later YE KYAW THUYA, later BALA 
MINDIN (later the great defender 
of KAUNGTON) later BALA NAWRAHTA.
later UDEIN NAN THU, later NANDA ' 
IOJTTA THINKYAN.
later MINHLA NGE.
later NANDA YAW DA, later THETTAW 
SHE, later MINGYI THETTAWHHE, later 
THADO MINGYI THETTAWSHE.
later. NEMYO KYAW HTIN (a Wungyi 
.in Alaungpaya1 s time) .
later MINHLA KYAW HTIN, later MINGYI 
KYAW HTIN,.. later MAHA PAKYAN, later. 
MAHA OTTAMA PAKYAN MAHA NANDA THIN­
KYAN,' later MAHA OTTAMA ZEYA THUYA-;
later MIN KYAW SHWE' TAUNG (one 
of Alaungpaya's V/ungyis) .
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55) NGA PW1NT later NEMYO SHWE TAUNG, later 
MIN HLA SHWE TAUNG, later NEMYO 
THIRI ZEYA NAWRAHTA (ore of 
AiaunRpava* s u^ns'vis) ♦
Though there was not a hereditary aristocracy it is 
seen from the list that the villagers of Molts oho had a 
large share of office and power in the Kohbaung dynasty.
Maha Thiha Thura it will he noticed was a Wungyi right down 
to Bodawpaya*s reign.
Nemyo Zeya Karmani was Governor of Ava, through 
Alaungpaya, Naungdawgyi, Hsinhyushin and Singu’s reigns, 
and then became a Wungyi in Bodawpaya's reign.
Nemyo Thihapate who became a Wungyi in Singu*s time 
had a son who also became a Wungyi - the Kyi Wungyi whom 
Colonel Burney met in Bagyidaw1 s reign. ” '
The Governor of Tavoy My at Phyu was the son of 
Mekhaya Bo.
Thus though there was no definite rules of succession, 
family influence, especially of the families who came 
from Moksobo did provide the Burmese court with a kind of 
aristocracy. The marriages, of the kings with their 
ministers* daughters would also create another claim for 
hereditary succession to office.
APPEND IK 0*
The Gwe.
Prom the Journal of the Burma Research Society
Vol. 15, Part II, by Mr.'G. Harvey.
vf(Jangoma i.e. Chiengmai is) very ill neigboured by 
the Gueoni (Paulus Venetus giveth them the name Gaugigii) who 
possess the mountains, whence falling in great companies to 
hunt for men whom they take and eat, they commit cruel but- 
cheries amongst them” (book III p.214 of Heylyn nCosmographie 
in Pour Books1 publ. London 1669, Bodleian Radcliffe C. 13). 
Mr. W*A,Wood, H.B*M.*s Consul General, Chiengmai, writes to 
me i nIhe Laos placed themselves under Siamese protection- 
in order to defend themselves against the hill people called 
nGueoniiT who used to'eat their* captives. In early times 
the most numerous fhill people* were presumably the Lawas 
(Was) who are supposed to have been the aboriginal inhabit­
ants of a great part of Siam, I do not know whether the Was 
were ever very numerous in Burma and the Sahn states, but 1 
suggest the possibility that Gwe,= Lawa or Wa.* *
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The Burmese mention two colonies, one at Awaing near 
Pegu town who in 1740 set up, as king of Pegu, Smim Htaw 
Buddhaketi (see para 12 "below) - these are called G-we Karen 
(Hmannan III. 382)$ the other at Okpo near Madaya 
in Mandalay district who had as leader one G-we-gonna-ein and 
rebelled against the king of Ava in 1747 - these are called 
Owe in Hmannan III. 393 but Gwe Law a (Lawa =
Wa or Wild Wa) throughoxit Konbaungzet, e.g* p-71-
Bo Htwan, an old officer of the late Sawbwa of North 
Ilsenwi, tells me there is a Mong Kwi north east of Kokang 
in North Hsenwi state, the G^ fnese call it Mong Kuei, and it 
is the home of very yjild Shan layoks and dacoits.
The Board of Officials, Hsenwi, tell me a race called 
Kwi are found, but not very commonly, in Kongtung and in 
Xawnglong, Wa States, and they resemble in appearance 
the Ojiinese inhabiting the hilly planes in the Hsenwi States
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The Chinese authorities quoted by Mr. luce give the 
name of the Kuei (Gwe) leader1 s wife as Nang Ku or Nang 
Oh an. Either form is ordinary as a Shan woman’s name.
U Shwe Lj_n, a retired pleader aged 84 living at Paung, 
Thaton district, writes to me "When transcribing palm leaf 
MSS as Gwe . They are a separate race scattered over
the hills in Lower Burma, chiefly near Shwegyin, Toungoo, in 
the Hlaingbwe township, and east of the Salween. They 
are a boorish race. They live by manufacturing dahs and 
spears and they are experts at steel work. They speak a 
distinct language and are neither Karens nor Talaings.
They owned no allegiance to the Talaing king of Pegu.1 1 
made enquiries of district officers in the places mentioned 
by U Shwe l»in but none had ever heard of the Gwe*
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APPENDIX D
The four reasons for the sending of Embassies2 
from the M.M*0*S* VqI.II. pp.104»
1) For the eventual subjugation of the other king*
2) (Thinking that he is about to wage war, to find out
his intentions.
5) To overawe and terrify the other side.
4) To enquire about the other king's marvels, and to
open trade negotiations*
The thirteen causes of war: from M*M*0*S. Vol.I p*178.
1) Boundary disputes.
2) Desire for riches (loot)*
5) Desire for good elephants and horses.
4) Desire for princesses.
5) At a third party’s instigation*
6) Treachery.
7) Disregard of embassies.
8) Attacks on the race*
9) Inefficiency of the king's arrangements for defence.
10) Lack of brave soldiers.
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11) Trade disputes.
12) Vindictiveness.
13) Anger.
